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FOREWORD 
In this study my intention has been to analyse the operation plans 
made by the Red Army for the Finnish theatre of war in the eve of and 
during the Second World War. During my visits in Russia to research 
in the former Soviet archives it was not possible to see the origi-
nal plans for operations. It was pointed out to me that the "ground 
level vegetation" is still the same in the border areas of Russia and 
Finland. This, of course, was a friendly way of saying to me that the 
legislation still forbids of giving those materials for researchers. 
On the other hand, since about 1988, it has been possible to 
research other materials of the Red Army. The battle orders of the 
operations which were realised are mostly available, as are the direc-
tives for planning issued by the Commissariat of Defence and by the 
High Command or Stavka. And basing the study on these materi-
als it is now possible to see both the general ideas of the planned 
operations and the solutions which were then chosen at the lower 
levels of decision. Some of the more important Stavka directives are 
not available but their content can be deduced from the lower level 
decisions and orders. 
The above referred "vegetation" remained of course the same 
in Finland and in her border areas. The front lines, from which the 
operations were started, changed, and this in turn changed the ob-
jectives which could be put on the paper, for a front (or army group), 
for an army, for an army corps or a division. Some more roads and 
railways were built during the war, but this did not change the over-
all picture of the theatre. The main problem for the Red Army seems 
to have been the scarcity of available roads to move the troops and 
the difficulty of getting logistic support to the fighting armies. 
Many of the operations which were planned were never re-
alised, because the military capability needed was lacking or the 
high command looked for a political solution of the crisis. On the 
other hand the knowledge of the plans presented in this book gives, 
I hope, material for discussion of the great political decisions, too. 
I wish to present my thanks to the friendly officials of the mili-
tary and naval archives in Sanct Peterburg, Gatchina, Moscow and 
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Podolsk, whom I have been able to consult during these 15 years, to 
my colleagues in Russia and Finland, to the translators Ms. Laura 
Loikkanen and Mr. Malcolm Hicks and to Ms. Marjo Grönroos who 
has produced the maps for this book. 
In Helsinki, December 6"', 2004 
Ohto Manninen, Professor of Military History 
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1. The first phase of the Winter War 
The Soviet Union's assessment of the threat to its territory remained 
quite constant throughout the late 1930s, and the operative plan for 
1939 began on the assumption that Germany and Poland would at-
tack the Soviet Union simultaneously from the west - with the prob-
able participation of the Italian navy - while Japan would attack from 
the east. It was estimated that Estonia, Latvia, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Turkey and Finland would join the war only if the operations of the 
Red Army and the Red Navy did not meet with success from the 
outset. 1  
The general guidelines (or directives) for the Soviet war plans, 
as proposed by the General Staff, were approved by the Soviet gov-
ernment, the Council of People's Commissars, the Defence Commit-
tee of which was chaired by the Prime Minister, V.M. Molotov. The 
activities of the Red Army were directed by the Main War Council of 
the People's Commissariat for Defence, People's Commissar K. Vo-
roshilov, and the activities of the Red Navy by the Main War Coun-
cil of the People's Commissariat for the Navy, People's Commissar 
N.G. Kuznetsov. It was part of the system that the central committee 
of the Party and its Politburo voiced their opinions when decisions 
concerning important policies were made. An important position as 
far as operative planning was concerned was occupied by the Gen-
eral Staff of the Red Army, under Army Commander (1st class) B.M. 
Shaposhnikov (1937-1940), while the chief of the General Staff of 
the Navy was Flagman (2nd class) L.M. Galler (1938-1940). 
In a memo that he drew up in 1937, Marshall M.N. Tukhatshevs-
ki foresaw that if war broke out, the Soviet Union would first have 
to seize Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and then advance to the line 
Grodno - Slonim in Poland. Battleships would have to be built for 
the Navy, and naval bases would have to be procured for these (Tal-
linn, Riga,Vindava and Libau). These plans bear a close resemblance 
to the action that Stalin took in September 1939, when the Second 
World War had broken out. On the other hand, Tukhatshevski con-
sidered Finland to be a separate issue from the events of Central 
Europe, and one for which a separate war plan would have to be 
made.2 
It was not widely believed in the Soviet Union that Finland 
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would attempt an invasion. Finland's total population was 3 650 000 
people, i.e. equal to that of Leningrad, and it was not capable of 
any extensive offensive actions on its own. However, as the threat 
of a world war grew, the Soviet Union did take Finland into account 
as a route for an attack directed at it. According to the memoirs of 
K.A. Meretskov, who was Commander of the Leningrad Military 
District at the time, Stalin's description of the situation at the end 
of June 1939 was that Germany was"ready to attack her neighbours, 
e.g. Poland and the Soviet Union, from any direction. Finland could 
easily become the bridgehead of the anti-Soviet actions of either of 
the main bourgeois-imperialist groups - the Germans or the Brit-
ish-French-American bloc. It was also possible that the blocs might 
agree on a joint attack against the Soviet Union, whereupon Finland 
would become small change in a game in which others would urge 
it to attack us as the champion of the Great War." 
Certain writers have maintained that the Soviet leadership 
suspected the Finnish government of being ready"to benefit at the 
Soviet Union's expense if Japan were to attack the Soviet Union, 
or if any intervention against the Soviet Union were to take place." 
Moscow held the belief that the Finnish army would act only in a 
protective capacity, its most important task being to secure the free 
strategic concentration and organization of strong foreign troops for 
the invasion of the Soviet Union, and especially for the seizing of 
Leningrad. On the other hand - as noted above - the directives is-
sued to the Leningrad Military District started out in 1939 from the 
assumption that Finland was likely to join the war only if the situa-
tion was disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. The Finns had been 
told several times in threatening terms that the Soviet Union would 
not wait for the intervening troops at the Finnish border.' 
Finland's defence plan was based on the idea that the Soviet 
Union's main attack would come from the direction of the Karelian 
Isthmus. The numerous waterways of the Ist1unus would direct the 
attack into narrow passages, and the idea was to stop the enemy 
at a line where the lakes in the middle part of the Isthmus and the 
River Vuoksi would cause congestion among the troops and their 
action potential would be weakened. The main defences, strength-
ened with permanent fortifications, were built along this line. By the 
beginning of the Winter War 101 concrete defence posts had been 
installed or rebuilt there, to form what came to be known as the 
Mannerheim Line. By comparison, the often mentioned Maginot 
Line in the French defence zone had 5 800 concrete fortifications in 
an area only slightly longer, along the border between France and 
Germany.`` 
In the light of the directives issued to the Leningrad Military 
District in the 1930s, it can be deduced that an offensive was being 
planned and that it was calculated that Helsinki could be reached in 
three weeks. The main attack was to proceed through the Karelian 
Isthmus and Viipuri (now Vyborg) to Hämeenlinna and Helsinki. 
There would be an attempt to attack from the northern shore of 
Lake Ladoga through Sortavala and Mikkeli to reach Rauma, and 
small detachments — although with extensive aims - were to be sent 
in the direction of Pieksämäki and Oulu (Map 1). On the other hand, 
as part of a more general war plan (24.3.1938), there would be in the 
Northwestern theatre an operation in the Karelian isthmus to the 
line Käkisalmi —Viipuri, and another one in the North to snatch away 
the Arctic coast in Petsamo and Rybatshii. A third was task was, put 
in a vague way, to cut the connection between Finland and Sweden, 
while more to the south, the troops of the Red Army would attack 
Tallinn (from Pskov) and Riga with an "special army" of as much as 
12 divisions from the reserves of High Command.' 
The strategic position of the Aland or Ahvenanmaa Islands as 
the key to the Gulf of Bothnia was well known in view of experi-
ences in World War I, but even in 1939 the great powers had no 
chances of invading it. The German Navy estimated its transporta-
tion capacity to be too small, and the Soviet Union believed, in the 
estimates it produced in the late 1930s, that Germany would try to 
use Finnish territory, especially the southern coast, for an offensive, 
and thus possibly the Aland Islands as well. 
When negotiating for cooperation with France and Great Brit-
ain in the summer of 1939, the Soviet Union planned to obtain bases 
in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and on the Aland Islands. In 
a crisis situation these bases were to be taken over without asking 
for permission from Finland and Estonia. The great powers did not 
reach an agreement, however. 
The Åland Islands did not play an important role in the plans of 
the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the 1930s. A surprise attack on the Åland Is-
lands from Kronstadt was not even considered feasible. On the po-
litical level, however, Moscow stood firm and persuaded Sweden to 
give up its planned defence treaty with Finland regarding the Aland 
Islands. The practical plans of the Baltic Fleet were limited to the idea 
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of invading a few islands in the Gulf of Finland, in addition to which 
mine fields were to be laid on the Finnish side of Suursaari. Never-
theless, preparations were made in November 1939 for an invasion 
of Hanko from the sea once the Red Army's offensive had proceeded 
to the inner parts of Finland. 
According to the directive that the Baltic Fleet received from 
the People's Commissariat for the Navy on 2 August, 1939, the war 
plan had to include: 1) destruction of the Navies of Finland, Estonia 
and Latvia, 2) invasions of Suursaari, Suurtytärsaari, Pieni Tytärsaari, 
Lavansaari and Seiskari, and 3) the use of submarines to prevent 
the Germans from using the Turku archipelago, the Åland Islands, 
Helsinki and Tallinn as support bases. 
The operative significance of the islands in the eastern part of 
the Gulf of Finland was emphasized by the fact that they were to be 
occupied even without a declaration of war if Finland were to violate 
her declaration of neutrality or if the Soviet government decided to 
ignore this neutrality. The Soviet Union had proposed a similar so-
lution for the mouth of the Gulf of Finland to the Western states in 
Moscow in summer 1939.6 
Meretskov's plan 
From the point of view of the Winter War, an important planning 
phase for the Red Army was related to summer 1939, as recounted 
in the memoirs of A. Vasilyevski and K.A. Meretskov. One significant 
point about this time is that the operational plans were changed 
during the year, whereas reviews were usually ordered in the win-
ter. Vasilyevski, who was deputy chief of the operational division of 
the General Staff at the time, recalls that the Main Military Soviet 
reconsidered the readiness of the Soviet armed forces for action on 
the Finnish front when"the international situation was weakening", 
i.e. before the Second World War had broken out. The General Staff 
presented a detailed plan that had been drawn up earlier and ap-
proved byVoroshilov, the basic ideas and main features having been 
the work of B.M. Shaposhnikov. When drawing up the plan, the 
General Staff had set out from the fact that Finland might receive 
help from some of the great powers. According to Shaposhnikov, a 
"retaliatory strike" against Finland would by no means be a simple 
matter. It would require"a harsh and difficult war lasting months, at 
least." It should be remembered that Shaposhnikov had been the 
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commander of the Leningrad Military District in 1935-1937. He em-
phasized at a meeting of the Main Military Soviet that war opera-
tions should be carried out quickly, otherwise Finland would receive 
significant help from the outside and the conflict would expand. 
Stalin laughed at Shaposhnikov: "You are asking for such im-
mense strength and resources to defeat a country like Finland. Such 
strength is not needed." 
The military and political leadership of the Soviet Union did not 
expect Finland to put up serious resistance. This was partly based 
on wishful thinking, and partly it was calculated that the weapon-
ry of the Finnish armed forces was old, since it had been inherited 
from the Tsar's army, that there would be desertion, and that fight-
ing against the Red Army would be considered an overwhelming 
task. The workers and the poorest peasants were thought to be se-
cretly unhappy with the government's policy, and it was expected 
that they would demand improved relations with the Soviet Union 
and threaten to punish those whose policy was hostile to the Soviet 
Union. 
The Main Military Soviet did not choose Shaposhnikov's plan, 
but ordered the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Mer-
etskov, to draw up a new version. Related to this is the fact that the 
People's Commissariat for Defence decided on 13 June that military 
exercises should be held in the Leningrad Military District in the 
autumn under Meretskov s command. Preparations were made in 
practice, as well. On 15 June the logistic administration of the Red 
Army ordered the Leningrad Military District to establish provisions 
stations for arriving troops along the railways leading to Leningrad, 
Murmansk and Archangelsk by 25 August, and logistic centres in 
Vologda, Tikhvin and Duo by 28 August. 
According to his memoirs, Meretskov personally received a task 
from Stalin at the end of June 1939 to draw up a memorandum on 
the options for"a retaliatory attack" on Finland in the area of Mur-
mansk and Leningrad. Meretskov drew up the memorandum in the 
appointed time - 2-3 weeks - and received comments on it from 
Stalin and Voroshilov in Moscow in late July. They insisted that the 
attack should last only a couple of weeks and promised that Red 
Army troops even from outside the Leningrad Military District could 
be used. Meretskov was told to submit a new report on the defence 
preparations in the early autumn.' 
Prior to the military expedition to Poland that began on 17 Sep- 
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tember, the Soviet Union raised the level of its war preparations in 
other directions as well, e.g. by moving troops to the Baltic and to 
the Finnish border. The concentration of troops at the border on the 
Arctic Ocean coast in the north was commenced on 3 September, 
and soon the Murmansk operative group was established. Its tasks 
were to prevent an attack on the Polyarnoye-Murmansk-Kandal-
aksha area from the west, defend the Kola Peninsula in the north 
and prevent landings. Troops on the Karelian Isthmus were similarly 
made ready for war. 
An important change was made in the plans of the military 
council of the Leningrad Military District in mid-September con-
cerning the basic grouping on the eastern border of Finland, in that 
it was decided to create a larger force by moving three divisions there 
in addition to the four already dispatched to the area. The leading 
organs were to be the headquarters of the 8th Army and two Corps 
headquarters. 
The reinforcement of the 8th Army also meant that there was 
now one additional direction of attack. Previously only defence had 
been planned in the Uhtua-Repola (or Rebola) area, but now the 
Special Army Corps was to be positioned there to operate towards 
Kajaani and Nurmes and thus support the attack onVitele (eastern 
coast of Ladoga) by the main force of the 8th Army. The idea of at-
tacking the rear of the Finnish main forces from the east got more 
strength. Implementation of this plan depended on how the Baltic 
(and European) situation developed. The planning work was aimed 
at a readiness to commence operations against Finland in late Oc-
tober - early November, but in mid-September the time when the 
attack groupings were to be completed was moved to November.' 
The concentration of Soviet troops along the border in the 
Karelian Isthmus began in early October, i.e. after the Baltic nego-
tiations had ended with results that satisfied the Soviet Union and 
when negotiations with Finland were beginning. At the same time, 
Finland mobilized its defences. It was at this point in time that the 
Finnish operation formally began, as the Leningrad Military District 
issued battle order number 1 to its troops at 1830 hours on 8 Octo-
ber: they were to group themselves along the border in the Isthmus 
by the morning of 10 October. Heavy artillery and three armoured 
brigades were sent to the area as well as reinforcements to the east-
ern border of Finland. 
Determined preparations for an attack on Finland began in the 
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last week of October. New troops were brought in and there were 
changes in the grouping. In accordance with the plans made in Sep-
tember, an order was given on 24 October for three more divisions 
to move to the Isthmus. The signal activities of the district that were 
an important prerequisite for the attack were mobilized with an or-
der given on 29 October, on the basis of which the 8th Army, among 
others, sent out its own signal order on 2 November in which the 
future location of the headquarters was defined as Loimola on the 
Finnish side of the border. 
A good example of this line of thinking is Meretskov's report 
written at the end of his inspection of combat training by the 8th 
Army (on 28.10. - 4.11.1939), in which he noted that there were only 
a limited number of days available for the troops to adjust to new 
battle conditions (i.e. in Finland). He also urged them to prepare 
signposts and name boards in Russian for the main population cen-
tres.9 
The main task laid down in the plan "to defeat the Army and 
Navy of Finland" prepared by the military council of the Leningrad 
Military District for the General Staff on 29 October was to break 
Finland's defences: "our troops will force their way into Finnish ter-
ritory simultaneously from all directions with the aim of isolating the 
enemy's grouping and in cooperation with the Air Force will deliver 
the decisive blow that will lead to the defeat of the Finnish army". In 
the Karelian Isthmus this meant"disbanding the protective groups, 
seizing the defence line across the Isthmus and crushing the enemy's 
main force with a decisive strike to the north-east, in cooperation 
with the troops proceeding in the direction of Vitele and those in 
the Sortavala, Viipuri and Käkisalmi sectors and seizing the area to 
line Hiitola - Imatra - Viipuri." After performing this task, the troops 
were to prepare for further action directed towards the inner parts 
of Finland. The plan also considered it possible that Sweden would 
send 2 or 3 divisions and at most 100 aircraft to assist the Finns. 
The plan deduced that "the endurance of Finland's army will 
depend on the result of the first battles." Therefore emphasis was 
placed on a massive first strike to be carried out with a major force. 
It was calculated that the operation could be accomplished in 10-15 
days, i.e. in 8-10 days on the Isthmus and in 15 days in the middle 
parts of Finland, the rate of advance being 10-12 km per day. In the 
instructions given to the commands on 29 November the Leningrad 
Military District set even stricter goals - apparently in order to raise 
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the spirits of the troops: to invade Viipuri in four days and arrive at 
Helsinki in two weeks.1° 
The plan of the Leningrad Military District was accepted in 
broad outline, and work commenced on its execution. It is said, how- 
ever, that the Chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov, warned the 
members of the Main Military Soviet against excessive optimism. 
Some time later the Chief was sent on a long vacation to Sotshi in 
the Crimea, although he was back in Moscow on 1 December, giving 
instructions to the Leningrad Military District." 
After the General Staff had deliberated on the plan drawn up 
by the Leningrad Military District, the district received a notification 
in early November that two new divisions would be available for the 
eastern border of Finland. The district itself positioned them in the 
direction of Murmansk and Kuhmoniemi. This reinforcement meant 
that the forces in the north increased by one-fourth. 
As preparations progressed, the final touches were put to the 
plan submitted by the Leningrad Military District. On 11-15 No- 
vember the People's Commissar for Defence, Voroshilov, issued or- 
ders that set in motion the activities that led to the beginning of the 
attack on 30 November, on 15 November he ordered the military 
council of the Leningrad Military District to begin the concentra- 
tions and movements required by the attack immediately, and on 
17 November instructions were dispatched to complete the con- 
centrations and to prepare, together with the Baltic Fleet and the 
Northern Fleet, for"a determined attack, the aim of which is to de-
stroy the enemy's ground and naval forces in a short period of time". 
The military council of the district had to present its" action plan" by 
20 November. At this time an army corps was established that was 
composed of Finns and Karelians resident in the Soviet Union. This 
was to form the army of Kuusinen's puppet government.'2 
The Leningrad Military District (commanded by Army Com-
mander 2nd grade K.A. Meretskov, a member of the military council, 
A.A. Zhdanov, and the chief of staff, Army Commander 2nd grade 
I.V. Smorodinov) had positioned 21 divisions along the front reach-
ing from the Arctic Ocean to the Gulf of Finland in readiness for an 
attack: the 14th Army on the border of Petsamo (three divisions, of 
which one was in the rear on the north coast of the Kola Peninsula), 
the 9th Army (four divisions, of which one was still on its way) in the 
areas of Kandalaksha, Uhtua and Repola, the 8th Army (six divisions 
and one armoured brigade) in the area of Petrozavodsk, and the 7th 
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Map 2. The operation orders in November 1939 
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Army (nine divisions, one armoured corps and three armoured bri-
gades), and one division in reserve on the Karelian Isthmus. (Map 
2) 
The size of the Soviet concentration on the north-eastern border 
of Finland at the end of November (excluding border troops and the 
rearguard and special troops) was approximately 400 000 men, 1 915 
cannons, 1500 tanks and 1 000 combat aircraft. The Baltic Fleet then 
had another 383 combat aircraft at the ready. 
The high command of the Soviet armed forces organized itself 
into a command body, adopting the traditional name of "stavka". 
The members were Voroshilov, as commander-in-chief, Stalin, N.G. 
Kuznetsov and the Chief of General Staff, Shaposhnikov.13 
Against the Mannerheim line 
On 30 November at 0730/0830 hours, after 30 —minutes of artillery 
preparation, the Red Army troops positioned along the border com-
menced an attack along a 1 610 km front that stretched all the way 
from the Arctic Ocean to the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Union had 
grouped at least one division along every road leading from east to 
west, and in some places even two divisions. The attack began along 
all the roads at the same time, and the Finnish troops everywhere 
had to withdraw long distances, approximately 80-100 km. 
According to a directive issued by the Leningrad Military Dis-
trict on 29 November, the tasks of the Baltic fleet included seizing 
Suursaari, Lavansaari, Tytärsaari and Seiskari and landing with a 
regiment-sized force to the coast of Finland. The Fleet did seize the 
islands in the Gulf of Finland on the first days of the war according 
to plan, there being no resistance." 
After seizing the islands, the Baltic Fleet was ordered to begin 
destroying Finland's coastal fortifications (2.12.) and to begin prepa-
rations for a landing in the Koivisto area and between Viipuri and 
Hamina (4.12.), using one division. The target chosen was the Pit-
käpaasi area, and Soviet vessels were carrying out reconnaissance 
related to this operation when they attacked the Kilpisaari battery 
(6.12.). The landings never took place, however, at first because it 
was not possible to silence the Finnish coastal batteries, and later 
because the high command decided on 30 December to cancel the 
instructions to this effect. By 20 January the situation had changed, 
as the Gulf of Finland had frozen over and it was not possible to start 
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planning for operations that would take place on ice.15 
The Red Army was prepared for a swift breakthrough, and it 
required an undelayed, flexible lightning war: "Once the attack has 
commenced, the action of the troops must be determined, they can-
not be tied down to front-line battles where the enemy's fortified 
positions are. We must leave protective troops at the front, go round 
the flanks and to the rear, and continue to carry out the task as-
signed to us." 
The attack did not go at all according to the preconceptions of 
the Soviet military and political leadership. The course of events was 
in every respect different from what had been presumed. The battles 
became prolonged, and every kilometre of the advance had to be 
accomplished with great difficulty. After crossing the border quickly, 
the attack stopped almost completely. 
The high command of the Red Army had already taken the Len-
ingrad Military District under firm patronage at the beginning of the 
war. Exhortations arrived frequently. Three days after the start of the 
war (2.12.) the high command admonished the 8th and 9th Armies 
for their slow and indecisive advance: "We cannot slouch down in 
Finland for a long time, carrying out day's marches of 4--5 km. We 
have to finish the matter quickly with a determined offensive by our 
troops." In order to intensify the attack, Army Commissar Lev Me-
khlis was sent to the 9th Army as a representative of the high com-
mand and Army Commander (1st class) G.I. Kulik to the 8th Army. 
The patience of the Soviet leadership lasted a little over a week. 
The "front-line headquarters that exists in practice" (i.e. the staff of 
the Leningrad district) was dissolved on 9 December and the 14th, 
9th, 8th and 7th armies and the Baltic and Northern Fleets were 
moved from the command of the Leningrad Military District to the 
direct control of the Red Army high command"stavka".'6 
The Soviets were advancing through the sparse road network 
of the uninhabited forests and approaching intersections from which 
they were to spread out and thus use their superiority in numbers to 
full advantage. Above all their troops were approaching the Sortava-
la — Nurmes - Oulu railway line, which was important to the Finnish 
logistics and movement of troops. If the line fell into Soviet hands, 
it would soon have meant that Finland was cut in two at the level of 
Oulu and overland traffic between Finland and Sweden was cease. 
Both sides considered the most important front of the war to be 
on the Karelian Isthmus, where the main forces were concentrated. 
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This is where the 7th Army (commanded by Army Commander 2nd 
class V.F. Jakovlev) attacked. Its task, with support from the Baltic 
Fleet, was to destroy the Finnish troops in front of it, seize the de-
fence lines on the Isthmus and advance to a line Hiitola station - 
Antrea station -Viipuri, after which it was to organize an advance to 
Lahti, Hyvinkää and Helsinki together with the 8th Army. The army 
included the 19th Army Corps in the west (its goal being Viipuri) 
and the 50th Army Corps in the east (its target being the Antrea 
station). 
The schedule of the 7th Army was determined as follows: the 
depth of the operation would be 85-110 km and the goal would be 
reached in 12-15 days. In other words, the first stage (advancing to 
Finland's main defence line) would last 4-5 days, the second stage 
(breaking the line) another 4-5 days, and the third stage to the Vii-
purl - Käkisalmi line, a further 4-5 days." It was later emphasized 
to the troops that it would be very appropriate to arrive at Helsinki 
by Stalin's 60th birthday on 21 December. The Red Army progressed 
very cautiously, however, and could not always remain in contact 
with the Finns, who had built obstacles, minefields, tank barriers 
and support lines with the help of which they could move slowly 
from one line to another and carry out confusing strikes with small 
patrols between the advancing Soviet troops. The Red Army would 
cease hostilities at night and withdraw to cover. Its traffic arrange-
ments were also inadequate at first. There were traffic jams on the 
Isthmus, men and sometimes even detachments lost their way, and 
the grouping of troops became more difficult." 
The depth of Finland's area for protective delaying action was 
12 km on the eastern side, 45-50 in the middle and 60-65 km in the 
west. The Soviet troops made contact with Finland's main defence 
position in the east, by Suvanto, on 4 December, that in the middle 
sector on 6 December and that in the west, on the coast of the Gulf 
of Finland, on 10 December. The average speed of attack of the 7th 
Army had been 3-7 km per day, less than half of what had been 
planned. Traffic jams in the rear and the fact that the battles were 
called off at night played a role in this slow progress. 
Despite the slow advance, the Soviet troops waged war mainly 
with pre-war points of emphasis at first, their planning being fo-
cused on solving immediate concrete problems. Meretskov was al-
ready being told by the high command on 2 December to reinforce 
the attack near Taipaleenjoki from one division to two, with the aim 
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of crossing the River Vuoksi at Taipaleenjoki and proceeding from 
there to the rear of the main Finnish position. The troops on this 
flank were combined into an operation group commanded by Corps 
Commander V.D. Gröndahl, with the 10th Armoured Corps in re-
serve, its light tanks waiting for the resistance to break down in or-
der to be able to reach out quickly far into the Finns' rear. According 
to Matvei Zakharov, Meretskov was exaggerating the attack on the 
Eastern Isthmus against the ideas of the General Staff. 
The troops of Gröndahl's group began an attack on three sec-
tors on 6 December. Their attempts at breakthrough were support-
ed by strong artillery and approximately 150 tanks, but they failed, 
leaving 35 destroyed tanks in front of the Finnish positions. After 
advancing 1-1.5 km, the detachments of the most successful 19th 
Infantry Regiment seized a bridgehead position on the other side of 
the river at Koukunniemi and took a firm hold on it. The Red Army 
attempted to cross the River Vuoksi in the direction of Kiviniemi on 
7 December, but failed." 
In order to make the command more effective, Meretskov him-
self was ordered to take charge of the 7th Army. In practice he had 
already moved to the post on 7 December. The command in the field 
was reinforced with personnel from the headquarters of the military 
district. The operative solution did not change much when prepara-
tions were made to break the Mannerheim Line. The Army's battle 
order on 12 December 1939 entailed the following goals: Gröndahl's 
group was to attack Käkisalmi and Antrea, the 19th Army Corps was 
to break the defence position in Leipäsuo and then attack the Pien-
pero area, the 50th Army Corps was to break the defence position 
in the area of Lähde - Summa, advance to Kämärä station and then 
attack Näykkijäivi, while the Lazarenko detachment, which con-
sisted mainly of fortification troops, was to attack the area of Kilpola 
- Kolkkala and secure the left flank. 
Thus the plan now had - even for the command headquarters 
- a clear point of emphasis in the direction of the main Leningrad-
Viipuri railway. After the breakthrough the light armoured troops 
were to advance through its western flank using the main road and 
cut off the road used by the Finns for withdrawal. To do this, the 10th 
Armoured Corps was to follow the 50th Corps and then spread out 
in the direction of Huumola, Säiniö station and Repola (in the north 
part of the Isthmus). This would prevent a Finnish withdrawal into 
Viipuri and it would be possible to attack their rear. In accordance 
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with the original plan, the Armoured Corps was supposed to be used 
for expansion of the breakthrough, i.e. a rapid advance to Viipuri af-
ter the collapse of the main defence line. At first this corps had been 
heading towards the Kiviniemi bridge and the road on the east side 
of the River Vuoksi, but when the road became blocked there, it was 
thrown to Summa to wait for the breakthrough. The high command 
wanted to increase the use of the Air Force in further battles, and 
sent bomber regiments from the reserve of stavka (1st Special Air 
Force) to the 7th Army. 
Due to the partial regrouping of the troops, the delayed opera-
tion did not begin until 15-17 December, and it reached its great-
est strength on 19 December. Despite unusually fierce attacks, the 
troops could not achieve any notable success during the first week. 
The attack by three Soviet divisions on the eastern Isthmus on 15-17 
December was fended off, while in the direction of the main attack, 
along the Viipuri-Leningrad railway, the Soviet troops tried to break 
through with the strength of three divisions in the Sumna-Lähde 
section, which was considered the most dangerous. Dozens of de-
stroyed tanks were left on the battlefield. In five days the 20th Ar-
moured Brigade alone lost 67 heavy tanks along this part of the front, 
most of them on 17 and 19 December. The Finnish defensive victory 
came to be called"the miracle of Summa" all over the world. 
By 20 December the Soviet troops in the Isthmus had com-
pletely lost the initiative, and the Finns considered the situation suit-
able for an extensive counter-offensive. The aim was to beat the ene-
my in front of the Mannerheim Line with a two-sided encirclement. 
The operation began on 23 December, but soon lost its strength. It 
nevertheless came very close to the headquarters of the 50th Corps, 
which Meretskov was visiting at the time, and in this way it had 
a concrete effect on the command of the Soviet offensive. It was 
becoming clear that troops would have to be increased if the Man-
nerheim Line was to be broken. 
After receiving more troops, the Gröndahl group began yet an-
other attack on the eastern Isthmus. It suddenly tried to cross Suvan-
to into the western flank of the defenders of Taipale with a strength 
of approximately one division on 25-27 December. The aim was to 
advance toViljakkala and then to Sakkola station and Käkisalmi af-
ter the breakthrough. The crossing of Suvanto was successful, but 
the attackers were fended off.2° 
After this the battles quietened down on the Isthmus. It had be- 
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come clear that the Red Army's operation plan was unrealistic. The 
troops were exhausted, they had suffered great losses and needed 
rest and reinforcements. For this reason the Main Military Soviet de-
cided to temporarily stop the offensive and prepare more carefully 
for a breakthrough at the Mannerheim Line. 
Preparations were begun by first improving the organization of 
the command of the troops. By order of the "stavka", the 7th Army 
was divided into two parts on 26 December: the 13th Army, operat-
ing in the direction of Käkisalmi and commanded by Corps Com-
manderV.D. Gröndahl, and the 7th Army, operating in the direction 
of Viipuri, still commanded by Army Commander 2nd grade K.A. 
Meretskov.2 ' 
Battles to the north of Lake Ladoga 
The task of the Soviet 8th Army stationed in Olonets (commanded 
by Division Commander I.N. Khabarov, and from approximately 4 
December onwards by Corps CommanderV.N. Kurdyrnov) was to 
advance 90 km in ten days to the line Joensuu-Tohmajärvi-Sortavala. 
After that it was to force its way to the rear of the Finnish troops on 
the Isthmus and help the 7th Army destroy them. In the next phase it 
was to attack Mikkeli, and its right wing was to attack the Pielisjärvi 
and Maanselkä areas and Kuopio and contact the 9th Army. The 8th 
Army included six divisions, a total of 75 000 men and 154 tanks. 
The attack began successfully, and the Finnish troops of the IV 
Army Corps had to surrender the Tulemajoki Line on the road along 
the north-east shore of Lake Ladoga on 2 December. 
Further north, the Soviet troops advanced 30 km in a week to 
Kollaanjoki and 60 km to Tolvajärvi in the Korpiselkä direction, to 
which the defenders had withdrawn from the level of Agläjärvi on 5 
December. The same speed was maintained by the (155th) Division, 
which attacked Ilomantsi from Porajärvi and arrived at Lutikkavaara 
on 6 December. 
As the Soviet attack in the Karelian Isthmus had been stopped, 
the emphasis of the overall plan was moved (around 10th Decem-
ber) a little to the South: now the main idea for the 8th Army was to 
reach the line Parikkala station — Hiitola, to meet the 7th Army there, 
and the left flank of the 9th Amy was moved a little southwards, 
from Iisalmi to Kuopio.Z'-  
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Some of the forces of the Finnish IV Army Corps held the So-
viet troops back on the Syskyjärvi-Kitelä defence line, while another 
part began counter-offensives on the northern flank and between 
detachments. At Tolvajärvi the Soviet troops were dangerously ap-
proaching road networks that reached to the rear of the IV Army 
Corps, so that the Talvela Group was given the task of defeating the 
enemy forces that had advanced in the direction of Korpisellcä and 
Ilomantsi and, together with the IV Army Corps, of recapturing Suo-
järvi. This strike caused the Soviet advance to halt. In three days the 
Soviet 139th Division was defeated, and in the same manner the 
75th Division was overcome at Ägläjärvi by Christmas Eve. After this 
the front in this area remained stationary until the end of the war. 
Around this time the IV Army Corps began its own coun-
ter-offensive on the north side of Lake Ladoga. After some initial 
difficulties, this led to the encirclement of two Soviet divisions by 
mid-January. Both divisions on the left flank of the 8th Army (the 
18th and 168th Divisions) had already had to stop their attack by 
19 December, and at the end of the year the situation on the front 
forced the command of the 8th Army to switch to active defence. The 
18th Division, which had advanced in the direction of Ruhtinaan-
mäki moved to a defensive grouping, and the Finns had cut off all its 
communications in the direction of Uomaa by 3 January.23  
The Red Army's offensive halted in this direction, but on the 
other hand, the Finnish troops were tied down to an exhausting 
phase of siege warfare, as they did not have enough fire power to 
resolve the encirclement. The basic problem for the Soviet 8th Army 
was the difficulty of obtaining enough troops for the operation. 
The thought of cutting Finland in two 
Battles were fought tinder even more difficult conditions in the di-
rections of Kuhmo, Suomussalmi and Salla than on the east side of 
Lake Ladoga. The climate was harsher, habitation was sparse and 
roadless areas dozens of kilometres wide separated the attacking di-
visions from each other. Thus a single front did not form on the east-
ern border of Finland, but instead narrow fronts that were only a few 
kilometres wide at first were created along the main roads. Superi-
ority could not be used to any benefit in the direction of the roads. 
On the contrary, the advancing division formed a column dozens of 
kilometres long, so that it was difficult to organize protection for its 
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flanks. Under these conditions skill in moving over roadless terrain 
and maintaining troops there became decisive. 
It was not until the end of October 1939, as war with Finland 
became a current issue, that the Red Army's strength had been in-
creased in this area and a decision had been made to advance to 
Oulu with the Special Army Corps in the lead. The number of troops 
in the northern sections of the front was increased further in No-
vember, and this made it necessary to establish a new army head-
quarters (the 9th Army) in Kemi on the White Sea. The Murmansk 
group was renamed as the 14th Army. The Special Army Corps and 
the headquarters of the 47th Army Corps were subordinated to the 
9th Army (commanded by Corps Commander M.P. Dukhanov, and 
from 22 December onwards by Corps Commander V.I. Tshuikov). 
When the battles began the army had 110 000 men and 191 tanks. 
Russian Karelia, including the Kantalahti (Kandalaksha) area, be-
came the support area. Thus the Oulu direction had altered within a 
few weeks from a binding front into an independent and important 
direction for attack. 
Finland's"waist" was a very sensitive area. If the Soviet troops 
could reach the good roads leading west from Suomussalmi, they 
could quickly advance to Oulu, cut the country in half and isolate it 
from Sweden. 
The task of the 9th Army was to attack Kajaani and advance to 
the Kemijärvi-Kontiomäki line and seize Oulu. The Military Soviet 
of the army began with the thought that it was highly improbable 
that large troops from other Scandinavian countries would come to 
Finland's aid. The seizing of Oulu would prevent outside material 
and assistance from reaching the Finnish army and it would leave it 
completely encircled. A sufficiently large group would have to be di-
rected against Oulu that it could also operate to the south-west, and 
a strong detachment would have to be sent from Oulu to Kemi. The 
supportive attack would start from Suomussalmi through Puolanka 
to Oulu and the Red Army's right flank would advance through Salla 
and Kemijärvi to Rovaniemi and Kemi. 
According to the military council of the 9th Army, the overall 
duration of the operation would be approximately 20 days to the 
Oulu - Kemi line and spreading to the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. 
The operation was planned to take place in three long leaps (70 km, 
75 km and 90 km; approximately 14, 15 and 30 lan per day, respec-
tively). It was obvious that an advance would be made to the Swed- 
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ish border. The directions given by the Leningrad Military District 
on 29 November were that"When arriving at the borders of Sweden 
and Norway, these are not to be violated nor are provocations to be 
tolerated. The soldiers of the Swedish and Norwegian armed forces 
are to be saluted at the border." 
As a result of a superficial and limited evaluation of the Finnish 
troops, the 9th Army assumed that the main forces would be met 
with along the line Puolanka - Kontiomäki, or even around Oulu, 
but in reality the encounter took place along the border between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. The 9th Army was greeted by only 
four Finnish battalions at the beginning of the war, but these soon 
received reinforcements from Kajaani and Oulu.2" 
The 54th Division of the Red Army Special Army Corps attacked 
in the Repola-Kuhmo direction, fighting its way towards Kuhmo 
and Korpisaie ni, arriving in one week at the important crossroads at 
Rasti (6 December) and threatening Finland's connections running 
from north to south. The Finnish troops carried out a counter-offen-
sive, however, and encircled the enemy, so that the division had to 
fend off Finnish attacks until the end of the war.25  
The Soviet aim in the Kandalaksha - Salla direction was to seize 
Rovaniemi and continue from there towards Tornio. The task of the 
defending Finnish battalion was difficult, because there was only a 
little snow and the freezing of the ground increased the infantry's 
opportunities to advance off the roads. The detachments of the So-
viet 122nd Division defeated the delaying Finns - now two battal-
ions - and reached the village of Salla, 110 km from the border, on 8 
December. They captured an intersection from where it was possible 
to advance through Joutsijäivi to Kemijärvi and through Savukoski 
to Pelkosenniemi, and arrived in Joutsijärvi and the Pelkosenniemi 
area to the north on 16 December. In two and a half weeks they had 
advanced 200 km. The troops were directly threatening Kemijärvi, 
the terminal of the Kemi-Rovaniemi-Kemijärvi railway. 
The counter—attack by the Finnish Lapland Group drove the 
Soviet troops back from Pelkosenniemi for a distance of 20 km 
through Savukoski to Saija (north-west of the village of Salla) on 19 
December. There the front line settled, and the imminent threat to 
the Finnish road from the Arctic Ocean was removed26 
The Red Army's 163rd Division from Uhtua (now known as Ka-
levala) attacked Suomussalmi from the direction of the roads of Jun-
tusranta and Raate, and its troops joined in the village of Suomus- 
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salmi on 8 December. The strength of the defenders increased from 
one battalion to two, and first the Siilasvuo Brigade and then the 
Siilasvuo Group were established on 6-7 December (commanded by 
Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo). Siilasvuo began a counter-offensive on 
11 December that cut off the maintenance connections of the Soviet 
troops in the direction of Raate. The initiative now switched to the 
Finns. The 163rd Division was defending the village of Suomussalmi 
and the areas to the west and north of it. 
The task given to the 9th Army before the war had emphasized 
speedy advance and circumventing enemy units that had settled for 
defence. When faced with resistance, the army headquarters was 
supposed to shift its emphasis to solving the problem and to finding 
a faster way of advancing. In practice, regroupings took more time 
than had been expected. When the Raate road had been cut off, the 
emphasis of the Soviet troops was shifted towards Juntusranta-Suo-
mussalmi. Following an order from the high command, the com-
mander of the army ordered the 44th Division, originally meant for 
the area south of Kajaani, to move in the direction of Raate. 
Once reinforcements had arrived, the Finns could attack the 
main forces of the 163rd Division on 27 December. At first the situ-
ation seemed unclear, but the Soviet troops had already given up 
fighting by 28 December. What was left of the division regrouped for 
defence at the level of Juntusranta. 
When the battle at Suomussalmi ended, the Finns already knew 
that the new 44th Division was coming to the 163rd Division's as-
sistance from Vashenvara. To the Finns' surprise, it stopped on the 
Raate road and formed a long march column — with its head 33 km 
over the border - and did not attempt to use its superiority to crush 
the fairly small Finnish detachment that could be spared from the 
battle of Suomussalmi. Snow and the difficult terrain prevented the 
Soviet troops from making full use of their technical superiority. The 
44th Division had arrived from the Ukraine completely unprepared 
for fighting under the conditions prevailing in this north-western 
theatre of war. The Finns cut off the column that had squeezed along 
the road in several places and had destroyed them one by one in 
fierce battles by 7 January. The Division was almost completely an-
nihilated. The remaining parts moved to defence positions along the 
road 9 km from the border, but it took a long time for the Soviet 
troops to concentrate reinforcements in the direction of Suomus-
sahni.to 
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On 26 December the new commander of the 9th Army, V.I. 
Tshuikov, decisively transferred the point of emphasis to the right 
flank, in the direction of Kandalaksha-Salla. The headquarters of 
the Special Army Corps had been brought there from the blocked 
Kuhmo direction to act as the command echelon and the 88th Divi-
sion began to arrive from Archangel to the aid of the 122nd Divi-
sion. There was not enough manpower to continue the attack here, 
either, however, as the troops had been exhausted by the difficult 
conditions under which the previous attack had taken place. Due 
to maintenance difficulties, the Russians withdrew from Joutsijärvi 
to Märkäjärvi on 11-16 January. Bringing in new troops was a slow 
process because of limited rail transport capacity and ice obstacles, 
which meant that shipments to Kemi from the Archangel direction 
were effectively blocked from 8 January onwards.28  
The defeats at Suomussalmi, Raate, Joutsijärvi and Kuhmo 
caused a threatening situation that continued for a long time, and 
in early 1940 the 9th Army had to concentrate on resolving this situ-
ation. 
The capture of Petsamo 
When the Winter War broke out, the task of the 14th Army, estab-
lished in Murmansk, was to seize Kalastajasaarento and Petsarno 
with the support of the Northern Fleet, build fortifications in the 
area and protect the southern side, preventing men and weapons 
from being brought in from the harbour of Kirkenes in Norway and 
preventing landings on the Murmansk coast. The Army also had to 
take account of Norway's participation in the war. 
In the Murmansk direction the Soviet 104th and 52nd Divisions 
seized without much effort Kalastajasaarento, Srednisaarento and 
the monastery and Liinahamari harbour in Petsamo itself shortly 
after war broke out. In the first 8 days the detachments of the Red 
Army advanced 150 km. The Finns destroyed the harbour equipment 
and fishing boats at Liinahamari, however, and carried out delaying 
actions as far as the level of Höyhenjärvi, where the Soviet advance 
stopped on 18 December. The long distances required the securing 
of traffic connections, and they also made troop maintenance more 
difficult. Naturally, maintenance preparations had not been made 
for an attack on Rovaniemi through the wild countryside of Lap-
land, even though the goal of the army after the first success was set 
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as being the capture of Rovaniemi and an advance to Alapitkä and 
Pelkosenniemi. Fighting was also hampered by the arctic weather 
conditions and the two months of almost continuous night.29 
Notes 
I For this study directives from several years were used: 9.3. and 9.12. 1935 and 
15.5. 1936 (RGAVIVIF fond 92 opis 2 delo 260), 30.12. 1936 and 13.1. and 23.3. 
1937 (RGAVMF fond 92 opis 2 delo 297), 27.2. 1939 (RGAV1NfF Fond 1877 opis 
1 delo 77) and 2.8. 1939 (RGAVMF fond 92 opis 2 delo 448). Manninen, Neu-
vostoliiton operatiiviset suunnitelmat 1939-1941 Suomen suunnalla. 1993 p. 78. 
2 1937. Okazanija marshala Tuhatshevskogo. Voenno-Istoritsheskij Zhurnal (lyh. 
VIZ) 8/1991 p. 44-53 and 9/1991 p. 55-63. 
3 Manninen 1993 p. 78-80. 85, I.N. Venkov, Plany storon i hod boevyh dejstvij 
(mscr. 1992), p. 8. 
4 Reino Arimo, Suomen puolustussuunnitelmat, passim. Arimo, Suomen linnoit-
tamisen historia, 114. 
Manninen 1993 p.80-85. God 1941:2 p. 565 (24.3.1938). The more wide lines are 
on a booty map in the Finnish War Museum. - The means are dating the map 
are not very good. It was printed before 1938, but the attack arrows may have 
been made later, anyway before the autumn of 1939. 
e Manninen 1993 p. 83-84. 
7 RGVA Fond 25888 opis 15 delo 458 p. 70-72. Manninen 1993 p.85- 87; Man-
ninen, 1987 p. 84-85; A.Vasilevski); Delo vsej zhizn p.95-96; K.A. Meretskov, Na 
sluzhbe narodu p. 178-179; N. I. Baryshnikov, Neuvostoliittolais-suomalainen 
sota. 1989 p. 136. 
s Manninen 1993 p. 88-89. Sovjetsko-finijandskaja vojna 1939-1940 gg. na more, 
1946, II p. 17. Mikhail Semiryaga, The Winter War (Moscow 1990), p. 12. The 
border of Murmansk group on the left to 56.Corps was Knjazhaja — Orijärvi 
—Vuorijäivi. RGVA Fond 34980 opis 7 introduction and Fond 25888 opis 11 delo 
17 p. 19-37, 176-186. - In earlier plans the headquarters of the 7th Army had 
been reserved for the Karelian Isthmus, but this was at the time tied down on 
the Latvian border, so the plan was to establish the headquarters of the 14th 
Army on the Isthmus. 
~ RGVA 25888-11-17 p. 108-116, 142, 149; Manninen 1993 p. 87, 91-92. 
~ o Memo 29.10. 1939 and operative directive 11. 1939 in Tainy ... p. 53-60, 76-
79. N.I. Baryshniko\; Sovetsko-Finljandskaja vojna 1939-1940 gg. Novaja i 
novejshaja istorija 4/1989 p. 33; G. Kumanev, Tshto my znaern o"zimnej vojne" 
(Sovetskaja Rossija 10. 3. 1990); Zaharov p. 181. Manninen 1993 p. 92-94. 
Manninen 1993 p. 94. K. Simonov, Glazami tsheloveka moego pokolenija, p. 
442-443. Zakharov p. 182. 
12 RGVA Fond 25888 opis 11 delo 17 p. 266; Fond 34980 opis 5 delo 2 (Tshibi-
sov 21.11.1939). Order 11.11. 1939 in Tainy ... p. 74-75. Manninen 1993 p. 94, 
Baryyshnikors, Sovetsko .. p. 34, Kumanev, Tshto my znaem. 
13 Venkov, Plany p. 11-12. Manninen 1993 p. 133-162. see RGVA Fond 37977 opis 1 
delo 595, p. 78, Fond 34980 opis 14 delo 57, p. 6, S-FV na more I:1 p. 20,11 p. 14. 
14 Venknv, Plant' p. 29. RGVA Fond 34980 opis 14 delo 46, p. 13. RGAVMF 92-2-
497 p. 1-4, 92-2-496 p. 2. S-FV na more I:2 p. 3. Groehler p. 156. - The Soviet 
Navy was ordered not to force its way into Swedish territorial waters. Sweden, 
on the other hand, refrained from military cooperation with Finland, although 
it did lay mines on the west coast of the light house of Märket at the level of the 
Aland Islands. The Soviet Navy requested maintenance vessels from Germany 
on 10 December so that the Soviet submarines could use them for support, but 
the idea was subsequently given up, even though Germany had agreed. 
15 S-FV na more L•2 p. 4-9, 17-22, 27, 32, 48-50, 57-59.y.A. Järvinen, Suomalainen 
ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa, 1948, p. 140. - 37. 
1 ~ Marurinen 100-102. RGVA Fond 34980 opis 4 delo 91, p. 33, opis 5 delo 4 p.4 (order 
of the 9.Army 4.12.1939). Semirjaga, Neuvostoliittolais-.. p.193; Semiryaga p. 24. 
17 Manninen 1993 p. 94-95. Directive of the Leningrad district 21.11.1939 to the 
7. Army, RGVA 34980-14-57; PF. Vashtshenko, Yesli by Finljandija i SSSR (VIZ 
1/1990). — In the attack order of 12.12. the boundary between 7. and 8. Army 
was defined: western coast of Ladoga - Tervus - Parikkala (RGAVIvIF 92-2-505 
p. 292). RGVA Fond 34980 opis 14 delo 56 (Memo of the actions of 7. Army), 
and opis 3 delo 230. 
18 Järvinen p. 72, 74, 86. 
1  Operative directive 1.12.1939 to 7.Army Tainy p. 122-123. RGVA Fond 34980 
opis 14 delo 57, p. 9. Manninen 1993 p. 102, Manninen 1987 p. 285, Venkov, 
Plan} p. 18. 
20 Manninen 1993 p. 102-103. Manninen 1987 p. 286. Järvinen p. 97-100, Merets-
kov, Na sluzhbe ... p. 100. 
RGAVIVIF 92-2-505 p. 292. Oper. directive to 7th Army in Tainy p. 173-175. See 
also the emphasis in the oper. directive to 8th Army in Tainy p. 176-177. Plans of 
Gröndahl RGVA 34980-6-85 p. 5-19, 22-32 and RGVA 34980-6-77 p. 1-11. 
21 Manninen 1993 p. 103, 105.Oper. directives 27.12.1939 to 7th and 13th Armies 
inTainy p. 219-221. 
22 Memo of the actions of the 8.Army, RGVA Fond 34980 opis 14 delo 56, Order 
for the 8. Army and the 9. Arm}, Tainy .. p. 176-178. Manninen 1993 p. 96. Nlan-
ninen 1987 p. 286. 
23 Manninen 1987 p. 286-287, 290. Venkov, Sovetskoe nastuplenie (mscr. 1992) p. 
26-27. Järvinen p. 188-191, 194, 196-203. 
24 RGVA Fond 25888 opis 11 delo 17 p. 205-207, 232, Fond 34980 opis 5 delo 292, 
p. 33-35. War council of the Leningrad district 16.11. 1939 to Dukhanov, RGVA 
Fond 34980 opis 5 delo 1; Order of the 14.Army 19.11. 1939, Fond 34980 opis 7 
delo 10 p. 42,. "Assessment of the realization of the operation"25.11.1939 by War 
council of the 9. Army, 34980-5-3 p. 1-7. Venkov, Plany p. 13. Manninen 1993 p. 
99. Semirjaga, Neuvostolöttolais-suomalainen sota vv. 1939-1940 kansainvälisen 
oikeuden näkökulmasta. Talvisota, Venäjä ja Suomi. Helsinki 1991, p.186. 
29 
25 Venkov, Plan)' p. 14. Venkov, Sovetskoe p. 30. Manninen 1987 P.  290-291. 
26 Venkov, Sovetskoe p. 31. Manninen 1987 p. 291. 
27 Manninen 1987 p. 287-290. War council of the Leningrad district 21.11.39, RGVA 
Fond 34980 opis 5 delo 4 p. 10-11, 21, 70, 92; 34980- opis 5 introduction p. 11.Opera- 
tion directive 10.12.1939 to the 9th Amiy in Taint' ... p.  178-179. Järvinen p. 228. 
28 Manninen 1993 p. 103. RGVA 34980 delo 5 opis 4 p. 21, 70, 92. 
29 RGVA 34980-5-2. S-FV na more II p. 20. Manninen 1987 p. 286. Manninen 1993 
p. 98, 100. 
30 
Order of battle of the Red Army in the 
Finnish theatre of war 30.11.1939 -13.3. 1940 
In Karelian Isthmus 
Leningrad military district - commander 2 cl. komandarm K. A. Meretskov, mem-
bers of war council A. A. Zhdanov, korpkom N. N. Vashugin, korpkom A. N. 
Melnikov; chief of staff komdiv N. E. Tshibisov. - Functioned as front staff 30.11. 
- 9.12. 
Northwestern front- commander 1 cl. komandarm S.K. Timoshenko, member of 
war council A. A. Zhdanov, chief of staff 2 cl. komandarm I.V. Smorodinov. - 
Formed 7.1. to control the operations of 7. Army and 13. Army. 
7.Army - commander 2 cl. komandarin V.F. Jakovlev -6.12., 2 cl. komandarm K.A. 
Meretskov 6.12.-; members of war council brigkom N.N. Klementiev, Shtykov, 
korpkom N.N. Vashugin; chief of staff kombrigV.N. Gordov -6.12., komdiv G.S. 
Issersson (already 17.12., still 30.12.), 2 cl. komandarm I.V. Smorodinov -7.1., 
kombrig S.G. Trofimenko, komdiv N. E. Tshibisov. - Formed in Kalinin district 
14.9. 1939. Moved 26.9. into Pskov oblast and 15.11. to Karelian isthmus. Dis-
banded 26.3.1940. 
13.Army - commander komkor (16.1.- 2 cl. komandarm) V.D. Gröndahl -2.3., kom-
kor F. A. Parusinov 2.3.-5.4.; members of war council korpkorn A.I. Zaporozhets, 
F.P. Polynin; chief of staff colonel/kombrig V.S. Golushkevitsh -2.3., kombrig 
G.I. Sokolov 3.3.-. - Formed 25.12. from Gröndahl operation group. Disbanded 
5.4. 1940. 
Reserve group of Northwestern front. - commander kornkor D.G. Pavlov. - In 
function 9.2.-29.2. 
19.Corps - commander komdiv F. N. Starikov, kombrig I. F. Nikolaev (in February), 
komdiv M.F. Teiyohin (in March). - In Karelian Isthmus already in September 
1939, in 7. Army 15.11.-1.3., in 13. Army 1.3.- (13.3.). 
50.Corps. - commander kombrig/komdiv F.D. Gorelenko. - To Karelian isthmus 
21.9. 1939. In 7. Army 15.11.-(13.3.) 
Gröndahl operation group - commander komkorV.D. Gröndahl. 4-25.12. 1939. 
10.Armoured corps - commander komdiv/komkor P.L. Romanenko. - In 7. Army 
(30.11.)-17.1. 
10.Corps - commander komdiv Davydovskii (still 11.1.), kombrig I. F. Nikolaev 
(from the end of February). - In 7. Anny 15.12.-7.4. 
34.Corps - commander komdiv V.M. Gonin (February), komdiv K.P. Piadyshev 
(March). - In 7. Army 3.2. - 23.4. 
28.Corps - commander komdivV.S. Popov, komdiv P.A. Kurotshkin (in March). - In 
7. Army 29.2.- (13.3.). 
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15.Corp5 - commander kombrig M.F. Korolev - In 13. Army 7.1. - (13.3.). 
23.Corps - commander komdiv S.D. Akimov. - In 13. Army (25.1.-)30.1.-(13.3.). 
3.Corps - commander komdiv P.A. Batov -5.3. - In Gröndahl group and 13. Army 
13.12.-(13.3.). 
3.Cavalry corps - commander komdiv Y.T. Tsherevitshenlco. - In reserve group 
22.2.-1.3., in front reserve 1-10.3., in 7. Army 10.-16.3. 
1.Mountain corps of Finnish People's Army. - commander komdiv A.M. Anttila 
11.1939-3.1940. 
1.D of Finnish people's army - In North Western front (30.11.)-(13.3.). 
2.D of Finnish people's army - In North Western front (30.11.)-(13.3.). 
4.D - From Belorussian district. In Gröndahl group and 13. Army 12.12.- (13.3.), in 
3.Corps 26.12.--7.1. (possibly to 26.1.), in 15.Corps 7.1.-(13.3.). 
7.D - From Kiev district. In 7. Army 11.1-, 50.Corps 29.1-20.2., in 10.Corps 20.2.-, 
in 34. Corps 1.3.-(13.3.). 
8.D - From Belorussian district. In Northwestern front 22.1.-, in 13.Army 25.1.-., in 
23.Corps 31.1.-, in 15.Corps 8.3.-. 
17.Motorized D - From Moscow district. In 13. Army 19.1.-, in 15.Corps 20.1.-
(13.3.). 
24.D - Formed in Leningrad district. In 50.Corps 21.9. 1939-, in 19.Corps 8.10.-
(19.2.), in 7. Army reserve (already 1.3.), in 34.Corps 6.3.-, in 50.Corps 9.3.-. 
42.Light Motorized D - Formed 17.1. 1940 in Leningrad military district, from for-
tification troops in Terijoki. In 34.Corps (already 11.2.), in 7.Army reserve 25.2.-, 
in 10.Corps 1.3.-(13.3.). 
43.D - From Kalinin district. In 50.Coips 21.9.-, in 19.Corps 8.10.-. In 7. Army re-
serve 20.12.-. In 10.Corps 1.1. 1940-, in 34.Corps 3.2.-, in 7. Army reserve 25.2.-, 
in 28.Corps 29.2.- and in 10.Corps 1.3.-. 
49.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 7. Army 14.9.-, in 50.Corps 25.10-3.12., in 
Gröndahl group and 13. Army 4.12.- (13.3.), in 3.Corps (26.12.) - (13.3. 1940). 
50.D - From Belorussian district. In Karelian Isthmus 6.1-. In 13.Army 18.1.-, in 
15.Corps 30.1.-(13.3.). 
51.D - From Odessa district. In 7. Army 23.1.-, in 10.Corps area 3.2.-, in 7.Army 
reserve (17.2.), detached (19.2.), in 50.Corps 20.2.-, in 19.Corps and 13.Army 
10.3.-(13.3.). 
62.D - From Kiev district. In 13.Army 14.1.-, in 23.Corps 17.2.-(13.3.). 
70.D - From Volga district. In 19.Corps (17.10.)-, in 10.Corps of 7. Army (26.1.), in 
34.AK:ssa 31.1./3.2.-25.2., in 10.Corps 25.2.-, in 28.Corps 29.2.-(13.3.). 
80.D - From Kiev district. In 7. Army 8.1.-, in 13. Army 1.3.-(13.3.). In 19.Corps 
(26.1.)- 10.3., in 23.Corps 10.3.-(13.3.). 
84.Motorized D - From Moscow district. In 7. Army 22.1.-, in 50.Corps (11.2.--
13.3.). 
86.Motorized D - From Volga district. In Reserve group of stavka 19.1-28.2., in 
28.Corps 29.2.-(13.3.). 
90.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 50.Corps 8.10.-, in (already 26.1.) - (13.3.). 
91.Motorized D - From Siberian district. In Reserve group of stavka 20.1.-( actually 
from 20.2.), in front reserve 1.3.-, in 34.Corps 9.3.-22.3. 
95.Motorized D - From Odessa district. In Northwestern front reserve 25.1.-, in 
19.Corps 21.2.-, in 34. Corps 1.3.-(13.3.). 
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97.D - From Kiev district. In 13. Army (by order 18.1.). In Northwestern front re-
serve 1.2.-, in 23.Corps 20.2.- 7.3., in 15.Corps 7.3.- (13.3.). 
100.D - From Belorussian front. In 7. Army 4.12.-, in 50.Corps (already 26.1.), in 
34.Corps 28.2.-(13.3.). 
113.D - From Belorussian district. In 7.Army reserve 24.12.-, in 10.Corps 3.2.-
(13.3.). 
123.D - From Kalinin district. In 19.Corps 26.10.-, in 50.Corps (already 26.1.). In 
7.Army reserve (about 25.2.-), in 50.Corps 1.3.-(13.3.). 
138.D - From Kalinin district. In 7.Army resetve (11.1939)-. In 50.Corps 11.12.-, in 
Army reserve 27.12.-, in 10.Corps 27.1.-(13.3.). 
142.D - Formed in Leningad district. In Karelian Isthmus 14.9.-, in 50.Corps (al-
ready 8.10), detached (17.10.), in 50.Corps 23.10.-, in Gröndahl group (5.12.), in 
13.Army 25.12.-, in 15.Corps 7.1.- (26.1.), detached 30.1.-(13.3.). 
150.D - From Belorussian district. In 7. Army reserve 5.11.-. To Karelian isthmus 
5.12.-. In Gröndahl group (15.12.)- and in 13.Army 25.12.-, in 3.Corps (already 
13.1., still 13.3.). 
173.Motorized D - From Volga district. In stavka reserve group 25.1.-. In North-
western front reserve 1.3.-, in 28.Corps 5.3.-(13.3.). 
Karelian fortification area (KAUR) - In Karelian Isthmus. 
7.Cavalry D - From Belorussian district. In 3.Cavalry Corps to Finnish direction 
20.2., in Reserve group of stavka. In 7. Army 10.3.-(13.3.). 
36.Cavalry D - From Belorussian district. In 3.Cavahy Corps to Finnish direction 
22.2., in Reserve group of stavka. In 7. Army 10.3.-(13.3.). 
1.Light armoured brigade - In 10.Tank corps, in 7. Army (30.11.)-(13.3.). 
13.Light armoured brigade - In 10.Tank corps, in 7. Army (30.11.)-(13.3.). 
20.Armoured brigade - In 19.Corps 8.- 23.10. In 7. Army (30.11.)-(13.3.). 
29.Light armoured brigade - From Belorussian district. In Reserve 15.2.-, in front 
reserve 1.3., in 34.Corps 12.3.-(13.3.). 
35.Armoured brigade - In 50.Corps 8.10.-, in 7. Army 15.11.- (13.3.). 
39.Armoured brigade - From Moscow district. In 7. Army 47.Corps (20.10. 1939). 
In 7. Army (30.11.)., in Gröndahl group and 13.Army (15.12.)- (13.3.). 
40.Armoured brigade - In 8. Army 28.9.-, in 19.Corps 9.10.-, in 7. Army 15.11.- 
(13.3.). 
15.Infantry-machinegun brigade - In Leningad district 10.Tank corps. In 7.Army 
15.11.-(13.3.). 
Marine brigade of the Baltic fleet - Fought in the Gulf of Finland 3-13.3. 
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Between Ladoga and Arctic Ocean 
Southern group of 8. Army - commander 2 cl. komandarm M.P. Kovaliov 13.1.-
11.2. Renamed 15. Army. 
15.Army - commander 2 cl. komandarm M.P. Kovaliov 11.-25.2., 2 cl. komandarin 
V.N. Kurdiumov 25.2.-28.3.; member of war council N.N. Vatutin, A.I. Gusev, 
korpkorn N.N. Vashugin; chief of staff kombrig M.I. Kozlov 11.-12.2., colonel/ 
kombrig P.A. Ivanov 12.2.-28.3. - Formed from 8.Army Southern group 11.2., 
disbanded 28.3. 
8.Army - commander komdiv I.N. Habarov -n. 4.12., kornkor V.N. Kurdiumov n. 
4.12-10.1., 2 cl. komandarm G.M. Shtern 10.1.-; member of war council brig-
kom S.I. Shabolov -17.12., korpkorn K.N. Zimin 17.12.-; chief of staff colonel/ 
kombrig Larionov -17.12., kombrig F.D. Rubtsov 17.12.-5.1., colonel G.P. Kotov 
5.1.-. - Formed from Novgorod group in 14.9. 1939, to Petrozavodsk 29.10. 
Operation group of kombrig Koroteev. -13.1.-13.3. 1940. 
9.Army - commander komkor M.P. Duhanov 17.11.-21.12., kornkor V.I. Tshuikov 
22.12.- ; members of war council brigkom Furt 16.11.-5.4., 1 cl. armkorn L.Z. 
Mehlis 8.1.-5.4; chief of staff komdiv A.P. Sokolov 17.11.-7.1., komdiv D.N. Ni-
kishev 7.1.-5.4., (pt.) colonel Razuvaev (7.2.), (pt.) komdiv M.S. Shmyrev (al-
ready 13.3.). - Formed 17.11. in Kemi in Eastern Karelia, disbanded 5.4. 1940. 
14.Army - commander komdiv A.A. Tjurin 17.9-2.10., (pt.) kombrig B.A. Pigare-
vitsh 2.-17.10., komdivV.A. Frolov 17.10.-(13.3.): member of war council brig-
kom A.I. Krjukov, T.T. Hrjukin; chief of staff kombrig B.A. Pigarevitsh 17.9.-. 
- Formed 16.9. as Murmansk group, renamed 19.11. 
56.Corps - commander komdiv A.I. Tsherepanov -28.2., kombrig K.A. Koroteev 
28.2.-. - In Petrozavodsk since September 1939. In 8. Army 26.10.-11.2., in 15. 
Army 11.2.-20.3. 1940. 
1.Corps - commander komdivV.A. Frolov (-17.10.1939), kombrig R.I. Panin -29.12., 
komdiv/kornkor D.T. Kozlov 29.12.-. - In 8. Army 22.11.-18.4. 
8.Corps - commander komdiv I.G. Rubin. - In 8.Arnry 2.2-11.2., in 15. Army 11.2.-
21.4. 
14.Corps - commander komdivV.G.Vorontsov. - In 8. Army 16.1.- 21.4. 
Special Corps - commander komdiv M.S. Shmyrov -6.3., komdiv P.I. Batov 6.3.-. 
- In 8.Army (already 30.10.), then in 9.Army 17.11.1939-23.3. 1940. 
47.Corps - commander kombrig/komdiv I.F. Dashitshev (already in October)-c. 
8.1.1940, kombrigV.I.Vinogradov c. 8.1.- . - In 9.Army 19.11.- 20.3. 
Repola (Rebola) operation group - commander komdiv D.N. Nikishev. - Formed 
2.2., disbanded 22.3. 
3.D of Finnish people's army - Formed 10.1. 1940, in 8.Army and in 15.Army - 
(13.3.). 
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4.D of Finnish people's army -Was up to 13.3. Border guards division. 
Border Guard division of Finnish people's army - Formed 12.1. 1940 in Mur- 
mansk, renamed 13.3.4. D of Finnish people's army. 
11.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 8.Army 12.1.-, in 8.Corps 20.1.-. Then as 
detached in 15.Army 12.2. (still 21.2.). In 56.Corps 10.3.-. 
14.D - Formed in Leningad district. Murmansk Group 16.9.-, in 14.Army 19.11.- 
(13.3.). 
18.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 56.Corps (already 17.9.1939), in 15.Army 
11.2. 1940-. Disbanded (before 8.4. 1940). 
37. Motorized D - From in Siberian district. In 8.Army 8.2.-, in 8.Corps 10.2.-, in 
56,Corps 9.3.-. 
44.D - From Kiev district. In 9.Army 9.12.-(13.3.). 
52.D - From Belorussian district. In 14.Army (by order 10.11.)- (13.3.). 
54.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 9.Army 16.11.-(13.3.). 
56.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 8.Army 1.Corps 17.9.-(13.3.). 
60.D - From Kiev district. In 8.Army 9.1.-, in 15.Army 11.2.-(13.3.), in 56.Corps 
19.1.- (2.3.), detached (9.3.). 
72.D - From Kiev district. In 8.Army 24.1.-, in 15.Army 11.2.-(13.3.). In 8.Corps 
10.2.-(13.3.). 
75.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 1.Corps (17.9.)-, in Olonets 7.12. - 20.3. In 
8.Army (22.10.) - (13.3.). 
87.D - From Ural district. In 8.Army 14.Corps 12.2. (actually 2.3.-) - (13.3.). 
88.D - Formed in Leningad district Arkhangelsk area. In 9.Army Special Corps 
26.12.- 21.3. 
104. Mountain D - Formed in Leningad district Murmansk area. In Murmansk 
Group 16.9.-, in 14.Army 19.11.-. 
119.Motorized D - From Siberian district, in 8.Army (nominally from 4.2.) and 
15.Army 11.2.-: In 56.Corps 10.3.- (13.3.). 
122.D - From Belorussian district. In Murmansk Group 7.11. 1939-, in 9.Army 
16.11.-, in Special Corps 27.12.-. 
128.Motorized D - From Ural district. In 8.Army 14.Corps 12.2.- (13.3.). 
131.D - From Kiev district. In Arkhangelsk (already 13.1. 1940.) h 9.Army (nomi- 
nally from 31.12.). Partly in 47.Corps (already 13.3.). 
136.D - From Moscow district. In 8.Army (already 20.10. 1939). In 7.Army 12.12.-, 
in 13.Army 25.12.-. In 15.Corps 24.1.-, detached 26.-31.1., in 23.Corps 30.1.- 
(13.3.). 
139.D - From Belorussian district. In 8.Army 1.Corps 18.11.-, later 14.Corps - 
(13.3.). 
144.Motorized D - From Moscow district. In 15.Army 11.2.- (actually 1.3.-), in 
8.Corps 9.3.-, in 56.Corps 11.3.-. 
155.D - From Kalinin district. In 7.Army (-25.10). To Medvezhegorsk (5.11.), in 
8.Army 1.Corps, later 14.Corps (13.3. 1940). 
163.D - From Moscow district. In 7.Army 47.Corps (24.9.). In Special Corps 18.11.-, 
then 9.Army 47.Corps (30.11.). In Repola operation group 15.2.-(13.3.). 
164.D - From Belorussian district. To Petrozavodsk 22-27.12. In 8.Army 25.12.-, in 
1.Corps 12.1.- (13.3.). 
168.D - Formed in Leningad district. In 56.Corps 24.9.-(15.3.), in 8.Army 29.10.-, 
in 15.Army 11.2.-. 
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172.D - From Moscow district. In 9.Army 1.3.-, in Special Corps 6.3.-. 
24.Motorized Cavalry D — From Belorussian district 3. Cavalry Corps. Since 
31.1. 1940 motorized cavalry division. In 8. army 8.2.-, in 1.Corps (already 9.3) 
— (13.3.). 
25.Motorized Cavalry D - Formed in Leningad district. In 8. Army in Pskov area 
(20.10., 13.11. 1939). Since 8.1. 1940 light motorized division. In 8. Army 16.1.-, 
in 15. Anny 11.2.-. In 8.Corps 2.2.- (13.3.). 
34.Armoured brigade — In 8. Army (30.11.)- , 15. Army 11.2.-. In 56.Corps 11.12.-
(13.3.). 
201.Air landing brigade — In Leningrad district. In 15.Army 11.2.-, in 8.Corps 
13.2.-. Later detached. 
204.Air landing brigade — From Kiev district. In 8.Army 9.2.-, in 15. Army 11.2.-, 
in 8. Corps 13.2.-, later detached, in 56. Corps (9.3., still 13.3.). 
214.Air landing brigade — From Belorussian district. In 8.Army 8.2.-, in 15. Army 
11.2.-, in 8.Corps 13.2.-, later detached. 
Ski brigade commanded by colonel V.D. Dolin. Formed in 9. Army in 3.2. 1940, 
destroyed by 20.2. 1940.. 
Sources 
— RGVA: Leningrad military district and Winter war archives. 
— RGAVMF: Baltic fleet archives. 
— Finnish military archives (SArk), booty and prisoner documents. 
— German Burades archiv — Militär archiv: Intelligence reports. 
— Red Army — internet site (www.rkka.ru). 
— Soviet historical books and memoirs. 
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2. The Soviet mass attack in 1940 
Re-evaluation and preparations 
During the first phase of the war the Soviet troops had not achieved 
results that would have forced the Finnish military command to give 
up resistance. The offensive on the Karelian Isthmus had stopped 
at the main Finnish defence position, and there had been few suc-
cesses on the northern side of Lake Ladoga. 
The Finns had already achieved impressive victories on the 
eastern border, and the Soviet advance had been fended off in the 
main position on the Isthmus. The minimal activity shown by the 
Soviet troops along the eastern border could have been due to the 
fact that the Main Military Soviet had decided that the result of the 
war would be determined on the Isthmus, so that the majority of the 
resources were to be directed there. 
When the advance came to a halt, four divisions not included 
in the original battle plan had already been brought into the Lenin-
grad Military District: two to the Isthmus, one to the 8th Army and 
another to the 9th Army. 27 divisions and a further 15 000 men of the 
Finnish People's Army (two divisions) were now gathered against 
Finland. 
According to Meretskov's own account, Stalin was extremely 
angry. He had scolded the commander because poor success in the 
war against Finland would have a deleterious effect"on our foreign 
policy, because these days the entire world is looking at us." Stalin 
had demanded that a change must take place in the operation. 
The basic weakness of the original war plan was that the troops 
had been distributed in an inefficient way. Adequate superiority 
could not be achieved in the areas of emphasis, as the Soviet Union 
was trying to attack in too many directions. The concentration of 
troops had been slower than expected, and the capacity of the roads 
in the directions of the attacks along the east coast had proved inad-
equate, so that it was impossible to take advantage of Soviet superi-
ority. Detachments arrived at the battle area one after another. The 
Murmansk railway, having only a single track, became a bottleneck 
for both the transportation of troops and maintenance. 
Already by early December the Soviet high command had start-
ed to suspect that Army Commander Meretskov, who had been in 
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charge of the operation had lost grasp and his readiness to consider 
other alternatives. Matvei Zakharov, who worked in the Operative 
Department of the General Staff, was ordered to investigate a suit-
able area for the main attack on location and to suggest appropriate 
command arrangements. On 16 December, after returning to Mos-
cow from the front, Zakharov suggested the following: 1) The main 
attack must be moved from the direction of Kiviniemi to that of Vii-
pun. 2) The destruction of the fortification zone must be organized 
in the way suggested by the Directions for the Breaking of Fortifica-
tion Zones. 3) In order to improve the command arrangements, it 
would be sensible to create two fronts: the North-Western Front (on 
the Karelian Isthmus) and the Karelian Front (from Lake Ladoga to 
Murmansk) . 
After this preparatory work, high-level commanders were sent 
from Moscow to acquaint themselves with the situation: the com-
mander of the Kiev Military District, Army Commander ist class S.K. 
Timoshenko, went to the Isthmus, and the commander of the Belo-
russian Military District, Army Commander 2nd Class M.P. Kovalev, 
went to the north-eastern side of Lake Ladoga." 
After the operations of the troops from the Leningrad Military 
District had proved fruitless, the Main Military Soviet had to halt 
the offensive in late December 1939 so that the command could be 
organized in a more reliable manner and a new operation plan could 
be drawn up for breaking through the Mannerheim Line. 
Individual improvements were already carried out in Decem-
ber. Starting on 24 December, a series of orders were given concern-
ing the establishment of special ski battalions and squadrons. A total 
of 45 000 men were assigned to approximately 40 ski battalions and 
200 ski squadrons. Most of them did not get into battle until the end 
of February and March.31  
There was no desire to leave the Finns alone during this period 
of deliberation. On 3 January the high command (Voroshilov, Stalin 
and Shaposhnikov) ordered: "For ten days we must use air bomb-
ings to strike systematically and forcefully at targets located deep in 
the rear: administrative targets and armament industries, rail bridg-
es, railway intersections, ports and cargo ships." This ended a long, 
relatively peaceful period on the Finnish home front. The Soviet Air 
Force was to concentrate on the destruction of the centre and port of 
Kemi in northern Finland, and assistance arriving from Sweden was 
to be cut off. At the end of January the blockade of Finnish ports was 
emphasized with air bombings and the dropping of mines along 
waterways. 
A special session of the Politburo dealt with the issues of the 
war in Finland during the first days of January. Among those pres-
ent were the commander of the Leningrad Military District and 
the members of the Main Military Soviet, the commanders of the 
military districts of Kiev and Belorussia, who had returned from the 
front, and key figures of the People's Commissariat for Defence and 
the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov, put 
forward the same plan for breaking through the Mannerheim Line 
as he had presented a few months earlier, and this time Stalin ac-
cepted it. The final shaping of the plan was entrusted to Timoshenko 
and the General Staff. 
At the suggestion of the General Staff, a North-Western Front 
was established in Leningrad by an order of the Red Army's Main 
War Council on 7 January 1940. On the same day, Timoshenko, who 
already had a knowledge of the Isthmus, was appointed commander 
of the troops at the front, which included the 7th Army (command-
ed by K.A. Meretskov) and the 13th Army (commanded by Army 
Commander 2nd grade V.D. Gröndahl) as well as several air force, 
artillery and rear detachments. The Baltic Fleet was also operatively 
subordinated to the front. 
Kovalev had not suggested a shared command at the front for 
the troops on the northern side of Lake Ladoga, and these remained 
directly under the People's Commissariat for Defence. Thus the Gen-
eral Staff acted as the administrative organ for all these armies and 
created a sub-centre for their rear maintenance (at the headquar-
ters of the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District). 
The main depot for this centre was inVologda. Kovalev himself was 
moved to take charge personally of the operations on the north-
eastern side of Lake Ladoga. 32 
The preparations for a new attack had to be carried out as 
quickly as possible, because if the attack was prolonged, there was a 
danger that Britain and France would become involved in the war on 
Finland's side. This would have caused new difficulties for the Soviet 
Union, and not only as far as Finland was concerned. 
A notable reinforcement of the troops to be used in the offen-
sive was already under way even while planning was still going on. 
During the 20-25 days of the preparation phase the front was re-
inforced with 12 divisions, two Army Corps headquarters and six 
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artillery regiments. The last replacement troops arrived at the front 
when fighting had already commenced. The Red Army command 
already had to rely on reserves from military districts as far away as 
Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, the Urals, Siberia and the Volga, but troops 
from the southern districts were not engaged, nor were any from the 
southernmost of the inner military districts (Orel and Kharkov), as a 
Western intervention was feared from the direction of the Caucasus. 
The defence against Japan in the Far East was also left intact. On the 
other hand, it was becoming more and more clear that the level of 
alert had to be increased in other border areas of the Soviet Union 
as well. When the secret service found out that France and Britain 
were planning an operation against the oil areas of the Caucasus, 
the highest war council of the Red Navy, among others, decided on 
29 January to improve the air defence of the loading areas in Baku 
and on the Caspian Sea. 
When the attack began, there were eight Army Corps head-
quarters (including one of the so-called Finnish People's Army) on 
this front, of which the 7th Army had four and the 13th Army three, 
and 23 divisions (of which two were Finnish). 
A high command reserve detachment was put together to the 
west of Leningrad (a cavalry corps, three infantry divisions and an 
armoured brigade). This was to cross the Gulf of Finland and attack 
across the Bay of Viipuri after the breakthrough had been achieved 
on the Isthmus, or alternatively use the breakthrough in the Viipuri 
direction to its advantage. Before the start of the mass attack, the re-
serve group was placed tinder the commander of the North-Western 
Front on 8 February.33  
After taking up his post, Timoshenko paid great attention to 
choosing the direction of the main attack, which was very impor-
tant to the overall result of the war. He toured the front, familiarized 
himself with the terrain, studied the Finnish defences and fighting 
methods and had discussions at the headquarters and at the front. 
Based on his observations and on analyses of his subordinates' re-
ports and suggestions, the front commander decided to direct the 
main attack atViipuri, justifying his decision on the following opera-
tive-strategic and tactical grounds: 
a) A breakthrough in this sector would create favourable condi-
tions for a decisive operation involving the entire front that 
could destroy the enemy's main grouping on the Karelian Isth-
mus and prevent it from withdrawing behind the Saimaa lake 
system. 
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b) The seizure of Viipuri would cause immense moral and material 
damage to the enemy, because this was Finland's second most 
important political, economic and military centre as well as a 
coastal fortification area. Furthermore,Viipuri was an important 
intersection for railways and main roads and a seaport. Seiz-
ing it would prevent the movement of the enemy's troops in 
south-eastern Finland, whereas the Red Army would have an 
opportunity to attack southern and central Finland. Viipuri was 
the "key" to southern Finland for the Finns, and if it was lost, 
defending the Karelian Isthmus would lose its meaning. 
c) The Soviet troops in this sector were only 30--35 km away from 
Viipuri. 
d) The troops had a very advantageous sector terrain-wise, from 
Muolaanjätvi to Summa. In this direction there were notably 
more roads and less lakes, in addition to which it was more 
densely populated. It was easier to use technology to break a 
strongly fortified line than to advance through roadless terrain 
and wooded areas of with water and mires. The aim was that 
the 7th and 13th Armies would execute a breakthrough simul-
taneously over a relatively wide front using the advantages of-
fered by the front that extended from the River Vuoksi to the 
village of Karlvila. The parallel flanks of the Armies would then 
carry out the main attack. 
e) The strikes by the Air Force and artillery had weakened the mo-
rale of the defenders. The effects of the artillery had been great-
est in this particular sector. 
The continuity of the operation of the North-Western Front was to 
be guaranteed by drawing up reserves in echelons in the rear. Ti-
moshenko decided to organize the troops for the main attack into 
four echelons: eleven divisions in the front line, the third divisions 
in the second line of the Army Corps in the second echelon, the two 
reserve divisions of the Armies, armoured brigades and a mecha-
nized sharpshooter-machine gun brigade in the third echelon, and 
the front commander's two reserve divisions and the two divisions 
of the "Finnish People's Army" in the fourth echelon. The infantry 
divisions had been organized into one echelon with all three regi-
ments in line, while every regiment had positioned its battalions in 
three successive echelons. The width of the front of an Army Corps 
was ordered to be 5--6 km, while a division's front was 2--2.5 km, a 
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regiment's 700-800 m, and a company's at least 400 m. This kind of 
echelon was to make it possible to carry out a massive first strike and 
reinforce the troops from depth at the right moment. It also created 
good preconditions for directing the emphasis of the troops flexibly 
as dictated by the situation. 
No one in the world had yet attacked a permanently fortified 
line like this. The English and French had not dared to attack the 
Siegfried Line, even though a notable part of the German Army had 
been tied down in Poland in the autumn of 1939. Similarly the Ger-
mans waited eight months in front of the Maginot Line and then 
went around it through Belgium in the spring of 1940. 
The attacking troops had to be trained before they were sent 
into the assault against the fortification zone. The instructions ex-
plained in detail how cooperation between the services was to be 
organized at different levels when breaking through fortified areas, 
and how artillery and air preparations and the actual attack were to 
be carried out, in addition to fighting in the rear and securing vic-
tory. 
The period from late December to early February was in prac-
tice one of trench warfare on the Isthmus. The Soviet troops were 
developing the way in which they should fight. They tried to ap-
proach the Finnish lines using the protection provided by trenches 
and ditches, and using armoured protective shields. The infantry was 
pulled behind tanks on armoured sleds. The balloons used for fire 
control purposes were troublesome to the Finns, because they en-
abled the Soviet artillery to project accurate fire into the nests of the 
defence line. There was also an attempt to soften up the dugouts of 
the Mannerheim Line with the heavy artillery fire over the sights, 
with flame-throwing tanks and with tanks left in front of the weap-
on holes of the fortifications. In some places the tanks managed to 
force their way through the Finnish defence line and settle there as 
nests - this happened at Oinola on the shore of Muolaanjärvi, for 
example. The result was that the Finns exhausted their strength try-
ing to recapture the line. 
The Soviet troops operating in the area between the Arctic 
Ocean and the Baltic Sea on 1 February comprised a total of 40 divi-
sions, the total strength being 957 675 men. More troops were arriv-
ing and the Red Army of 3.5 million men had more than adequate 
reserves. Of the 13 Finnish divisions, 9 were on the Isthmus, togeth-
er with a cavalry brigade. The Soviet troops on the Isthmus had a 
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significant superiority over their adversary: more than two-fold for 
the infantry and almost three-fold for the artillery, while they were 
utterly superior in terms of tanks and aircraft. On 11 February the 
Red Army had 1 558 tanks on the Isthmus, whereas the Finns had 
only 10 usable tanks in their reserves." 
Breaking through the Mannerheim Line 
Before the start of the mass attack the Soviet troops carried out small 
attacks in early February to improve their initial position. These rela-
tively powerful attacks from the Finnish point of view took place 
daily on 1-9 February, and there were 100-150 tanks on the move 
on 5 February. 
A North-Western Front directive issued on 3 February 1940 
stated that the task of the front was to penetrate the fortification 
zone with simultaneous attacks by the inner flanks of the 7th and 
13th Armies and disperse the opponent's defence forces along the 
line from the River Vuoksi to Karhula (see Map 3). The right flank of 
the 7th Army was to attack on the line Vuoksi - Muolaanj ärvi, in the 
direction ofYrjölä - Ristseppälä. It would have to reach the line Lohi-
joki - Purpua - Ilves - Kämärä station-Huumola in four or five days, 
and would then have to prevent the enemy from advancing to the 
west destroy the entire enemy grouping on the Karelian Isthmus. 
The North Western Front was then to advance to the line Käkisalmi 
- Antrea station - Viipuri. The depth of the first operation was 20-25 
km and the overall depth of the operations, for which 12-15 days 
had been reserved, was 60-65 km. The speed of attack was to be 2--
3 km per day when breaking through the defence line and 6-10 km 
per day when chasing the Finnish troops. (The North Western Front 
provided additional instructions that pinpointed a target for mass 
attack on the western side of Viipuri; i.e. the troops crossing the Bay 
of Viipuri had to cut off the main road and railway leading west from 
Viipuri and advance to the line Kolhola —Villala - Nurmi station.)35 
The commander of the 7th Army, Meretskov, ordered that artil-
lery preparations should last two hours and twenty minutes (from 
0940 to 1200 hours on 11 February), while the commander of the 
13th Army, Gröndahl, ordered three hours of artillery preparation 
and an infantry attack to begin at 1150 hours. Due to unfavourable 
weather conditions, the Air Force could not participate in the fire 
preparations. Flying conditions in the direction of the Gulf of Fin- 
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Map 3. The idea of mass attack in Febri.iary 1940 
land were vesy poor on 5-17 February and 21-28 February. 
Fighting was fierce from the start. The attackers had to cross 
a zone full of granite posts and anti-tank ditches, fields of barbed 
wire, minefields, obstacles and entanglements. The infantry attack 
took place under the protection of the artillery's avalanche of fire. 
The distance of impact for the infantry was to be 200 in at most, and 
the tanks were to advance to holes cleared in the obstacle zone on a 
level with the first echelon of the infantry, and then cover the infan-
try and make way for it while fighting alongside it. The assault troops 
attacked behind the first echelon of the infantry. After the artillery 
preparations, the strike detachments set off to capture bunkers and 
firing nests. 
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Three Soviet divisions supported by several hundred tanks at-
tacked along the entire width of the defence sector of one Finn-
ish division, and in the Lähde sector the attackers managed to force 
their way forward along the road. 
The assault detachments of the Red Army captured seven bun-
kers during the first day of the attack, and advanced to the depth 
of one or one and a half kilometres. They reached the support line 
of the main Finnish position, although only at a width of two com-
panies. In the other defence sectors of the 7th and 13th Armies the 
assault detachments managed to capture only a few bunkers and 
firing nests. They crossed the Finnish obstacle zone everywhere, but 
then became stuck. 
The following day the Soviet attack continued on the eastern 
side of Lake Summajäivi, and with the Finns thoroughly exhausted 
the front line was captured throughout the Lähde sector. 
With strong artillery support, the Soviet troops overcame a wide 
tank obstacle ditch of the support line on 13 February and by the 
evening the 123rd Division, with a strength of two regiments sup-
ported by tanks, had forced its way into the terrain around the Lähde 
intersection. At night they formed a tank fortress and dug in for the 
counter-offensive. The depth of penetration was now four kilome-
tres. 
The troops were quickly regrouped in support of the break-
through. The 7th Division was taken into battle on the left flank 
of the 123rd Division, and the 90th Division on the right flank. To 
guarantee success, the commander of the 7th Army assigned a mo-
bile detachment including an armoured battalion and a motorized 
infantry-machine gun battalion to the 50th Army Corps. (The 7th 
Army had a total of three such mobile groups at its disposal.) 
On the evening of 13 February Timoshenko gave the troops 
new directions in accordance with developments in the situation. 
The 7th Army was to provide efficient reinforcement for the break- 
through in the direction of Lehtola (Lahti) and to the rear of the 
defence position at Summa (Hotinen), as well as destroying the lat- 
ter. The left flank of the 19th Army Corps was to strike in the direc- 
tion of Leipäsuo station and capture it with the help of a mobile 
detachment appointed by the front commander. The activities of the 
10th and 34th Army Corps had to be made more efficient. On the 
night of 13 February the Air Force was to attack the enemy reserves 
who were approaching the front along roads from the direction of 
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Käkisalmi andViipuri. Special attention had to be paid to the area of 
Kämärä (Huumola) station. Timoshenko criticised the commanders 
harshly for their slackness and warned that in the future he would 
make sure that everyone would have to answer for his actions. On 
the following day the breakthrough was extended, so that by night-
fall its width was approximately 4 km and its depth 5--6 km. 
The Soviet breakthrough forced the Finns to withdraw to tem-
porary stations further back in the Summa and Lähde sectors, and 
on 15 February the supreme commander, Mannerheim, gave the 
army on the Isthmus permission to withdraw to temporary stations 
at the level of Samonlahti - Somme - the southern end of Näykki-
järvi - Kämärä station. 
On the following day the 90th Division captured Merkki and 
the 123rd Division pushed its first detachments into the area of 
Lukusuo, three kilometres north of Lähde, and to the Autio front 
three kilometres west of Lähde. The 84th Division attacked in the 
direction of Kiltinen. With the attacks by the 100th Division from the 
front and the 7th Division from the rear and flanks, the Soviet troops 
eliminated the strongest base of the Mannerheim Line, Summa, on 
15 February. By the evening of 15 February the width of the break-
through had expanded to eight kilometres. 
On 16 February the detachments of the 50th Army Corps ad-
vanced successfully to the north and north-west, and the troops of 
the left flank of the 19th Army Corps (90th Division) and the mobile 
detachment attacked Leipäsuo station. The mobile group captured 
Kämärä station. By the evening the breakthrough by the 7th Army 
had widened to 11-12 km and its depth was now 11 km, its tip being 
at Kämärä station. 
After persistent battles, the efforts of the left flank of the 13th 
Army began to bear fruit on 14-16 February. The first defence zone 
on the 18 km front of the 17th Division and 23rd Army Corps was 
crossed and the Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 4--5 km, 
reaching the northern shore of Lake Punnusjäivi, the northern part 
of Kyyrölä and the northern shore of Lake Muolaanjärvi. By the eve-
ning of 16 February the key parts of the Mannerheim Line had been 
destroyed and the defenders had suffered heavy losses. The speed at 
which the 7th Army had advanced corresponded to the goals of the 
command of the North-Western Front, but the success of the 13th 
Army was only about half of what had been expected.36 
A gaping hole had been bored in the Finnish defence line on 
the Isthmus, and on 17-19 February the Finns, successfully conceal-
ing what they were doing, withdrew along the entire front between 
the Vuoksi waterway system and the Gulf of Finland to a Temporary 
(VT) Position. On 17 February the commander of the North-West-
ern Front ordered the commander of the 7th Army to begin pursu-
ing them. The army had to harry the enemy energetically so that 
it would be impossible to reorganize resistance in the direction of 
Viipuri. Contacts with the mobile troops ordered to proceed in the 
direction of Leipäsuo station, Kämärä station and Säiniö should be 
maintained if at all possible. The army had one day in which to or-
ganize special ski groups to follow the enemy. The 19th Corps had 
to finish clearing Leipäsuo station, Väisänen and Taasionlampi of 
enemy troops, and was to move its main strength to the Hotokka 
- Kämärä front (near Kämäräjärvi) on 18 February. One division of 
the corps had to be moved to another attack echelon, away from the 
west to help the 13th Army capture the Muolaa base. After clear-
ing the area of Pien-Pero - Näykki - Huumola of enemy troops, the 
main forces of the 50th Corps were to move to the south-western 
shore of Lake Kämäräjärvi, Honkaniemi station yard and Mannila, 
also on 18 February. The 10th Corps had to begin a strong attack in 
the direction of Johannes in order to prevent the enemy from with-
drawing to Viipu i by that route. The 34th Corps had to follow the 
enemy along the west coast of the Isthmus and force the troops onto 
the Gulf of Finland. 
Stalin had formed too optimistic an image of the progress of the 
attack. He assumed the vanguard to be 6 km fromViipuri and ordered 
the North-Western Front to support the"mobile detachment" in the 
lead with truck and horse transport and to seize the Finnish defence 
positions in front of Viipuri. There was no going into Viipuri before 
heavy artillery, munitions and other maintenance had been brought 
closer by rail (using the Säiniö station). A quick attack would nar-
row the flanks, but it was hoped that aerial surveillance would spot 
the Finns' counter-measures in time. Throughout the operation, all 
the way to the capture of Viipuri, the city would be bombed without 
interruption,"sparing nothing and no one".37 
The Soviet advance increased significantly in speed, covering as 
much as 6-10 km in one day in some directions. The troops had al-
ready made contact with the Temporary position by 17 February, and 
two days later tanks managed to force their way behind this position 
in the terrain of Mustalampi and all the way to the main Viipuri- 
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Muolaa road. The inexperienced draftees were nervous when tanks 
appeared in the rear, even though the tanks could not capture the 
area permanently without protective infantry. At night they grouped 
themselves in a circle close to the Finnish rear. 
On 17-25 February the Red Army cleared the area west of the 
Mannerheim Line of enemy forces, captured the fortresses of Koivis-
to and the islands and capes whose batteries protected the entrance 
to the Bay of Viipuri, and established control over the routes leading 
from the east coast. 
The Finns were forced to admit that the continuous cold was a 
disadvantage to them, in terms of both the well-being of individual 
soldiers and the military situation as a whole. The waterways, which 
the Finns had considered to be their best lines of defence, had such 
a thick covering of ice that even heavy tanks could cross them, turn-
ing them into paths for an enemy attack. The activities of the So-
viet troops began to extend to the Bay of Viipuri on 18 February. The 
crevices cut in the ice by the Finns did not remain open for long, and 
from 22 February onwards, the islands in the bay found themselves 
becoming targets for a Soviet attack." 
Breaking into the Finnish Temporary position 
The Temporary position ran from the north-western shore of Lake 
Muolaanjärvi through Pien-Pero and Näykkijärvi to Sommee sta-
tion on the coast of the Bay of Viipuri. Mainly because of the difficult 
terrain (forest, snow and the lack of roads) the mobile detachments 
of the 7th Army did not succeed in their attempts at capturing this 
line. Another reason was that the Finns had had time to settle into a 
defensive position. A three-day snowstorm on 21-23 February was 
a great advantage to the Finns, because it slowed down the advance 
of the Soviet troops and covered the narrow forest roads with snow. 
The Finns referred to this snowstorm as their"last ally". 
In spite of the fact that the Finnish detachments had managed 
to dig themselves in at the temporary position and on the north-
western side of Lake Muolaanjärvi, the detachments of the 7th Army 
captured a defence centre belonging to the second zone in the area 
between Mustalampi and Näykkijärvi on 21 February. In this sector 
the Finns had maintained their positions along a line from Pien-
Pero through Suuri Ryövärinsuo to the north shore of Lake Näyk-
kijärvi. They attempted with one battalion on 22 February and with 
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three or four battalions on 24 February to remove the curve that had 
been created into the temporary position, but failed. 
23 February was the Red Army's day. Its troops had been en-
couraged to carry out the decisive breakthrough on that particular 
day, but the North-Western Front had to stop in order to organize a 
co-ordinated strike. 
The attack troops were exhausted after having fought continu-
ously for several days, but the troops of the 7th Army and the right 
flank of the 13th Army had an opportunity to rest on 26-27 February. 
During this time they reorganized themselves, carried out mainte-
nance and regrouped. The divisions in the first echelons in particular 
were reinforced, and in the early morning hours of 26 February the 
commander of the North-Western Front issued directions on how 
they were to break down the Finns' second defence zone. 
The withdrawal to the VT position increased pressure in the 
Vuoksi area, and the Finnish III Army Corps had to reinforce its 
western flank, to which the 13th Army moved its point of emphasis 
from Taipale at the end of February. 
On 27 February a division (136th) of the 13th Army partially 
captured the Muola-Ilves defence area from the south-east and an-
other division (62nd) threatened to go round the area in the north-
east. Still another division (97th) penetrated the isthmus between 
the lakes, passed Lake Ayräpäänjärvi, forced its way to the man de-
fence zone on the northern shore of the latter and began an attack 
against the Heilcurila defence area. 
After two days of rest and preparations, the Soviet troops on 
the Isthmus commenced an attack on 28 February. The aim of the 
North-Western Front was to destroy the Finnish grouping in theVii-
puri area and reach the line Käkisalmi - Joutseno - Lappeenranta 
- Luumäki - Virojoki. The attack took place under extremely difficult 
conditions, as the winter was unusually harsh 
As the Finns were withdrawing to a rear position, the So-
viet troops could now report great successes. The attacks regularly 
stopped for the night, however, and thus could not keep up with the 
withdrawing Finns. The artillery did not cause any great damage to 
the Finns this time, because it was still for the most part paralysed 
on the jammed roads of the Isthmus. For the same reason, it took 
the Soviet troops some time to move armoured reserves to the front 
line. They reached the T or Rear position in the direction of Viipuri 
- Tali on 1-2 March, but the terrain there was equally difficult and 
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limited the use of armoured weapons. Now it was the turn of the 
13th Army to advance, capturing the main Finnish position behind 
Lake Ayräpäänjärvi. 
The detachments of the 7th Army were preparing to go north 
to skirt round the fortifications in the Viipuri area, while the 13th 
Army continued to attack from the north and north-west and some 
of its troops were preparing to cross the middle course of the River 
Vuoksi atVuosalmi. The former reserve group was designated as the 
28th Corps (three divisions and reinforcements) on 29 February and 
placed within the 7th Army.39 
Operations between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic Ocean 
The experiences acquired by the Red Army at the beginning of the 
war showed that time had to be reserved for battles in the unin-
habited forests of the border area. Nevertheless reinforcements were 
brought to the eastern border within the limits of transportation and 
maintenance capacity. The Soviet troops were preparing attacks 
along some parts of the front on the northern side of Lake Ladoga at 
the end of the Winter War, although only a few of these attacks were 
ever carried out. There were no opportunities for operative, let alone 
tactical cooperation between sectors of activity. 
The forces of the Red Army fighting in the direction of Petroza-
vodsk - Sortavala doubled in size in January-February, so that there 
were (or would soon be) eight infantry divisions and two cavalry 
divisions in addition to the original eight divisions. Regiments that 
were worn out by battle were also reinforced, the maintenance orga-
nization was improved and a new field railway was quickly built. 
In order to facilitate command, the 8th Army was divided in 
two in January, and Army Commander (2nd class) G.M. Stern took 
charge of the army on 10 January, with Army Commander 2nd class 
M.P. Kovalev commanding the southern group. This division was 
confirmed on 11 February by establishing another army headquar-
ters. In the southern group, a new 15th Army was formed (com-
manded by Kovalev), while Army Commander 1st class G.I. Kulik, 
chief of the Main Artillery Administration and a friend of Stalin's 
from the civil war period, still acted as inspector in this direction. 
With special authorization from the high command, he intervened 
both in questions of personnel and in operative issues. 
The Finns continued to harry the Soviet troops they had encir- 
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eled on the north side of Lake Ladoga.The Soviet divisions defended 
dourly in the great encirclement of Kitelä and in several smaller ones 
that were gradually set up by the Finns during February. During this 
phase of encirclement warfare the Finns had to fend off all the Soviet 
troops that tried to enter the area by any of the roads leading to it. 
When the mass attack on the Karelian Isthmus had commenced, 
the 15th Army received an order on 12 February to attack the Impi-
lahti - Sortavala area over the ice and advance to the line Sortavala 
- Kuokkanierni - Rauhalahti. Before that the army had to try to free 
the 18th Division at once from encirclement and capture the islands 
on the western side of Pitkäranta and Salmi. The stavka probably 
intended to facilitate the success of the breakthrough by increasing 
pressure on the rear of the defenders in the "Käkisalmi direction", 
and Kovalev drew up a three-phase attack plan, but the attempts did 
not meet with any great success. CommissarVashugin, who arrived 
from the Isthmus, found great shortcomings in order and discipline, 
and Kovalev received an order on 25 February to hand over the army 
to his successor.ao 
In the first days of March the 8th and 15th Armies began a mass 
attack. After spreading out to the flanks in the uninhabited areas 
of Kollaa, the attack troops of the 8th Army (6 divisions) began to 
advance slowly, supported by heavy artillery, as the strong attack de-
tachments of the Red Army applied powerful pressure, and along 
the flanks, too, with their ski squadrons. Although the Finns brought 
reserves into these areas, they could not completely stop the advance 
of the Soviet troops. The first bases in the centre of the defence posi-
tion were captured on 10 March after a week of fighting, and on the 
evening of 12 March the Soviet troops penetrated 1.5 km along the 
railway track on the southern side of Lake Kollaanjärvi_. The counter-
attack prepared by the Finns never took place as news of the newly 
achieved peace arrived at this point. 
In early March the situation of the 15th Army at the front was 
much more difficult than that of the 8th Army. The Finns managed 
to keep the 168th Division and what was left of the 18th Division 
encircled, and the 15th Army had only one line of communication 
at its disposal, passing through Lodeinoe Pole, Salmi and Pitkäranta 
along the shore of Lake Ladoga. The Finns had managed to cut off 
this important line of communication on the north side of Pitkäranta, 
but the command of the 15th Army had to try to open it before the 
attack on Sortavala. Kulik had the operation plan approved by the 
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General Staff on 1 March, and after that the operation to capture the 
islands to the west of Pitkäranta. Kulik himself supervised the op-
eration. The task of capturing Maksimansaari, Petäjäsaari, Paimion-
saari andVuoratsu were given to the 37th Division. On the morning 
of 6 March the troops of the division began the attack on Petäjäsaari 
and Paimionsaari after artillery preparations. This time the artillery 
fire had been well organized and the defenders were not capable of 
organized resistance. Every one of them died. By the evening the de-
tachments of the Red Army had captured three islands - Maksiman-
saari, Petäjäsaari and Paimionsaari. Connections were re-established 
with the 168th Division and the Finns' maintenance roads were now 
in danger. Hence the Finns withdrew a kilometre in the direction of 
Pitkäranta. The next phase was meant to be an advance, with the 
support of two new divisions, to Impilahti.a ' 
When the battles of Suomussalmi and Raate were over, the 
main parts of Siilasvuo's 9th Division were concentrated more in 
the south, in the direction of Kuhmo. At the end of January most 
of the Soviet 54th Division was encircled there, but it managed to 
defend itself under difficult conditions until peace was announced. 
The ski troops that tried to reach the division from the east failed in 
their attempt, and Colonel Dolin's three-battalion ski brigade, for 
example, was destroyed completely in mid-February. A special Re-
pola operation group commanded by the chief of staff of the 9th 
Army had been formed in early February for an assistance operation, 
but a headquarters for this group could not be organized before the 
failure of the ski troops.` 2 
The Special Army Corps of the Red Army was tied by 6 - 9 Finn-
ish battalions, and then by a Swedish volunteer brigade. A new So-
viet attack was delayed by the difficulty of transporting additional 
troops. The 9th Army was supposed (Map 4) to begin an attack from 
15-17 March onwards with emphasis on the Salla direction, and 
most of the 9th Army Aviation was also to be concentrated in the 
direction of Kemijärvi. The aim was to cut off the connections be-
tween Märkäjäivi and Kemijärvi and destroy the Finnish group in 
Kemijärvi. At the same time the 54th Division had to be helped to 
break free from encirclement. Eight Soviet ski battalions were about 
to begin their raids to cut the connecting road from Kuusamo, and a 
reconnaissance attack against the Swedish brigade began on 12-13 
March, the last day of the war.13  
There were numerous rumours during the war that France and 
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Map 4. The idea of avi operation through Salla in February 1940 
England would send troops to help Finland in Petsamo, Murman-
sk and Archangel area, and thus the Soviet 14th Army had to be 
continuously prepared to defend the Kola Peninsula and Petsamo 
against a landing. Furthermore, the army began to prepare for an 
attack to the south, although it considered only the capture of the 
village of Nautsi possible because of the difficult circumstances and 
the limited troops available. Nautsi was located in the western"arm-
pit" of the arm of Petsamo. Movement to the south began in late 
February and Nautsi was taken on 7 March. The Soviet troops in this 
direction as well then positioned themselves for defence after hav-
ing advanced 165 km. 
At the end of the Winter War the 14th Army included in its plan-
ning the capture of the Kirkenes harbour on the Norwegian side of 
the border, because of the threatening situation in north-western 
Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did not want to pro- 
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yoke Norway unnecessarily, and the air force of the 14th Army was 
ordered not to fly close to the Norwegian border.44 
The Finnish army on the threshold of defeat 
During the first half of March decisive battles were fought in three 
main directions in the Karelian Isthmus: in the direction of Antrea 
station as the Soviet troops tried to advance to the rear of the main 
Finnish troops, on the eastern and northern sides of Viipuri and in 
the Bay of Viipuri. 
The commander of the North-Western Front, Timoshenko, still 
determinedly tried to carry out his original plan - to defeat the Finn-
ish troops in the Karelian Isthmus without allowing them to with-
draw to the inner parts of Finland. The advance to the rear of Viipuri 
was to cause great distress to the main Finnish forces. 
As the temporary position fell, the commander at the front 
ordered the 7th and 13th Armies on 29 February to break the de-
fences of the Finns once and for all and to crush the Finnish troops 
on the Isthmus. The overall task did not change: the troops were 
to follow the enemy, break its resistance in the positions of Viipuri, 
capture Viipuri and acquire a bridgehead position on the western 
shore of the Bay of Viipuri. The 7th Army was to advance to the line 
Karisalmi station - Lavola - Jukola - Ahokas and additionally to bite 
down firmly on the western shore of the Bay of Viipuri, while the 
13th Army was to"ensure success on its left flank in the direction of 
Antrea station." 
The high command of the Red Army and the command of the 
North-Western Front were, after a few days, prepared to deliver the 
decisive blow, as planned, even from the Koivisto peninsula, across 
the Bay of Viipuri and deep into the rear of the Finnish grouping in 
the direction of Pitkäniemi, inViipuri and even into the Saimaa area. 
On the afternoon of 3 March the commander of the 7th Army was 
ordered to send troops of the 28th Corps over the Bay of Viipuri the 
following night and with their assistance gain a bridgehead position 
some distance along the main Viipuri-Helsinki road. The corps was 
to seize on the western coast the areas of Repola, Nisalahti and Vi-
lajoki and then continue the attack to the north, towards the Simola 
station (15 km south of Lappeenranta). The Soviet troops were able 
to obtain reinforcements over the ice as the roads on the Isthmus 
were overloaded. The commander of the Baltic Fleet was ordered to 
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send coastal troops to assist the Red Army. 
The situation in the Bay of Viipuri was becoming critical for the 
Finns. At first they did not have any infantry at all to protect their 
flank and the firing possibilities of the coastal artillery were limited. 
It was a slow process to arrange the operative headquarters and con-
nections required by the situation. 
The Soviet troops who had advanced over the ice from Pul-
linniemi landed at Häränpäänniemi and Vilaniemi on the western 
shore of the Bay of Viipuri, and on 8 March they managed to cut 
off the main road leading from Viipuri to Helsinki. They contained 
the forces of the enemy by advancing at the same time over the ice 
through Suursaari and Lavansaari towards Kotka and Virolahti. A 
total of seven ski battalions of the Baltic Fleet attacked the area be-
tween Ristniemi and Kotka on 4 March. 
The six divisions of the left flank of the 7th Army (the 10th and 
28th Corps) finally converged upon a coastal strip 40 km wide, and 
the Soviet troops widened their bridgehead position to the west, 
north and north-east, extending it even to a depth of 12-13 km in 
the west. 
For the protection of the area between Hamina and Vilaniemi 
the Finns formed a new Hamina group that was directly subordinat-
ed to the supreme commander. All available reserves were gathered 
on the coast, so that the defence of the rear position weakened. The 
limiting of bridgeheads was successful, but the situation was becom-
ing very dangerous for the Finns. Only a few roads leading to the 
north-west and north, in the direction of the mire and forest areas of 
the province of Mikkeli, remained under the control of the Finnish 
troops on the Isthmus, and the Soviet Air Force and ski detachments 
were trying to prevent them from using these roads wherever a nar-
row passage existed." 
The right flank of the 7th Army, with a strength of six divisions 
and a mobile group, broke the enemy's resistance on the north-east-
ern side of Viipuri and advanced to the north-west. The railway was 
cut between Viipuri and Antrea station, thus severing the rail con-
nections of the Finnish troops in the Käkisalmi and Sortavala area 
to the west as well. The Soviet attack on Tali, north-east of Viipuri, 
surprised the adversary, but defences held up better elsewhere in the 
rear position despite the losses suffered. 
The detachments of the 34th Corps at the centre of the 7th 
Army managed to force their way first to the perimeter of Viipuri 
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and then to the suburbs, and finally, on 12 March, they captured a 
part of Viipuri, but the defenders were able to position themselves 
along a new defence line. Fierce battles were still being fought over 
Viipuri on the day when peace was declared on 13 March. According 
to Meretskov, the commander of the 7th Army, the aim was to show 
the Finns that the road to Helsinki was open to Soviet troops, and 
prevent possible intervention by Britain and France." 
The left flank of the 13th Army advanced to Kaunissaari (in 
Vuoksi) and Noskuanselkä and the centre of the front advanced to 
Kaupinsaari in the Pölläkkälä station sector and crossed the River 
Vuoksi in two places with five regiments, with the intention of strik-
ing at the enemy's rear. The Finns had to try to get reserves from Tai-
pale and other places. Fierce battles were fought beside the Äyräpää 
church and in Vuosalmi, where daily losses among the attacking 
forces were as high as 700 men. On 11 March the Soviet troops were 
about to cross Vuosalmi and the situation was beginning to be intol-
erable for the Finns in the unprotected clearings on the north-east-
ern shore of Vuoksi as well.`' 
Things were beginning to improve for the troops of the North-
Western Front. Even though they were tired and had suffered heavy 
losses, the battle could be continued. In order to take advantage of 
the success of the troops that had crossed the Bay of Viipuri and 
to spread quickly across southern Finland and partly into central 
Finland, the commander of the North-Western Front had a cav-
ahy corps, armoured brigades and ski battalions and squadrons in 
complete readiness. These troops were situated in the Koivisto area. 
Reserve troops assigned by the Headquarters for this purpose were 
also brought to the Isthmus." 
It has been calculated that at the end of the war a total of 960 
000 men, 11266 cannons and mortar, 2 998 tanks and 3 253 military 
aircraft were grouped against Finland. The total strength of the Finn-
ish army at the end of the war was 340 000 men. The Finns had 944 
field guns, although a third of them were completely outdated and 
had a stiff gun carriage, and 241 anti-armour guns. When the opera-
tions were over, the Red Army had 58 divisions on the front in Fin-
land - according to Shaposhnikov. In the next phase, the intention 
was to bring four divisions to the front and then ten more.49 Thus a 
decision in principle had been made for a strength of 72 divisions, 
i.e. six-fold superiority in numbers. Any war expedition from France 
and Britain would have ended up in a defensive position. 
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3. The period of the 'Interim peace' 
The overall plan of the Soviet General Staff in 1940-1941 
In the Finnish historiography the period between the Winter War 
and the so called Continuation War is called the 'Interim peace'. 
When the Winter War came to an end, the Soviet Union had to fear 
the war operations of England and France only from the south, from 
the direction of Persia and Turkey, even though the north could not 
be left completely without attention. This situation analysis was de-
scribed by the transfer of troops that took place after the Winter War. 
Of the troops that had participated in the Winter War, several divi-
sions were moved to the Caucasus. 
The operation begun by Germany in May 1940 on the west-
ern front turned the eyes of the Soviet leadership towards Rumania. 
The occupation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina was carried out 
almost bloodlessly on 28 June - 1 July 1940, using the troops of the 
Odessa and Kiev Military Districts. 
This decisive phase on the western front meant for the Soviet 
Union an opportunity to expand its security zone in the direction 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On 15-17 June 1940 Soviet troops 
advanced into all the Baltic republics without any fighting. The ex-
ample of the Baltic States, the transfers of troops and the threatening 
allusions to"Finland's turn" in speeches by officers of the Red Army 
led to a sharp shift in the tone of diplomatic reporting. In Finland the 
"August crisis" arose, but actually no greater concentrations than be-
fore were brought to bear on the Finnish border, even though some 
military exercises, e.g. one for paratroopers, were held in the Len-
ingrad Military District. After the Winter War Finland took a back-
ground position in Stalin's great policy, although it was still taken 
into consideration in military planning as a likely enemy state. 
When the Soviet borders were continuously moving to the west 
in the first years of World War II, the operative situation changed 
decisively, which meant that the strategic overall plan had to be 
changed from that in force in autumn 1939. This was complicated, 
however, by occasional differences of opinion between Stalin and 
the General Staff. 
From mid-April 1940 Major-General A.M. Vasilevskii acted as 
the main architect of the operation plan. The main framework was 
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drawn up by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshall Shaposhnikov, 
but Vasilevskii did the main work, together with N.F. Vatutin and 
G.K. Malandin. When Germany's western military expedition was 
over, and the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Bukovina had been added 
to the Soviet Union, the new plan was completed in late July 1940, 
and the image of a threat that it presented remained practically un-
changed until June 1941. 
Shaposhnikov saw that only enough troops to guarantee the 
status quo should be left in the east to face Japan. It was also con-
sidered that the northern sea border and the southern land border 
could be left almost unprotected. The main forces of the Soviet Union 
would have to be positioned on the North-Western and Western 
Fronts, against Germany, along a line from the Baltic Sea to Poles'ya 
(in central area of the German border). 
In September 1940 the Soviet General Staff had returned to 
its routine working mode to the extent that its"operative thinking" 
could be renewed. Shaposhnikov had had to step aside from his post 
in August 1940, but planning was continued on the same basis. In 
September the Minister of Defence, Marshal Timoshenko, the new 
Chief of the General Staff, Meretskov, and Vatutin presented Stalin 
and some members of the Politburo with a memo by Timoshenko 
and Meretskov dated 18 September 1940. Stalin thought that the 
Germans would attack in the south-west in order to seize economic 
and production centres, and ordered the main concentration to take 
place in that direction. Vasilevskii, Malandin and A.F. Avisov now 
made corrections to the outline. The basis for planning was ap-
proved on 14 October 1940, and the detailed plan was to be ready by 
15 December, so that the commanders of the military districts and 
headquarters could start making plans for their districts by 1 January 
1941. 
From the autumn of 1940 - when Meretskov became Chief of 
the General Staff - the basic notion of the grouping of the Red Army 
changed: the emphasis moved to the south-west, where it remained 
until June 1941. Lying behind the reinforcement of the South-West-
ern Front were the views of Stalin and the Party. 
In the new"plan to defend the borders of the state", which was 
completed in late winter 1941, even larger concentrations were to 
take place in the western border areas. Certain military districts were 
already being instructed in January to move troops to Belorussia, the 
Ukraine and the Caucasus in the spring. The orders to carry out the 
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transfer plans were given in late April and May and the actual trans-
fer of troops was commenced in May - June. 
In August — September 1940 the perceived enemies in the west 
were Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Finland, while Japan 
would maintain armed neutrality but could attack at any time. 
The probability that the plans for action against Germany would 
have to be used increased in spring 1941, when Germany had given 
up the idea of landing in Britain, at least for the time being, and 
turned its attention to the Balkans. 
The Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, proposed to 
Stalin on 15 May 1941 that a preventive attack against Germany 
should be commenced immediately. Germany must not be given the 
initiative. Zhukov would not have proposed this had the idea been 
entirely unknown to Stalin, but the latter nevertheless considered 
the Red Army to be still unprepared for war. 
The main doctrine of the Red Army was an offensive one. Ac-
cording to Stalin, a modern army did not have to spend too much 
time on defensive action. Since the Soviet doctrine began with the 
idea of fighting on the enemy's territory, it was clear that the plans 
were for an attack or counter-attack. 
The first alternative for a Soviet attack on Germany was to con-
centrate troops to the south of Brest-Litovsk from 1940 onwards 
and mount powerful attacks on Lublin, Cracow and finally Breslau 
(Wroclaw), followed by an advance to the upper course of the Oder. 
The direction was considered advantageous because Germany was 
not thought to have updated its defence in the area of the former 
Poland. During these attacks the German main forces would have to 
be actively contained to the north of Brest. The aim in the first phase 
of the war was to cut off Germany's connections to the Balkans, cap-
ture its most valuable economic support area and prevent the Balkan 
states from joining in the war. This required a mass concentration 
in the area of the Kiev Military District. According to calculations 
in spring 1941, there would be 152 Soviet divisions available on the 
main front between Tshizev and Ljudovleno, arrayed against an as-
sumed 100 German divisions. In other directions (those of Finland, 
East Prussia, Hungary and Rumania) active defensive action was to 
be taken, as well as preparatory measures for an attack on Rumania 
when circumstances became favourable. 
The second alternative was to centralize the main forces on the 
north side of Brest, causing losses to the main German forces and 
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capturing East Prussia. This alternative became more and more un-
likely as troops were moved from Siberia, their emphasis being in 
the Ukraine." 
The Finnish theatre of war as a part of the whole 
After the Finnish Winter War and the occupation of the Baltic coun-
tries, the strategic position of the Soviet Union in the Baltic region 
had changed decisively. A directive from the People's Commissariat 
for the Navy defined the task of the Baltic Fleet as being the creation 
of a defence system in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland that could 
be used to achieve control of the northern part of the Baltic Sea and 
destroy the enemy's bases and vessels. 
The image of the enemy projected in the Baltic Fleet's general 
plans of summer 1940 is interesting. The main enemy in the Baltic 
Sea is seen to be Germany, if that country succeeds in defeating Brit-
ain and the two settle into a compromise peace. And even if Germa-
ny were to suffer defeat, Britain might still make use of it against the 
Soviet Union. In any case the alliance between Finland and Sweden 
would play an important part in the war operations, as these two 
countries could bring about a conflict by attacking the Soviet Union 
on Germany's orders. 
In summer 1940, Sweden was defined as an enemy along with 
Germany and Finland. As the defence line was now at the level of 
the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Fleet had an opportunity 
to direct its operations in the direction of Sweden as well. These op-
portunities had not been taken particularly seriously until the Winter 
War, when the involvement of Sweden seemed a likely prospect. The 
plans included the use of submarines and the air force to impose a 
blockade on Sweden's harbours and the Göta canal system. 
Matvei Zakharov notes in his memoirs that the Soviet Union 
underestimated Finland's ability to recover from the losses of the 
Winter War. The overall picture was that "The likelihood of signifi-
cant forces of the Finnish army, supported by German divisions, will 
be stationed in the direction of Viipuri - Leningrad points to a prob-
ability of activity in this direction. It is not impossible that supporting 
attacks by the enemy would follow later in the direction of Petroza-
vodsk and Kandalaksha (Kantalahti)." 
Zakharov recalls that (according to calculations made in July 
1940) Finland was believed to have placed the "Österman army" (6 
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divisions and 3 brigades) at the front on the Isthmus, with the three 
divisions of the"Talvela Group" in the"central sector", towards Svir. 
It was calculated that Finland would not be much of a threat with-
out German forces and that 3-4 divisions would be needed on the 
Isthmus. This Soviet estimate was based on the situation at the be-
ginning of the Winter War, however, for in reality the Finnish army 
would be much stronger - 20 divisions and 3 brigades after receiving 
German reinforcements - and the Soviet Union would be attacked 
everywhere from Hanko to Petsamo (later Petchenga), although with 
emphasis on the River Svir. The Soviet headquarters had calculated 
that the concentration of Finnish troops would take 20-25 days, but 
in practice it took approximately 12 days in 1941. 
On 14 August 1940 the Chief of the General Staff gave instruc-
tions to the Leningrad Military District to draw up new plans by 
25 August concerning the positioning of the troops in the district 
and to specify the district's plans, including its protection plan. Work 
on drawing up the district's new operative plan was commenced on 
13 September. Sweden, Finland and Germany were considered the 
likely enemies, and an evident need to remedy the greatest short-
comings is shown by the fact that the district carried out exercises in 
1940 that concentrated on fending off a landing in the Baltic region 
and in Murmansk, together with a paratroop exercise (by the head-
quarters of the airborne brigade and a special paratroop battalion). 
Experiences of landing operations had been gathered in connection 
with the occupation of Estonia. 
After the Winter War most of the Soviet troops on the Finn-
ish border had been moved elsewhere to new tasks, and although 
the divisions that remained there retained their wartime strength, 
Finland, too, kept more troops in service than the 1939 peacetime 
strength would have presupposed. 
On 26 September, after the planning work was completed, the 
districts were ordered to establish a headquarters for the 7th Army 
in Petrozavodsk by 1 November on the basis of the headquarters of 
the 56th Army Corps. All the army headquarters had been removed 
from the Finnish border after the Winter War, except for the 14th 
Army in Murmansk. In practice, the 7th Army headquarters began 
operating on 23 November. The 54th Division from the 14th Army 
was also subordinated to it. As the winter passed, the 23rd Army 
headquarters, which was to be positioned on the Karelian Isthmus, 
was also included in the plan. This began operating in May 1941.s ' 
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The race to the Åland Islands 
In January 1940, during the Winter War, the Soviet Union drew up a 
plan to occupy the Aland Islands that would have required the trans-
portation of approximately 20 000 men to the Islands from Estonia 
and Latvia. The basic idea was to cut Finland in two with an attack 
by ground forces at the latitude of Oulu and, with the navy attacking 
the Åland Islands, cut off Finland's sea connections as well. Bases 
for light naval troops, submarines and air forces would be located in 
the Aland Islands, and the Finnish Navy would be prevented from 
escaping from the archipelago of Turku, which would lead to its de-
struction. These basic ideas remained in later plans. 
In a plan drawn up by the Baltic Fleet in September 1940 the 
starting point was that the enemies in the coming war in the Bal-
tic would be Sweden and Finland, or possibly Germany, Sweden 
and Finland. The main tasks of the Baltic Fleet were to destroy the 
enemy's navy and its bases, prevent its main forces from entering 
the Gulf of Finland, lay protective mines and capture the Aland Is-
lands. The naval air force was to support the capture with assaults 
and landings. 
In a more detailed plan to capture the Aland Islands (10 Sep-
tember 1940) the targets of the operation were Eckerö, Aland proper 
and Lemland. The other islands in the archipelago were to be cap-
tured later. The Soviet fleet would face Finnish and Swedish ar-
moured coastal vessels, German cruisers and submarines, destroyers 
and torpedo boats from the enemy states, minefields, coastal artil-
lery and ground forces. The landing would require one infantry divi-
sion from the troops of the Leningrad Military District, three marine 
battalions and one airborne battalion. All in all, an entire airborne 
brigade from the Leningrad Military District would be reserved for 
the operation, although the commander of the air forces of the Baltic 
Fleet nevertheless allowed only two battalions to be borrowed in 
addition to the aircraft of the Red Army's air force that were suitable 
for an airborne operation. 
The airborne battalion would start out from New Peterhof and 
the three marine battalions from Paldiski. The first echelon of the 
landing would include two infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, 
a reconnaissance battalion and an engineer battalion from the di-
vision, while the second would include one infantry regiment, an 
artillery regiment, an tank battalion and maintenance troops. These 
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echelons would start out from Tallinn and Paldiski. It had to be taken 
into account in the planning that it would be difficult to prepare for 
a landing in secret when operating from the Tallinn area, because the 
Russians had enemies in Estonia. 
Half of the first landing was to be directed at Eckerö Bay and 
the other half at Mariehamn. By morning the first landing was to 
create fronts in the central area of the Aland Islands and the place 
names Eckerö Bay, Mariehamn, Godby and Torpö were mentioned 
in this context, as the extreme points of the first phase. 
The troops were to move from the harbours to the landing area 
by night in order to avoid being noticed, and the strike was to be 
carried out quickly and powerfully enough that troops could not be 
sent to Finland's assistance from Sweden in time. 
The special naval detachment (OON) established for the op-
eration would include: 
a) 5 destroyers and one "turboelektrohod" (Stalin), 
b) 3 patrol vessels and one"turboelektrohod" (Molotov), 
c) 3 patrol vessels, 
d) three transport groups forming a detachment, a total of 12 ves-
sels 
e) a detachment (OVR) to protect the sea area where the landing 
was to take place: 6+7 minesweepers, 8 boats and three gun-
boats 
the air detachment of the OON: 
- the 44th squadron (MBR-2 reconnaissance aircraft) 
- two squadrons from the 13th and 138th Air Regiments (land-
based fighters) 
- two squadrons (from the 73rd Air Regiment) (SB fast bomb-
ers) 
The commander of the detachment was to have been in charge of 
the invasion. 
A supportive squadron of the Baltic Fleet comprising two bat-
tleships and other large vessels would arrive in the area, and the SB 
aircraft of the 35th and 37th Bomber regiments operating from the 
airports of Pärnu and Tartu would also prepare to support the opera-
tion. 
To deceive the enemy, the intention was to simulate a landing 
fleet that was on its way to Gotland. These vessels were to depart 
from Libau. 
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A surprise attack could conceivably have been successful, as 
Finland was forced in autumn 1940 to dismantle the defences built 
up in the Aland Islands during the Winter War. The issue had been 
made more urgent by rumours reaching Moscow about the possibil-
ity of a closer relationship between Finland and Sweden, although 
these rumours were not taken very seriously at the time. The greatest 
danger would have faced Finland and the Aland Islands if Germany 
had decided to carry out the carefully prepared operation Seelöwe 
and had thus been committed to a protracted exercise on the coast 
of England. 
The most advantageous time for the operation was not men-
tioned in the plan. The Aland Islands were at least to some extent 
protected by ice in winter, although this had not prevented Sweden 
and Germany from bringing their troops there in winter 1918. In any 
case, the threat increased towards the spring, and Sweden was ex-
ploring the possibilities in April-May 1940 of sending troops to the 
islands to provide reinforcements for the Finns."Z 
The Hanko expansion plan 
In his radio speech to the people of Finland on 26 June 1941, when 
a new war broke out, President Ryti compared the Soviet base in 
Hanko to a pistol that was aimed at Finland's heart. According to 
Soviet Navy documents, the base was indeed preparing an attack on 
either Helsinki or Turku. 
The main strength of the ground forces in Hanko was the sepa-
rate 8th Brigade, established in spring 1940. This consisted almost 
entirely of experienced men from the 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk"Iron" 
Division that had taken part in the Winter War on the Isthmus. Two 
infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion and 
a signal battalion had been taken from this division to form the 8th 
Brigade. The Brigade included a tank battalion, too. The organiza-
tion of a brigade was almost unknown in the Red Army infantry at 
that time, but it was apparently considered appropriate to coastal 
conditions, where fire power and special expertise were important 
rather than the number of men. When Estonia had been occupied, 
the Leningrad Military District established another infantry brigade, 
the 3rd Brigade, for the Estonian islands. 
The presence of railway batteries (three 12-inch cannons and 
four 180 mm cannons) was explained by the fact that these could be 
useful in mobilizing the artillery power of the base for rapid action. 
The actual coastal batteries meant for closing the Gulf of Finland 
were still in the process of construction when the Continuation War 
broke out. 
In August 1940 the commander of the base, Rear Admiral Be-
lousov, outlined its tasks in relation to the overall plan for the Baltic 
Fleet. At that time the only adversary to be taken seriously was Ger-
many together with Finland and Sweden, although Belousov con-
sidered it possible that a war might break out with Finland alone or 
together with Sweden but not supported by Germany. This would be 
virtually a repeat of the situation in the Winter War. 
In the case of war, the tasks of the Baltic Fleet would be: 
1. to protect the coast, 
2. to protect the fleet's own connections (especially between Kro-
nstadt and Hanko) 
3. to cut off enemy connections in the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Bot-
nia and the Finnish archipelago, 
4. to support the land forces with fire power and tactical landings, 
and 
to attack enemy territory. 
With regard to the third and the fifth tasks, it was important to cap-
ture the Åland Islands at once. This would be followed by a landing 
on the Finnish coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and possibly even on 
the Swedish side. Belousov regretted that an insufficient number of 
transport vessels had been reserved during the Winter War, and be-
cause of that no attack on the Aland Islands had been carried out. 
The tasks of the Hanko base were: 
1. to protect the mine-laying and artillery positions between 
Hanko and Osmussaar that could be used to close the Gulf of 
Finland, and to"neutralize" or capture related Finnish batteries 
surrounding Hanko. 
2. to organize a base for submarines and light naval forces for ac-
tivities in the northern part of the Baltic Sea. 
3. to expand the base in order to gain depth for defence and to 
protect the anchorages at Lappohja, Tvärminne and the outer 
harbour of Hanko. 
4. to protect the base on land, at sea and in the air. 
The third point in Belousov's plan (expanding the base to cover 
the area of Tammisaari-Bromarv) is especially noteworthy, as it was 
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in connection with this that Belousov pointed out that the expan-
sion could be turned into an operation that fitted the scale of the 
entire Baltic Fleet, i.e. it would be the first phase of an operative or 
strategic landing directed at Helsinki or Turku. Thus the base could 
really have been used in the manner of a pistol aimed at Finland's 
heart. The attack would probably have been directed at Turku, too, if 
the Finnish defences had been crushed quickly at the mainland front 
in the east. 
The order of importance of these tasks defined by Belousov and 
the possibility of carrying them out naturally depended on the extent 
of the war and the resources available. In the overall plan prepared 
by the Baltic Fleet in summer 1941 the first task of the Hanko base 
was to create a springboard for the Red Army's attack on Finland. 
It is interesting to see how the Hanko base intended to carry 
out its expansion attack (Map 5). The operation was to commence 
simultaneously on land and with landings directed towards the 
north-west and the east. As the landings were taking place, subma-
rines and light forces would encircle the Finnish coastal area from 
Öro to the cape of Porkkala. 
TeHhuB 
I " 	/ 
~V 	 romare 	 - 
Padvamaa 	 1 	 TAMM SAARI 	%~ 
(r1 	Bengtsår ; ~  
) Lappohlå . -  
~ 	Älgö 	SkorlandeP 
Tvärminne —~ 
ANKÖ 	
<O;Jussarö 
Map 5. The idea of enlarging the military base in Haniko (1940) 
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An order given on 12 November 1940 can be regarded as proof 
that the Hanko base was turning away from a naval target and to-
wards the mainland of Finland in its thinking. This order transferred 
the 8th Brigade from the Baltic Fleet to the command of the Lenin-
grad Military District from 1 December onwards. 
Only the first and fourth tasks (defending the mine-laying and 
artillery position and the base itself) are mentioned in the operation 
report for the Hanko base for the period of the Continuation War 
(drawn up in 1942), since General Kabanov generally mentioned 
only its defensive tasks. It must be noted that most of the reinforce-
ments planned for the base during the war did not arrive and that its 
position became more difficult than had been expected. Attack was 
not an option under the circumstances. 
It was calculated that a total of three infantry divisions would 
be needed, and that they would have to be available by the start of 
the operation. The 8th Brigade would have been used in the first 
echelons, and Belousov emphasized training the brigade for landing 
operations. The detachments would operate as follows: 
— One regiment (without regimental artillery or logistics) would 
land in small vessels and boats at Degerö and attack Tammisaari 
from the east. The plan included the option of a landing from the air, 
but it was not specified any further in the calculations. 
— One division would operate in the main landing in the di-
rection of Padvamaa. After arriving at Tenhola, this division would 
advance towards Tammisaari from the north-west using the "stra-
tegic road" and side-roads. The first shipment would be loaded in 
the port of Hanko and on the islands of Bengtsår and Prästö, mostly 
onto smaller vessels and in five fairly small Sextant-type transport 
vessels. The troops would land at Bromarv, Padvamaa and the cape 
of Krokby (in Tenhola), destroy the enemy's fire positions and cover 
the arrival of the second shipment. 
— The second shipment, including artillery, would be carried in 
12 Sibir-type transport vessels from Tallinn and Paldiski and arrive at 
the Hanko roadstead at a specified time, proceeding from there to 
various sides of Padvamaa fromVestervik to Bromarv. 
—1.5 divisions were to be grouped at the land front on the Han-
ko Peninsula in order to be able to attack the "fortification area" in 
Tammisaari simultaneously with the landings. This detachment was 
to be supported by an armoured force and artillery. The goal was that 
the division proceeding through Tenhola, together with the detach- 
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ment attacking from the Lappohja area, would destroy the Finnish 
troops grouped in the northern part of the Hanko peninsula. 
The operation was expected to require an air force comprising 
one fighter regiment with 1-2 squadrons of assault aircraft and one 
bomber regiment. Not all these aircraft could be stationed on Han-
ko, however. Two fighter regiments, one reconnaissance squadron 
and one bomber squadron could have been based there, but the rest 
would have had to operate from Estonia. 
In spring 1940 the Finnish headquarters calculated that two di-
visions could attack Finland from Hanko. The strength of the base 
- 27 809 men were evacuated in December 1941 - corresponded well 
to two infantry divisions, although the battle troops maintained by 
the land forces amounted to only one strong division.53  
The attack plan for the year 1941 
A basic idea was in September 1940 formulated for a situation in 
which Finland would be alone against the Soviet Union, and also for 
a war in which the main enemy would be Germany. The directives 
to the Leningrad Military District concerning a war against Finland 
were dated 18 September, the same day as the general plan. In these 
instructions the General Staff defined the following main tasks: 
1. To protect the border while troops are being transported. 
2. To advance with the main forces on the North-Western Front 
through Savonlinna towards Mikkeli and through Lappeenran-
ta towards Heinola, circling round the new border fortifications 
and attacking Helsinki from the direction of Viipuri, through 
Sippola, and to penetrate into central Finland, destroy most of 
the Finnish army there and capture the region. This attack was 
to be timed to coincide with an attack on Helsinki carried out 
from the Hanko Peninsula and by the Baltic Fleet from the Gulf 
of Finland. 
3. Simultaneously with the main attack on the North-Western 
Front, an attack was to be mounted by the Northern Front in 
the direction of Rovaniemi, Kemi and Oulu, with the aim of 
reaching the Gulf of Bothnia and thereby isolating the northern 
part of Finland and cutting off the direct connections from cen-
tral Finland to Sweden and Norway. 
4. To take active measures in the north to capture the harbour of 
Petsamo from Finland in the first few days of the war, in con- 
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nection of which the Norwegian border between Petsamo and 
Nautsi would have to be closed. 
h1 order to improve command and maintenance functions, two 
fronts were to be created: a Northern Front and a North-Western 
Front." 
One significant aspect of this planning was that Norway, for ex-
ample, is considered to be able to help Finland, along with Sweden, 
even though German troops had already arrived at the borders that 
Norway shared with Finland and the Soviet Union in July. It seems 
to be typical of this planning that at least some minor points were 
merely copied from old files. 
The Soviet Foreign Commissar, Mr. Molotov demanded in Ber-
lin in November 1940 that Germany should allow the Soviet gov-
ernment to settle the Finnish situation in peace. After that Moscow 
drew up new directives to apply to a situation in which the enemy 
was Finland alone. Such a directive was sent to the Leningrad Mili-
tary District on 25 November 1940, ordering it to prepare an attack 
on the North-Western Front and stating that an attack on the North-
ern Front was to begin at the same time (Map 6). Since the latter was 
supposed to be commanded by the chief of the Archangel Military 
District, another directive was presumably sent there. 
The planning of autumn 1940 reveals that two fronts were con-
sidered necessary to defeat Finland: the North-Western Front (with 
its headquarters in Leningrad) and the Northern Front (with its 
headquarters in Kandalaksha). A similar solution had been resorted 
to in the Winter War, when the two armies on the Isthmus had been 
commanded by the North-Western Front and the four armies on 
Finland's eastern border had been directly subordinated to the Gen-
eral Staff. Now the border between the fronts was moved north and 
the Northern Front had approximately twice as many troops as it 
had had during the Winter War. This shows the increase in the im-
portance of the Northern Front in the overall attack. When peace was 
negotiated in Moscow in 1940, it was required that Finland should 
build a railway line from Kemijärvi across the Soviet border so that 
a direct connection could be established from Kandalaksha on the 
coast of the White Sea to the Swedish border. The Finns feared at 
the time that the purpose behind this was to make sure that Finland 
could be cut in two in the case of war, the Red Army having failed 
in this during the Winter War because of the difficult terrain and for 
other reasons. 
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Cutting Finland in two was now considered a top priority, ev-
idently on account of the increased German strength in northern 
Norway. A new army corps (the 42nd Corps) was established in the 
Kandalaksha Direction in Mach 1941. Even though the planning was 
clearly limited to the area of Finland, the idea that in the case of a war 
the Soviet Union would have wanted to penetrate through northern 
Sweden to the Atlantic coast of Norway, perhaps to the area of Nar-
vik, or would have been obliged to do so, is not excluded. 
As the Leningrad Military District was to finish its planning 
work by mid-February 1941, it can be assumed that the idea of a 
winter war had been given up at least for that year. The plan did 
include one ski brigade among the troops deployed in the Olonets 
area, however, because it was considered to be most useful there. 
Finland, at least, would have been in the danger zone in May 1941, if 
the Germans had turned their attention to the west or south. 
The Red Army had gone off to the Winter War with only about 
twenty divisions, but now more troops were reserved for the attack 
from the outset. 
— The Northern Front would have two armies and an indepen-
dent army corps (altogether four army corps), i.e. 15 infantry divi-
sions, one artillery regiment of the high command and 23 flight regi-
ments, 
— the North-Western Front would have 4 armies, 9 infantryArmy 
Corps and one mechanized Army Corps, i.e. 29 infantry divisions, 2 
armoured divisions, 1 motorized infantry division, 5 armoured bri-
gades, 12 artillery regiments of the high command, 6 pontoon bat-
talions, 7 engineer battalions and 55 flight regiments. 
— Furthermore, the high command reserves had 3 infantry divi-
sions in the area of Tikhvin, Volkhovstroi and Tshudovo. At least in 
September, it was planned that the reserves of the high command 
would have another 7 infantry divisions in the Western Military Dis-
trict and 7 infantry divisions in the Kiev Military District, i.e. a total 
of 14 divisions (in the rear of the districts) to be used in the Viipuri 
direction if needed. 
It was calculated that the forces of the Leningrad Military Dis-
trict would be available 6-8 days after the mobilization order. On 
the other hand, the troops transported from other districts by train 
would be available in the north-western sector (in the directions of 
Petrozavodsk and Viipuri) 35 days after the start of mobilization and 
in the northern sector in 40-45 days. The Northern Front was to at- 
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tack 40 days after the start of mobilization, and the North-Western 
Front 5 days earlier. 
Troops would be brought to the border in northern Finland 
from the districts of Moscow,Volga and the North Caucasus, where-
as Olonets (Aunus) and the Karelian Isthmus would receive troops 
from the districts of Moscow, the Urals, Orel, Kharkov and the North 
Caucasus. Furthermore, the troops available to the commander of 
the North-Western Front would include an Army Corps in the spe-
cial Baltic Military District in the area of Tallinn - Paldiski, one divi-
sion of which was planned to be transported to Hanko to operate 
against Helsinki and another to be either similarly transported to 
Hanko or to land on the Åland Islands. There was also a separate 
infantry brigade available. 
The tasks of the two fronts created to defeat Finland were: 
—The Northern Front, together with the Northern Fleet, was to 
defend the capes of Kalastajasaarento (Rybatshyi) and the coasts of 
the Kola Peninsula, especially the harbour of Murmansk, to capture 
Petsamo Harbour, and to advance with land forces to the Norwegian 
border between Petsamo and Nautsi. 40 days after mobilization it 
was to move vigorously into the attack in the directions of Rovani-
emi - Kemi and Oulu and reach the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, cut-
ting off Finland's land connections with Sweden and Norway. It was 
to seize the Kemi - Oulu area on the 30th day of the operation. 
— The North-Western Front was to destroy the Finnish armed 
forces, seize its entire area and reach the Gulf of Bothnia on the 40th 
day of the operation. For this purpose it would 
1) protect the directions of Viipuri and Käkisalmi during the con-
centration of troops, retain Viipuri under all conditions, and 
deny the enemy access to the shore of Lake Ladoga, and 
2) begin a general attack on the 35th day after the concentration 
of troops, carry out the main attack in the general direction of 
Lappeenranta — Heinola - Hämeenlinna, with supporting at-
tacks in the Korpiselkä - Kuopio and Savonlinna - Mikkeli di-
rections, defeat the Finnish army's main forces in the Mikkeli 
-Heinola - Hamina area, capture Helsinki on the 25th day of 
the operation and reaches the line Kuopio — Jyväskylä — Hä-
meenlinna - Helsinki. 
The southern border of the Northern Front's area of operations would 
have run from north of the Maaselk5 station on the Murmansk rail- 
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way line to Kokkola on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. Altogether 
the front had 15 divisions at its disposal, one artillery regiment of the 
high command and 23 flight regiments. 
The fact that two-thirds of the available air forces had been di-
rectly subordinated to the front headquarters suggests that the em-
phasis was clearly to be in the direction of Salla. Two divisions had 
been there at the end of the Winter War; and now the number of 
troops would be quadrupled. 
The armies were given the following tasks: 
On the Northern Front: 
— The 14th Army, together with the Northern Fleet, was to de-
fend the harbour of Murmansk, the coast of the Kola Peninsula and 
the capes of Rybatsyi (Kalastajasaarento), capture Petsamo harbour 
with at least two divisions in cooperation with the navy and the air 
forces of the army and the navy, and reach the Norwegian border 
in the sector Petsamo - Nautsi. The Northern Fleet was operatively 
subordinated to the 14th Army, but would be given long-distance 
tasks directly by the high command. The army would have three in-
fantry divisions, one artillery regiment of the high command and 
four flight groups at its disposal. 
— The 21st Army had three army corps, a total of nine divisions 
and four flight groups. Its main grouping (six infantry divisions) was 
to be in the area of the Salla railway, and the supporting group (three 
divisions) in the area of Sovajärvi - Pääjärvi east of Posio. It was to at-
tack in the direction of Rovaniemi and Kemi, advance to the coast of 
the Gulf of Bothnia and seize the Kemi area. Later it was to prepare 
for action against Oulu. Thus the Soviet war plans relied vesy heavily 
on success in the direction of the Saha - Kandalaksha railway. 
— At the latitude of Suomussalmi - Kuhmo the separate 20th 
Army Corps was to defend along the Lake Kamennoe - Tuulosjärvi 
front, preventing the Finnish troops from forcing their way into So-
viet territory and protecting the Murmansk railway. The Army Corps 
was to attack in the Suomussalmi - Puolanka direction with two di-
visions, capture the Puolanka area and then advance to Oulu, while 
one division made its way towards Nurmes. The direction of empha-
sis of the planned advance to Oulu at the beginning of the Winter 
War had been through Kuhmo, but now - on account of lessons 
learned - no emphasis was placed on this direction. 
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On the North-Western Front: 
—The 7th Army was to carry out the main attack (from the areas 
of Korpiselkä and Tojosvaara) in the Korpiselkä - Kuopio direction 
with at least four divisions, destroy the opposing parts of the Finnish 
army and capture the Joensuu area on the 15th day of the operation. 
On the 30th day it was to capture the Kuopio area, encircling the 
main concentration of enemy troops from the north. It was then to 
prepare to attack Jyväskylä. 
— The 22nd Army was to protect the railway and deny the en-
emy access to the shore of Lake Ladoga. After grouping, the army 
was to carry out the main attack in the Virmuntjoki - Juva direction 
with four divisions, encircle and destroy the enemy in that area, and 
reach the line Savonranta — Juva - Kampila on the 15th day of the 
operation. Later, depending on the situation, it was to prepare to act 
together with the 23rd Army against Heinola or together with the 
7th Army against Jyväskylä and later Tampere. It was to reach the 
line Kangasniemi — Leivonmäki - Lake Iloma - Kalld<inen on the 
30th day of the operation. 
— The 23rd Army was to carry out its main attack with at least 
four divisions in the Lappeenranta — Lahti - Riihimäki direction, 
destroy the enemy troops in its path and reach the line Savitaipale 
— Valkolainmäki - Taavetti station on the 15th day of the operation. 
Later, proceeding north around the strongest fortification area, it 
was to combine with the 20th Army to destroy the enemy in the 
Helsinki direction, and, was to reach the line KailKkinen — Kärkölä - 
Mäntsälä on the 30th day of the operation. The aim was to include a 
mechanized Army Corps in the breakthrough after reaching the line 
Savitaipale - Taavetti station. 
—The 20th Army, which had formed up along a line from Louk-
ki station to the coast of the Gulf of Finland, had the task of breaking 
the enemy's fortification area. It was to destroy the opposing troops, 
reach the line Taavetti station - Hamina on the 15th day of the op-
eration, and advance to the line Mäntsälä - Porvoo by the 30th day. 
Later, on the 35th day, it was to capture the Helsinki area together 
with the 23rd Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps. 
The task of the Air Force was defined on 25 November 1940 as fol-
lows: 
1. to cooperate with ground forces by operating against the ene-
my's ground forces (troops grouped for battle and large group-
ings), 
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to destroy the enemy's aircraft, 
to prevent military transportation on land and at sea, 
to destroy the enemy's fleet, together with the navy air force 
and navy, 
to act together with the navy to cut off Finland's imports across 
the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea, and 
to protect the transportation and unloading of troops on the 
Hanko peninsula, using also air power from the Baltic district. 
The Northern Fleet was to: 
1. retain Murmansk, and protect the coast of the Kola Peninsu-
la and the capes of Kalastajasaarento, together with the 14th 
Army, 
2. cooperate with the 14th Army, and 
3. reconnoitre sea connections in the western part of Norway and 
the Kattegat. 
The Baltic Fleet, being operatively subordinated to the North-West-
ern Front, was to: 
— act together with the air force to destroy the Finnish fleet (and 
that of Sweden, if the latter was to take part in the war), 
— operate along the coast of the Gulf of Finland and from the 
Hanko Peninsula together with the grouped troops, protect 
their flanks and destroy the Finnish coastal defences, 
3. protect the transportation of two infantry divisions from the 
northern shore of the Estonian Soviet Republic to the Hanko 
Peninsula in the early days of the war, and also the transporta-
tion and unloading of a large landing force on the Åland Is-
lands, and 
4. undertake operations using both submarines and aircraft to cut 
off sea connections between Finland and Sweden (if the latter 
was to take part in the war) in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic 
Sea. 
It is to be noted that the tasks of the fronts and armies as laid down 
in the directive are not quite synchronized. The North-Western Front 
is expected to capture Helsinki on the 25th day of the operation, 
whereas the 20th Army is expected to do so on the 35th day. Also, 
where optimistic estimates during the Winter War had envisaged an 
operation lasting a couple of weeks, a month was now reserved for 
77 
this, and at least preparations had been made for setbacks on a men-
tal level by considering the inclusion of 14 additional divisions from 
the reserves stationed on the Western Front. 
Taking the previous Soviet war experiences into account, the 
plans probably mean that the main northern attack was not to take 
place in the direction of Kuhmo as in December 1939. Experiences 
with the Mannerheim Line and knowledge of the circling of the 
Maginot Line during the successful German operation in France 
had evidently tempted the leadership to plan the main attack to take 
place north of the strongest zone in the new main Finnish defence 
line. 
All and all, it must be noted that the planning was all the time 
limited by the geography of Finland and the country's lines of com-
munication, but details were being polished. According to the pre-
liminary instructions given in September, the 22nd Army was to cap-
ture Mikkeli, the 23rd Army was to capture Heinola (through Lemi), 
and in the first phase the 20th Army was to reach the line Kouvola 
- Kotka. It was planned that the 23rd and 20th Armies and the forces 
advancing from Hanko would attack Helsinki at the same time. 
During autumn 1940 the plan was modified so that more time 
was reserved for breaking through the Finnish front line in Novem-
ber, the first objectives being drawn closer to the border. It was cal-
culated that after this first effort the main forces of the Finnish army 
would be destroyed in the Mikkeli — Heinola - Hamina area, and 
armoured troops were to be brought in after the breakthrough to 
speed the process up. The final phase — the advance to Helsinki and 
the Gulf of Bothnia - would not take vesy long, and it would all be 
over in a month and a half." 
A new, defensive plan, connected with the overall planning of 
the Red Army was drawn up in the Leningrad Military District in 
spring 1941 by the Chief of the Operative Division of the General 
Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin and the chiefs-of-staff of the 
14th and the 7th Armies. The basic idea was to prevent the enemy 
from advancing into Soviet territory, win time for grouping for a 
counter-offensive and move the war into enemy territory within two 
weeks. 
The Red Army's overall plan for spring 1941 lacks as far as Fin-
land is concerned, the concept of an offensive. A series of containing 
attacks was probably the most applicable option. Decisive superior-
ity was not to be achieved. The following grouping was predicted for 
the Finnish army: 
"1. Six infantry divisions supported by 3-4 German divisions along 
the front from the Gulf of Finland to Savonlinna. 
2. Three infantry divisions along the Onkamo — Ilomantsi - 
Nurmes front to protect the Kuopio - Joensuu direction. 
3. Two infantry divisions along the Kuhmo - Suomussalmi front 
to protect the Oulu direction. 
4. Two infantry divisions in the area of Märkäjärvi. 
5. Two infantry divisions in the area of Petsamo. 
The Finnish army is expected to complete its ordered grouping in 
20-25 days. 
The likelihood that significant Finnish forces, supported here 
by German divisions, will be grouped in the Viipuri-Leningrad area 
points to the possibility of active measures in this direction. 
It is not unlikely that supporting enemy attacks in this theatre 
of war will follow later on in the direction of Petrozavodsk and Kan-
dalaksha."56  
Since the main military tasks - in addition to isolating Finland 
from Sweden - included securing supremacy in the Gulf of Finland, 
it was decided that when the war broke out, the entire northern coast 
of Estonia, including the troops stationed there, would be subordi-
nated to the command of the Leningrad Military District. The border 
between the Northern and the North-Western Fronts was placed to 
the north-west through the mainland of Estonia, running west of 
Ostashkov and Ostrov, through Viru, west ofViljanti and east of Hi-
idenmaa and Saarenmaa. Thus the southern border of the Northern 
Front would have closed off the entire area of Finland and the Gulf 
of Finland to be commanded from Leningrad, which was operative-
ly logical even though it did not follow the border of the military 
administration. In addition to the Leningrad Military District, the 
planned area included the northern part of the Baltic district. This 
would have placed the area of the Gulf of Finland under the com-
mand of Leningrad. This seems operatively logical, but it did not fol-
low the borders of the military districts. According to an order given 
by the Red Army General Staff on 14 May 1941, the northern coast of 
Estonia all the way to the straits between Matsalu and Worms would 
become the responsibility of the Leningrad Military District on the 
first day of mobilization. According to the general Soviet plan for 
the war against Germany, two divisions and the 4th Flight Division 
79 
were to be included on the Estonian coast to the Northern Front, to 
be directed against Finland, simply by moving the border between 
the fronts. Of these, at least the flight division had been ordered to 
support Hanko, but it did not have the opportunity to do 
This general plan drawn up for a war against Germany entailed 
the deploying of 21 divisions belonging to the Northern Front against 
Finland. To balance the assumed 27 enemy divisions - 20 Finnish 
divisions, six German divisions and apparently one volunteer divi-
sion - the Soviet Union had five divisions of the 14th Army at the 
latitudes of Kainuu and Lapland, four divisions of the 7th Army in 
Olonets (Aunus) and the Lake Ladoga area, nine divisions of the 
23rd Army on the Isthmus - including three armoured divisions and 
one motorized infantry division - and three divisions west of Lenin-
grad. The emphasis placed on the Salla railway in Soviet planning is 
shown by the fact that an Army Corps headquarters (the 42nd Army 
Corps headquarters) was established in this direction in winter 1941 
(no later than 14 March 1941).58 In June 1941, the planned area of 
the Northern Front began to take shape. 
Finland's position was still threatened after the peace nego-
tiated in Moscow, and it has been greatly debated to what extent 
the Soviet Union was actually preparing another attack. As already 
mentioned, a general characteristic to the Interim Peace seems to be 
that the Soviet Union's other directions of action occupied the Red 
Army's interests at times considered critical for Finland. The training 
of troops and improving of weaponry also took up a great deal of 
time and resources. 
The operative journeys and war games connected with the So-
viet war planning of 1941 were arranged under central control by the 
beginning of April. In this timetable it is possible to discern where 
the troops required on each front were to be obtained and tenta-
tively also the priority given to each part of the plan. The first place, 
according to the planned succession of events in the General Staffs 
plan, was assigned to the Leningrad direction, second place being 
occupied by the Caucasus, involving representatives of the Cauca-
sus, North Caucasus,Volga and Urals military districts, and the Baltic 
District, and after that the Ukrainian front, involving the Kiev, Khar-
kov, North Caucasus and Odessa military districts. On the other 
hand, the corresponding operative visit to the Belorussia front, con-
cerning the Western, Moscow and North Caucasus military districts, 
was postponed until later in the autumn, to take place only after a 
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planning visit to the Far East. It is of course true that there may have 
been other reasons behind this order of priorities as well as the haste 
with which the plans had to be revised. 
A field reconnaissance expedition led by the General Staff was 
held in the Leningrad military district on 1.-15.3.1941, involving 
representatives of the Leningrad, Orel and Urals military districts, 
i.e. the North-Western Front of a"Finnish war", personnel engaged 
in the offensive planned during the winter. (A corresponding recon-
naissance expedition for the Northern Front of the"Finnish war"was 
to be held on 15.-30.8.1941 for representatives of the Arkhangelsk 
and Volga military districts and the 14th Army, but it was eventually 
prevented by the prior outbreak of war.) The next step was the ar-
ranging by the General Staff of an operative strategy war game for 
representatives of the Leningrad and Arkhangelsk military districts 
on 1.-15.5.1941. (Likewise, planning journeys by both the General 
Staff and the local military districts in an area extending from Mur-
mansk to the Karelian Isthmus were on the programme for Octo-
ber.) 
A field reconnaissance trip to the area controlled by the 7th 
Army and 14th Army (i.e. the Finnish east border) was planned to 
take place under the commander of the Leningrad military district 
on 15.-30.6.5 It is not known whether this ever took place in the 
southern part of the area, but a journey of this kind was undertaken 
further north by Commander (General M.M. Popov) and the other 
leaders of the military district and the command of the 14th Army. 
Given the political situation prevailing at the time, the visit was fol-
lowed by an order to transfer the 122nd Division immediately to 
the vicinity of the border in Salla, and correspondingly, movement 
of the 1st Tank Division from Pskov to Alakurtti in Salla began on 
19.6. On the same date the General Staff confirmed, in accordance 
with existing plans, the southern border of the Northern Front (to 
be created as a result of the war) to run across Estonia and required 
the Arkhangelsk military district to form a front headquarters in ac-
cordance with the plans for a more extensive attack on Finland. 
As is well known, the Soviet Union did not have the oppor-
tunity to direct the planned 49 divisions against Finland in June 
1941, although the Leningrad Military District was still superior in 
strength to the estimate of 21 divisions for the Finnish army prior to 
the outbreak of the Continuation War in that month. The divisions 
in the Finnish direction had been reinforced to wartime strength in 
May 1941 and the 23rd Army headquarters had been established for 
the troops on the Isthmus, and on 19 June the troops in the north 
assumed readiness for battle. This took place immediately after Ger-
man troops "in transit" through Kemijärvi had turned towards the 
eastern border. 
When Germany attacked on 22 June 1941, the Soviet mobiliza-
tion trains also started out towards Finland, naturally according to 
the existing plans. We can note that the points of emphasis were 
in the area of Viipuri (a mechanized corps) and towards Kandalak-
sha, which points to attacks in the directions of the most important 
roads. By 25 June, two Soviet armoured divisions were already con-
centrated in the Viipuri area.6° The strength of the German attack 
nevertheless contained the resources of the Leningrad Military Dis-
trict to the south-western part of its area. 
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4. After the Barbarossa: Operations with 
limited goals in 1941-1943 
After the German attack on the Soviet Union, general Vasilevskii, 
deputy chief of the General staff, issued orders on 22.6.1941 for ex-
ecution of the protection plan to begin. This required that the armies 
in the north should exercise tight control over the national boundary. 
A Northern Front, comprising the whole of the Leningrad military 
district and Northern Estonia, was then created on 24.6. As planned, 
the North-Western Front (the Baltic military district) left some troops 
in Estonia for the Northern Front, although these included more re-
cently formed troops than had been expected according to the plans 
laid down in November. This reduced their capacity for mounting an 
attack over the Gulf of Finland. The more experienced troops were 
moved to positions confronting Germany. This abandonment of the 
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plan for enlarging the grouping of troops against Finland also meant 
that the staff of the Arkhangelsk military district was now ordered 
to form an army headquarters, that of the 28th Army, rather than a 
front headquarters." 
From the very beginning of the war the chief attention on the 
Northern Front came to be directed further towards the south-west. 
The Germans advanced rapidly, and the North-Western Front re-
sponsible for defending the southern boundaries of the Baltic region 
decided as early as 30.6. that it was impossible to defend even the 
line of the western River Dvina and that defences should be de-
veloped in the Pskov area and west of Narva and action should be 
taken to evacuate Saaremaa (Ösel) and Hiiumaa (Dagö). Although 
the supreme command was opposed to any abandonment of the 
River Dvina line, the situation developed of its own accord. It was 
in any case decided on 29.6. that the 1st Mechanized Corps of the 
Northern Front, which had been held in reserve, was subordinated 
to the North-Western Front (with the exception of the ist Tank Divi-
sion), and a few days later work began on constructing new defences 
on a line Pskov — Luga — Staraya. The district's remaining tank forces, 
the 1st Tank Division from Kandalaksha and the 10th Mechanized 
Corps from Antrea, with the exception of the 198th Motorized Divi-
sion, were ordered to form a reserve in the Krasnogvardeisk — Push-
kin area. There they were assigned to the North-Western Front on 
9.7. 
A headquarters for the North-Western Region was set up on 
10.7.1941 as a common higher command for the Northern Front 
and North Western Front and placed under the command of one of 
Stalin's trusted military representatives, K.Ye. Voroshilov. The Baltic 
Fleet was also subordinated to this North-Western Region. All this 
meant that the possibilities for conducting operations on the Finnish 
front were reduced considerably, although admittedly the transfer 
of the 1st Tank Division was delayed until 14.7. by a Finnish offen-
sive.62 
The Finns capture the Lake Ladoga region of Karelia 
Although the Soviet Union was forced to progress from one emer-
gency solution to another throughout the summer and autumn of 
1941, plans were constantly being laid and targets set for new of-
fensives, e.g. the plans for surrounding the troops at the head of 
the rapidly advancing Finnish thrust into the Lake Ladoga region of 
Karelia in the Pitkäranta area in July by means of a pincer movement 
via Sortavala and Olonets, and the corresponding plans for cutting 
off the foremost Finnish attackers on the Karelian Isthmus in Au-
gust. The troops intended for operations in Olonets in September, 
however, simply failed to arrive in time. 
The advance of the Finnish Army into the area north of Lake 
Ladoga eventually took place on 10.7.1941 and was immediate-
ly highly successful. The Soviet 7th Army attempted to improve 
its battle command efficiency by organizational means, forming 
the Suojärvi operational group on 14.7. in response to the Finnish 
breakthrough, and slightly later, on 22.7., creating the Petrozavodsk 
Group, also known as the Antonyuk Group, and the Southern, orTs-
vetayev Group. The Northern Front expected the Finns to assign one 
division each to the advances towards Petrozavodsk and Olonets, 
allowing one division to proceed towards Suojärvi and at the same 
time continuing the attack on the Soviet 168th Division in the Sor-
tavala area with two divisions of their own. It was estimated that the 
new Suojärvi, Petrozavodsk and Olonets Groups would be able to 
destroy the motorized columns at the head of the Finnish invasions 
and then repel the principal Finnish thrusts to the east approximate-
ly at the level of Palalahti and Salmi. Since they did not believe that 
they had the strength to destroy the latter troops, the task of the 7th 
Army was defined as being that of containing the eastward advance 
of the main Finnish force by means of determined resistance and 
thereby to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible, work-
ing actively on the flanks and rear of the invading force. 
In order to destroy the Finnish troops moving towards Petroza-
vodsk and Olonets (and return to the old defence lines) it was nec-
essary to reinforce the troops with two new divisions, which were 
to be grouped in the area of Petrozavodsk and the town of Olonets. 
There were no troops free in this part of the front to perform that 
function. 
The Olonets group and the Southern Group began a counter-
attack on 23.7. that was to last two days, whereas the Suojärvi Group 
was never able to establish itself properly and collapsed around 22.7. 
On the other hand, the Finnish offensive came to an end at the 1939 
border, whereas the situation was expected to develop further in the 
Leningrad area. 
At the beginning of August the Olonets Group and Southern 
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Group were ordered to undertake a new counter-offensive, with the 
aim of destroying the Finnish troops that were advancing towards 
Vitele by attacking from the area south-west of Sotjärvi and then 
advancing to Pitkäranta. It was at that point that assistance was 
obtained from the 272nd Division and the 3rd DNO (Division of 
People's volunteers), the two divisions that had been called for ear-
lier. 
The idea behind the operations on the Northern Front was that 
the Southern (Tsvetayev) Group should defend doggedly in the di-
rection of the River Tuulos and that the Finnish Pitkäranta grouping 
should be encircled and destroyed, partly by an attack by the troops 
of the 23rd Army in the Sortavala area along the northern shore of 
Lake Ladoga and on as far as Lemetti and partly by an attack from 
the Antonyuk Group from the direction of Petrozavodsk. 
The Soviet forces had at their disposal: 
— the Tsvetayev Group, which was expected to be ready for the 
offensive by 1.8. and which comprised: one marine infantry bri-
gade, the 7th Motor Cycle Regiment, the 452nd Infantry Regi-
ment, a "destroyer" detachment composed of party members, 
and the 3rd Leningrad Volunteer Division (minus one regi-
ment), 
— the Antonyuk Group, consisting of the 24th Motorized Regi-
ment, the 10th Reserve regiment, the 9th Anti-Tank Regiment 
(of the 9th Anti-Tank Brigade), the 2nd Tank Regiment and the 
272nd Division, which would arrive in the concentration area 
by 7.8. 
— the Bondarev Group in the Sortavala area, which would be pre-
pared for action by 28.7. and which comprised the 450th Infan-
try Regiment (minus one battalion), the 2nd Battalion of Border 
Guards, the 367th regiment of the 71st Division and almost a 
regiment of artillery. 
— The Ladoga Naval Squadron, with 6 gunboats and the 2nd Ma-
rine Landing Battalion. 
The Soviet offensive had collapsed by 12.8., however, having achieved 
no more than a few temporary, local successes.63 
Retreat from the Karelian Isthmus 
The situation rapidly turned against the Soviet Union by the time 
the Finns had advanced on the Karelian Isthmus as far as the shore 
of Lake Ladoga and had reached the River Vuoksi. Thus the com-
mand of the Northern Front proposed on 16.8.1941 that its troops of 
the 168th, 142nd and 198th Divisions that had been effectively cut 
off — and rendered more or less useless - in the area south-west of 
Sortavala should be transferred by ship to the Käkisalmi area, to join 
the 23th Army. The Stavka agreed to this on 17.8. and the transfer 
was carried through for the most part, although to a location some-
what closer to Leningrad. 
The Stavka drew its own conclusions regarding the poor suc-
cess achieved in the engagements with the Finns and issued an 
order on 23.8. under which the Northern Front was to be divided 
into the Leningrad Front, functioning chiefly in the area south of 
Leningrad, and the Karelian Front, extending from Lake Ladoga 
to the Arctic Ocean. The border was to run on a line Voskresens-
koye — Radogoshch —Yeremina Gera — Sviritsa — Sortavala —Varkaus. 
The Leningrad Front was subordinated to the headquarters of the 
North-Western Region, while the Karelian Front was placed directly 
under the command of the Stavka. In order to reduce the number 
of subsidiary fronts, which were difficult to look after, the Leningrad 
Front deemed it essential (on 28.8.) to evacuate Saaremaa, Hiiumaa 
and Hanko as soon as the equipment was available for doing so. This 
was not achieved by any means at once, however, not even after the 
evacuation of Tallinn. 
When the counter-attack by the 115th and 123rd Divisions of 
the 23rd Army on 24.8. failed to produce the desired result and no 
permanent resistance could be organized on the Salmenkaita line, 
the Leningrad Front (under the command of M.M.Popov) ordered 
its troops on 25.8.1941 to maintain a determined resistance. The 
commanders and commissars were to be held personally respon-
sible under martial law for the slightest retreat that might take place 
in their sectors. In addition, a brief attack was to be made by the 
123rd Division to capture the Heinjoki railway station and estab-
lish a line Lake Äyräpää — Lyykkylä. The River Taipaleenjoki — Lake 
Suvantojärvi — River Vuoksi defence line was to be held at all costs 
and every attempt by the enemy to cross these waterways was to be 
repelled. In spite of all this, however, the Finnish advance continued 
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uninterrupted, now taking effect in the direction of Viipuri as well, 
both by sea and overland. 
By 28.8., however, the Leningrad Front had received permission 
from the Stavka to retreat from theVyborg Line to a line further back 
on the Isthmus, but again the Stavka ordered that the troops were 
not under any conditions to abandon the new positions prepared on 
the Mannerheim Line. The 23rd Army had five divisions available 
at the end of the month, the 123rd, 115th, 43rd, 142nd and 198th 
(Motorized) Divisions, mostly in need of reinforcements or in the 
process of being transferred, together with a detachment from the 
naval schools of the Baltic Fleet (at the River Rokkalanjoki). 
Again the supreme command was somewhat late in reacting, 
for the Finns had already encircled the major part of the Soviet Ar-
my's grouping at Viipuri, and it was necessary to retreat as far as the 
front line of the Karelian fortification area (south of the 1939 bound-
aiy). This order reached the 43rd, 115th and 123rd Divisions in a 
situation in which the majority of their troops were in the process 
of withdrawing into the Koivisto area, since their opponents were 
blocking the roads to Beloostrov and Sestoretsk. The remnants of 
these divisions had assembled at Koivisto by the morning of 2.9. and 
were then transported across the Gulf of Finland, while the 142nd, 
265th and 198th Divisions and one regiment of the 115th Division 
took possession of the front line in the Karelian Fortification area, 
the 291st Division and one regiment from the 1st Volunteer Divi-
sion being brought up to protect their flanks. This meant that there 
were about eight divisions on the Isthmus, but most of them were 
small and were lacking in heavy weaponry. The Finns nevertheless 
stopped their advance immediately south of the 1939 boundary, for 
political and military reasons, and did not attempt to penetrate into 
the Fortification area.64 
Efforts were made to improve the defences of Leningrad by 
gathering all the available troops to form a new front and changing 
the commander. First Voroshilov, who had commanded the whole of 
their North-Western Region (cancelled on 29.8.), was appointed in-
stead of Popov as Commander of the Leningrad Front, and then, on 
11.9., the Stavka replaced him with Zhukov, who enjoyed the par-
ticular confidence of Stalin, at the suggestion of a commission under 
Molotov that had functioned in Leningrad at the end of August and 
beginning of September. The hostilities taking place around Mos-
cow soon demanded the Stavka's principal attention, however, and 
Zhukov was recalled to Moscow on 2.10. The next commander of the 
Leningrad Front was General I.I.Fedyuninsky, who had distinguished 
himself at the River Taipaleenjoki in 1939, to be followed by General 
M.S.Khozin, who had been in charge of the Leningrad military dis-
trict in the 1930s, and the next year by General L.A.Govorov. 
The Karelian Isthmus was a relatively peaceful area as far as the 
Leningrad Front was concerned. There were few open battles there 
and operations were carried out only on a local scale (up to 1944), in 
order to achieve adjustments in the front lines. 
Counter-attack by the 14th Army 
The Finnish and German troops in the north had recaptured Saha 
early in the war and had carried out forays towards the east that con-
stituted a threat to the Murmansk railway line. This notwithstand-
ing, the 1st Tank Division, which had been held in reserve as the 
main safeguard for the railway in the Salla-Kandalaksha area, had 
to be sent to south of Leningrad against the Germans. In order to 
ensure sufficient strength for defence, the 14th Army asked for the 
88th Division which was then responsible for coastal defences in 
the Arkhangelsk region. Agreement was obtained for this, and the 
transfer of troops began on 9.8. Most of the division was transported 
to the Louhi and Boyarsk railway stations on 9.-15.8. and from there 
to the front. The predicament of the Soviet troops became more seri-
ous at this point, however, as the Grivnin Brigade, which had been 
holding the front, was forced to retreat further away, north-east of 
Kestenga, and thus as soon as it arrived, the 88th Division began an 
attack designed to eliminate the forces that had captured Kestenga 
and advance to the River Safyanga (Sohjana). The attack was arrest-
ed by"an unidentified Finnish battalion"on 18.8., however, and after 
nearly a month of attempting a breakthrough, the 88th Division and 
the Grivnin Brigade received orders on 12.9. to defend their existing 
positions for the time being. On 16.9. the Karelian Front was given 
new orders to regain the original defence line in the Murmansk and 
Kandalaksha directions, but they no longer had the strength to make 
any renewed efforts.65 
The headquarters of the 14th Army experienced difficulties in 
maintaining command over a front that extended from Murmansk 
to the latitude of Repola and contained numerous foci of action, and 
thus the Karelian Front proposed on 3.9. that an operative group 
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should be set up, comprising the 88th and 54th Divisions and the 
newly formed Repola Division, to function in the Kestenga — Uhtua 
— Repola area, with its headquarters at Kemi, and to be under the 
direct command of the Karelian Front. The supreme command, or 
the Stavka, indicated on 5.9. that it had no objection to the forma-
tion of a Kemi Operational Group, and a little later, on 5.10., when it 
was deemed appropriate to continue the reorganization of the chain 
of command, the Stavka also decided to divide the 14th Army into 
three operative groups, those of Murmansk, Kandalaksha and Kemi, 
with headquarters formed from that of the 42nd Corps. This change 
was delayed by hostilities, however, and was finally implemented on 
20.10., when the 14th Army itself issued orders for the creation of 
the Murmansk and Kandalaksha Groups." 
Engagements in Olonets 
The Finns renewed their offensive eastwards along the north eastern 
coast of Lake Ladoga on 4.9., but the Red Army had prepared itself 
for this by strengthening its defences. An order was received on 27.8. 
to build a defence line in the rear of the 7th Army, although this was 
by no means ready by the time the Finns resumed their advance. A 
recently formed division (313th) was assigned to the 7th Army on 
28.8., and when the Finnish troops had taken the town of Olonets 
and were threatening the railway line between Zvanka station and 
Lotinanpelto (Lodeinoe Pole), the destination of another division, 
the 314th, was switched from the Leningrad direction to the Oyat 
and Zaostrov stations on the Olonets Isthmus on 6.9. An anti-tank 
regiment was also assigned to the 7th Army on 5.9.67 
On behalf of the Stavka, Marshal Shaposhnikov instructed 
the commander of the 7th Army, General Gorelenko, on 8.9. to re-
capture or destroy the town of Olonets by means of air-raids and 
artillery fire; he should prevent cutting off the rail connection be-
tween Petrozavoctsk and Volkhovstroi. Lorteynoe Pole was not to be 
abandoned. Gorelenko was of the opinion that an attack on Olo-
nets should take place from the Podporozhe area, in collaboration 
with the Avakumov (or Petrozavodsk) Group, and that on both the 
Olonets and Petrozavodsk sectors one more infantry division was 
needed in order to defeat the enemy. Shaposhnikov was neverthe-
less adamant that the 314th and 313th Divisions that had already 
been allocated for this purpose should be sufficient. The chief of staff 
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for the North-Western Region, M.V.Zakharov, who had been chief 
of staff in the Leningrad military district prior to the Second World 
War, was supervising operations in the field at the time. 
The proposal drawn up by the 7th Anny for defeating the Finn-
ish group in Olonets was approved by the General Staff on 15.9.1941, 
but the rate of advance was set in the final plans at no more than 
6-7 km per day, so that the operation could be expected to last 11 
days rather than the initially projected 7 days. It was also decided to 
reinforce the Tsvetayev Group with one further anti-tank regiment. 
In the end, however, this planned attack, like its predecessors, was 
thwarted by the Finnish advance. 
When the Finns had crossed the River Svir, Marshal Kulik, a 
member of Stalin's inner circle who was in charge of the campaign 
in the area, staying in Volkhovstroi, attempted to bomb the railway 
bridge over the river and prevent the Finns from crossing at other 
points, too. To these ends, further forces were assigned to the 7th 
Army under orders issued on 18.9.-24.9., comprising the 21st and 
32nd Divisions (from Siberia), which were placed under the di-
rect command of the Stavka in the Volkhovstroi area, and the re-
cently constituted 46th Tank Brigade. The new Onega Fleet, based 
in the eastern end of the river Svir, was also subordinated to the 7th 
Army.68 
hz order to intensify its combat capacity in the Svir and Olonets 
areas, the Stavka issued a decree on 24.9. detaching the 7th Army 
from the Karelian Front and placing it directly under Stavka com-
mand, appointing the former head of the General Staff, Meretskov, 
as its new commander. The line from the railway station of Maa-
selkä to Pielisjärvi was set as the northern limit for its operations. 
This also meant that Marshal Kulik lost his position as far as the 
Voll<hov area was concerned. Meretskov's defence operation was 
nevertheless hampered by the fact that the Germans were advanc-
ing towards Tikhvin in his rear and the reserves that had been in-
tended for his use had to be redirected against this threat. Finally, 
responsibility for operations in the Tikhvin area was also placed on 
his shoulders. He resigned his command of the 7th Army"temporar-
ily" on 9.11.1941.69 
The situation in the Svir area was the more dangerous in the 
eyes of the Soviet leadership, and the reinforcements were moved 
there, which was in any case easier to accomplish. At the same time 
new troops had to be assembled in northern Olonets on a temporary 
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basis, although a new division from the reserves found its way there 
in September and another in October. Once the Finns had taken 
Petrozavodsk on 1.10.1941, the Stavka began to transfer the troops 
"released" from that theatre, 1-2 divisions, further south to Tsveta-
yev. It was evidently thought that the Finns' offensive would come 
to an end or slow down sufficiently in the uninhabited areas north 
of Petrozavodsk. The 114th Division was also ordered to transfer to 
the 7th Army at this point, whereas the Medvezhegorsk operative 
group was separated off from the 7th Army on 13.10. on account of 
command problems and placed under the Karelian Front, the border 
of its area being line Kenosha - the southern shore of Lake Latsha 
- Muromsky - Priama.70 
East of Medvezhegorsk 
When the Karelian Front received permission on 30.10.1941 to 
abandon its position at Kondupoga in order to establish stronger 
defences west of Medvezhegorsk and along the River Unitsa, it was 
noted that particular attention had to be paid to defending the road 
running east of Lake Onega to Vytegra. Responsibility for the de-
fence of the eastern shore of the lake was divided between the Kare-
lian Front and the 7th Army under an order issued on 12.11." 
Following the subsequent battles, the Karelian Front was al-
ready planning by 16.11. to abandon Medvezhegorsk, in which case 
the 37th, 313th and 71st Divisions would have been withdrawn to 
the eastern shore of the Bay of Poventsa to secure the Kargopol — Pu-
dozh — Nyandoma and Pudozh —Vytegra roads. The 289th Division 
would then have been moved north from the Maaselkä district into 
the roadless area to protect the railway from the south. The problem 
with this plan, however, was that the Finns would have been able 
to advance to Sumsky Posad and cut the Obozerskaya — Belomorsk 
(Sorokka) railway line. A second alternative was to continue the bat-
tle for Medvezhegorsk, for which purpose at least one more division 
would have been needed from the high command to protect the 
Pudozh — Nyandoma and Pudozh —Vytegra roads. If the situation 
in Medvezhegorsk were to become unsustainable, the operational 
group would have to retreat towards Sumsky Posad to protect the 
railway line from the south. The Stavka regarded this second alter-
native as the better one, but ordered them to retain control of Med-
vezhegorsk. 
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Help was in any case at hand. The 263rd Division was due to 
arrive in Soroka (Belomorsk) from the defence of Arkhangelsk on 
18.11. This division was not deployed for the defence of Medvezhe-
gorsk, however, but fought divided near the stations ofVelikaya Guba 
and Maaselkä. Somewhat later, around 25.11., a detachment of 6 to 
7 ski battalions was sent to Nandoma as an emergency measure to 
defend Pudozh and the Pudozh — Nandoma and Pudozh — Vyteg-
ra roads on the eastern shore of Lake Onega. These ski troops had 
probably been intended for use in mobile operations on the flanks of 
the Finnish forces, as the Karelian Front was later criticised for using 
them for defence, on guard duties and as a reserve for the front. 
Another instruction, issued on 19.11.1941, was aimed at tight-
ening the Soviet defences and required the systematic mining of the 
ice on Lake Onega and of the Medvezhegorsk — Pudozh - Vytegra 
and Pudozh — Kargopol — Nandoma station roads. A separate opera-
tive engineering group was set up for this purpose.72 
The Soviet leadership also had to make sure throughout that 
there was a certain reserve of troops further back, in the Arkhangelsk 
district, in order to defend the northern coast and to be available 
should the Finns succeed in crossing the Murmansk railway line. At-
tempts had been made since the very beginning of the war to keep 
one division in reserve there at all times. Under the orders allowing 
for the formation of the 58th Reserve Army, on 2.11. and 5.11., this 
army was to be responsible for protecting the shore of Lake Onega 
and the River Vytegra from 1.12. onwards. The grouping of the 58th 
Army was nevertheless adjusted at the beginning of December, on 
4.12., so that there would be only one division in the western part of 
the area, the 368th Division. Various so called marine sniper brigades 
- based on men transferred from naval detachments - began to ar-
rive in the Karelia area in December.73  
The loss of Medvezhegorsk to the Finns on 6.12.1941 was a 
severe setback for the Red Army, and the Stavka immediately or-
dered the restoration of the previous situation in that area and along 
the railway line from Medvezhegorsk to Maaselkä. This led the War 
Soviet of the Karelian Front to issue a directive on 17.12.1941 to the 
effect that the left wing of the front was to attack in the direction of 
Medvezhegorsk — in spite of the fact that they would be facing Finn-
ish troops that were much better accustomed to winter conditions 
— while the 14th Army on the right was to exhaust the enemy's man-
power and armaments by attacks on positions in that area and by 
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capturing the high ground that gave control over the whole terrain. 
More efficient use of the ski battalions was sought by combining 
them into two brigades. Preparations for the offensive were to begin 
on 26.12. and the operation itself on 10.1.1942. 
The idea behind the main offensive (Map 7) was that the Maas-
eHKä Group (three divisions, two brigades and a tank company) 
would attack Medvezhegorsk from the north and the Medvezhe-
gorsk Group (two divisions and a ski brigade) from the south, encir-
cling and destroying the Finnish grouping in the area. 
—The Maaselkä Group was to occupy the Vel kaya Guba — Lake 
Pettel- Shchukozero level on the first day, while a motorized de-
tachment (one company of ten tanks and a marine infantry brigade 
with transport vehicles) should capture the settlement of Maaselkä 
itself and attack southwards to the west of Medvezhegorsk. (One 
marine infantry brigade intended for this operation had been mainly 
included in the front's reserves.) 
Map 7. The idea of retaking Medvezhegorsk in January 1942 
95 
— A separate division subordinate to the front, the 263rd Divi-
sion, would engage the Finnish troops in the centre of the settle-
ment. 
— The Medvezhegorsk Group should also engage in a battle of 
attrition with the Finns and attack Poventsa on the morning of the 
second day. Half of the ski brigade should cross the Bay of Poventsa 
and intercept the Finnish lines of communication with Medvezhe-
gorsk from the south. 
Stalin ratified the plan for the Medvezhegorsk operation on 
29.12.1941, during teleprinter discussions which the front's Chief of 
Staff, Svirsky, held with the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vasi-
levskii. In view of the difficult situation in the Leningrad area, how-
ever, the Stavka decided to cut the preparation time down to 4 days, 
even though Vasilevskii had admitted in the discussions that this was 
a tight schedule and given permission for the commencement of the 
attack to be postponed from 30th December to 1st or 2nd January if 
necessary. 
Just before the beginning of the attack on Medvezhegorsk on 
3.1., the Kemi Operational Group was given the task of attacking 
on 7.1. in order to engage the troops opposing them in the Repola 
sector and prevent these from being transferred to Medvezhegorsk. 
This support manoeuvre had to be abandoned, however, because of 
a shortage of troops. 
The Stavka issued a reminder to the fronts on 10.1.1942 that the 
strength of the Red Army was insufficient to maintain a superior bal-
ance of forces everywhere and that the style of their attacks would 
have to be altered, deploying small striking forces with substantial 
fire-power and artillery attacks (i.e. the systematic use of concen-
trated artillery fire in advance of an infantry attack). The problem for 
the Soviet troops was that they were unable to amass a superior fire-
power, being restricted to superior manpower at the points where 
they achieved a breakthrough. As it was, the attack on Medvezhe-
gorsk fizzled out and was repelled almost as soon as it had begun, so 
that the Stavka issued orders for its abandonment on 11.1.'' 
The general plan for winter 1942 
Once the German pressure on Moscow had died down, a joint ses-
sion of the Politburo and Stavka held at the Kremlin on 5.1.1942 
revised the plans for future hostilities during the winter of 1942. The 
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proposal put forward by Shaposhnikov contained removal of the 
threats to Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus and — more gen-
erally in connection with this — the defeat of Germany and its al-
lies in the course of the coming year. Stalin was nevertheless of the 
opinion that they should move onto the attack at once, while the 
Germans were paralysed by their defeat in Moscow and were poorly 
prepared for the ravages of winter. Any delay of the Soviet counter-
offensive until the spring would only be to the Germans' advantage, 
as they would gain time for re-grouping. The Germans should not 
be allowed to rest, but should be driven relentlessly westwards until 
spring, by which time the huge new intake of Soviet reserves would 
be properly organized and trained, whereas there would be little left 
of the Germans' reserves. In this way "Hitler's men" could be de-
stroyed in the space of a year. An effort should be made to mount 
an attack on all nine fronts between Lake Ladoga and the Black Sea. 
Thrusts should be made by the Leningrad,Volkhov and North-West-
ern fronts, for example, in order to break the siege of Leningrad and 
advance some 300 - 400 km by the summer. 
The weak point in Stalin's idea was that the Red Army did not 
have sufficient forces at the beginning of the winter to create the 
necessary superiority in strength on all fronts at once. Zhukov be-
lieved that they should be satisfied with strengthening their position 
in the west and should concentrate on defence elsewhere, i.e. in the 
north and south, but the meeting, chaired by Stalin, expressed little 
support for this opinion. 
It became apparent in the course of the late winter and early 
spring, however, that the Red Army was indeed unable to raise suf-
ficient strength for any of its offensives. Thus Stalin was inclined 
fairly early in the winter to prepare for another German incursion 
towards Moscow, although, against the advice of Shaposhnikov, he 
still wished to mount an attack in the Leningrad area. In practice, the 
attacks launched by theVolkhov Front in February—April 1942 failed 
to drive the Germans out of the area east of Leningrad, even though 
this front was, temporarily, combined with the Leningrad Front un-
der a single command. Likewise, little success was achieved as far as 
the Leningrad area was concerned by either the operation mounted 
in May — July 1942 to release the 2nd Strike Army or the Sinyavin 
operation in August — October. The Finnish Army had halted close to 
the 1939 boundary on the Karelian Isthmus, and the Red Army was 
able to reduce its forces in that direction. Thus the 23rd Army, which 
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had been fighting on the Isthmus, received nothing more than de-
fensive orders from the Leningrad Front. 
Addressing a joint meeting of the Main Defence Committee 
and the Stavka at the end of March 1942 at which Voroshilov, Ti-
moshenko, Shaposhnikov, Zhukov andVasilevskii were also present, 
Stalin continued to stress that the Germans were not to be handed 
the initiative. A few days later he decided that an attack to the south-
west would be made in May, while elsewhere the accent would be 
on defence with only sporadic forays with limited objectives. Later 
an offensive could be mounted on all fronts from the Baltic to the 
Black Sea with the intention of regaining the western boundary of 
the Soviet Union (i.e. the 1940 boundary in the case of Finland). 
Actual plans were laid at that time for the period from April to June; 
everything else was merely considered in outline. The aim was to fill 
out this part of the plan in the course of the spring, but the military 
situation was such that the plan remained at the general map stage 
until the end of the year.75 
An attempt to regain Svir 
Although the Karelian Front and the Svir area did not form part of 
Stalin's plans for offensives in January 1942, the persistent threat 
to the Murmansk railway on the Finnish front led to preparations 
for an attack. Troops belonging to the new 58th Reserve Army was 
moved to the Arkhangelsk region in February, and one of its divi-
sions, the 152nd Division, was transferred to the Karelian Front, with 
two divisions held in the rear areas east of Karelia. 
It was important as far as the plans of the 7th Army were con-
cerned to eliminate the danger of a German and Finnish attack 
southwards from south of Svir, and this created a necessity for ad-
vancing as far as Svir, or even to the area north of it. The 7th Army 
thus proposed (Map 8) to invade the area of Pid'mozero —Vachozero 
— Svir station, with the intention of proceeding north from Podporo-
zhe over the River Svir without taking control of the southern bank 
between Voznesenie and Podporozhe. 
The Stavka was critical of the plan when considering it on 
11.3.1942, claiming that the army did not have the forces required to 
achieve these goals and, as the assailants, would find themselves in 
an unfavourable position. It therefore issued the following instruc-
tions: 1) It was necessary first to disperse the enemy grouping in the 
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Map 8. The idea of pushing the Finns back from the River Svir in April 
1942 
Kakovichi — Demidovskaya — Podporozhe area, to occupy the area 
between Podporozhe and Svir 3, advancing to Svir, and then to se-
cure a point at which to cross the River Svir. 2) It would then be pos-
sible to move an attack force further east and join with the Tsvetayev 
Group to destroy the Finns' 7th Division before advancing to Svir on 
a front Voznesenie — Podporozhe. The army would not receive any 
reinforcements or reserves other than those already agreed on. 
The Stavka later improved the attacking power of the 7th Army 
on 27.3.1942 by changing the command of its operational group (re-
placing Tsvetayev with Zaitsev) and assigning one division of new 
troops to it, the 368th Division, which had arrived from the Arkhan-
gelsk region. It was also due to receive a tank battalion of 51 tanks, 
two artillery regiments (by 10.4.) and a flight group (by 6.4.), and it 
is possible that some of these promises were kept. In any case, the 
99 
Svir operation began on 11.4. and was terminated on 23.4. without 
reaching even the territory on the southern bank of the river." 
The focus moves north from Medvezhegorsk 
The primary concern of the general staff of the Karelian Front was to 
restore the situation on its southern flank, in the area north of Lake 
Onega, and no very far-reaching goals were laid down. The planning 
of the Medvezhegorsk Operative Group in the interval 4.2.— 3.3.1942 
was similarly limited in its objectives, being centred on re-capturing 
a strategically located village. The plan that the Karelian Front had 
for the Kemi Operative Group, on the other hand, included an attack 
on 19.2.1942 directed at an old pre-war defence line, employing the 
27th Division, six battalions of the Northern Ski Brigade and also the 
67th Marine Infantry Brigade and the Southern Ski Brigade, which 
they were to receive for this purpose. 
In its developed form this plan devised by the commander of 
the Karelian Front was completed on 13.3.1942. The Kemi Opera-
tive Group was to destroy the Finnish Repola Group and occupy 
an area extending up to the line Rugozero — Andronova Gora and 
prevent the Finns from moving their reserves to Medvezhegorsk or 
north from there. An offensive in the Medvezhegorsk area was to 
begin at the same time. The reinforcements needed for the attack 
towards Repola would amount to one division, one marine infan-
try brigade, two cannon regiments and one howitzer regiment from 
the supreme command, one M-8 rocket launcher regiment and one 
M-30 rocket launcher battalion. There was already one light rocket 
launcher regiment and a tank battalion at the front that could be 
used in this operation. 
The idea was to attack the main road leading to Lake Rugozero 
and trap the Finnish troops to one side of it, advance to the lake 
itself and surround and destroy the Finnish troops in the Repola 
area. Some of the troops could then be sent on westwards and could 
reach a point west of Andronova Gora. At the same time the bor-
der troops and partisans, backed up by systematic air raids, could be 
used to close off the Rugozero — Padany — Maaselkä road during the 
operation. 
The deployment of the forces was planned in such a way that 
one division would attack the River Onda from the point at which 
the breakthrough was made and advance via Lake Pizma to the ter- 
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rain around the road junction, where it would prevent the passage 
of the Finnish troops along the Kochkoma — Repola road from the 
south. A second division would advance along the main Kochkoma 
— Rugozero road to the eastern bank of the River Onda and set up 
its defences there. One brigade, presumably of ski troops, would at-
tack the Finns' flank and rear and one brigade would be held in re-
serve." 
The Karelian Front nevertheless wished to strengthen its com-
mand organization for the purposes of this offensive, and Stalin did 
indeed approve on 2.3.1942 of the amalgamation of the Maaselkä 
and Medvezhegorsk Groups by 10.3. to form the 32nd Army and of 
the provision of reinforcements for this new unit.78 
When the Karelian Front put its proposal for an offensive before 
the Stavka, Stalin replied, according to the memoirs of the front's 
commander General Frolov,"Of course Petrozavodsk and the whole 
of Karelia must be liberated, but our chief enemy at moment is the 
Germans, and that means that the troops of the Karelian Front in 
the north must concentrate on attacking the fascist German troops." 
The Stavka evidently thought that the Finns would in any case not 
mount an attack, and also that under winter conditions they might 
be more difficult to defeat than the Germans.79  
Thus the Stavka ordered the Karelian Front on 27.3.1942 to 
prepare for an offensive against the Germans in the Murmansk, 
Kandalaksha and Kestenga sectors, with the aim of protecting the 
harbour at Murmansk and the Murmansk and Obozersk railway 
lines. The main attack would be made by the 14th Army close to 
the sea, backed tip by simultaneous attacks by the 19th Army in the 
Kandalaksha sector and in the Kestenga sector by the 26th Army 
(two divisions, two marine infantry brigades and one ski brigade). 
The Northern Fleet, which possessed marine infantrymen from the 
Murmansk area, was ordered to cooperate with the Karelian Front. 
The Stavka took further action to reinforce the Karelian Front 
in a second directive, issued on 27.3., designed to strengthen its 
command structure and — in theory — give it greater fire-power. The 
Kandalaksha Group was to form a 19th Army and the Kemi Group 
a 26th Army, and the headquarters of both of these were to be func-
tioning by 5.4. The ski battalions were to be combined to form two 
ski brigades, which were to be armed with light mortars and 45 mm 
anti-tank guns. Meanwhile the Air Force was to create new flight de-
tachments in the Soroka (Belomorsk), Kandalaksha and Louhi areas 
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(by 12.4.), and the various armies were to be strengthened with 1— 2 
artillery regiments each (4 altogether), three armies, the 19th, 26th 
and 32nd, were each to receive a M-8 rocket launcher regiment and 
the 14th Army a M-13 rocket launcher regiment (by 15.4.), in addi-
tion to which a total of four tank battalions, each of 25 tanks, were to 
be transferred to the front by 13.4. This was to ensure that full readi-
ness for an offensive was achieved by the middle of April." 
The objective of the operation was to advance as far as the na-
tional boundary. The commander of the Karelian Front specified the 
duties of the various armies in his directive of 4.4.1942 as follows. 
The 14th Army was to be ready by 15.4. to destroy the enemy forces 
in its path and advance to the national boundary, the 19th Army was 
to be ready on 25.4. to attack in the Alakurtti sector, push the enemy 
back as far as Lake Kuolajärvi and dig itself in on a line defined by 
the lakes Kuolajärvi — Anaj ärvi —Vuorij ärvi, and the 26th Army was to 
be prepared by 23.4. to destroy the enemy troops in front of it, push 
them back to the River Sofyanga and entrench itself there. 
The 19" Army, for instance, was required according to the plan 
drawn up on 14.4.1942 to break through the enemy lines in the area 
of Upper Lake Verman — the river mouth of the Lower Lake Verman 
River Voyta and advance to the above-mentioned line Kuolajärvi 
— Airajärvi —Vuorijärvi. The main group of the 26th Army (the 23rd 
Guards Division to the south of the Lower Lake Chernoye and the 
263rd Division along the main Louhi — Kestenga road, with the 80th 
Marine Infantry Brigade in reserve) was to first to attack Kestenga, 
with the 8th Ski Brigade providing protection on its northern flank 
and the 67th Marine Infantry Brigade carrying out a supporting at-
tack in the Lohivaara area to the south. 
The 14t'' Army (Map 9) was to break through the German front 
south of Lake Chapr and circle its right-hand flank with an as-
sault group comprising the 72nd Marine Infantry Brigade, the 10th 
Guards Division and the 6th Ski Brigade, at the same time as the 
12th Marine Infantry Brigade from the Northern Fleet would make 
its landing in the coast, including a decoy landing. The aim was to 
surround and eliminate the German 6th Mountain Division west of 
the Western River Litsa, continue the attack on the enemy's rear-
guard on the neck of the Sredny headland, destroy the enemy troops 
that had been trapped there and advance to a boundary line running 
from Malaya Volokovaya inlet to Lake Chapr. The enemy would also 
be engaged simultaneously by attacks from the 14th Division, one 
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Marine Infantry Battalion and the troops from the 23rd Fortification 
Area, with the 5th Ski Brigade and the 152nd Division, which had 
recently arrived in the area, held in reserve. 
The Karelian Front nevertheless announced on the same day, 
14.4.1942, that although the troops were indeed grouped in the re-
quired manner in the Kestenga and Murmansk areas, the support 
fire detachments promised by the Stavka had not arrived. If suffi-
cient fire-power could be obtained in time, the offensive in the Mur-
mansk direction could begin on 18. — 20.4. and that in the Kestenga 
direction on 25.4. It should be noted that the 19th Army advance in 
the Kandalaksha sector had evidently been postponed on account of 
a shortage of troops and fire-power and that the attack on Kestenga 
had been strengthened with an additional division. The Stavka ap-
proved on 16.4.1942 the times by which the forces on the Karelian 
Front should be prepared for action and issued confirmation on 24. 
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— 25.4. that the assault on Kestenga should begin on 24.4. and that 
towards Murmansk on 28.4.8 ' 
In spite of the fact that not even the 26th Army had received 
its promised reinforcements, the thrust towards Kestenga (Map 10) 
began on 24.4. Progress was made, and the 8th Ski Brigade on the 
right flank reached Okuvara Guba by 30.4., being then assigned the 
task of attacking towards the south and cutting off the road that 
passed north of Kestenga. At the same time the front commander 
ordered the forces to be re-grouped and the second echelon to be 
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transferred behind the 186th Division and the 80th Marine Infan-
try Brigade in the main direction of attack, beside the 23rd Guards 
Division. The two regiments of the 263rd Division that had suffered 
the worst losses were withdrawn to the reserves. As late as 24.4. 
the Stavka had urged the front to maintain an energetic attack and 
called for tanks from other parts of the front to be subordinated to 
it. It also gave orders on 26.4. for an M-8 rocket launcher regiment 
to be sent to Soroka (Belomorsk) by 3.5., but these reinforcements 
similarly never arrived.82 
The Murmansk offensive began on 28.4. and both the main 
attack and the landing were initially successful. The Germans suc-
ceeded in defeating the main force of the 6th Ski Brigade on 30.4., 
however, and the balance of power altered, bringing the Soviet at-
tack to an almost complete halt. The 5th Ski Brigade was rushed up 
from the reserves to join the battle, but the 152nd Division failed to 
reach the scene of combat because of stormy weather. 
In its assessment of the situation on 3.5. the Stavka decided to 
maintain the targets of the Karelian Front and 7th Army spring of-
fensive in force and confirmed the task of the 7th Army as being to 
capture Podporozhe during May, reach the southern bank of the Svir 
in the area Voznesenie — Svir 3, entrench itself in the general area of 
Svir between Lakes Onega and Ladoga and seek bridgeheads at Pod-
porozhe and Svir 3. The army could not expect any reinforcements 
or additional weapons, and thus the enemy was to be destroyed bit 
by bit, focusing the attack consecutively on different points. On the 
left wing, in the area between Lake Segezhskoy and Gumbestsa, the 
emphasis was to be on defence. Having reached the River Svir, the 
army was to leave two divisions in reserve south of Podporozhe and 
adopt as its principal task that of providing protection in the direc-
tions ofVytegra andVolldzov. It was no longer possible to mount an 
attack, however, and the General Staff issued a reminder on 22.5. 
that the main duty of the Ladoga Fleet was to secure the transport 
route to Leningrad. 
The Stavka ordered the Karelian Front on 3.5. to advance in ac-
cordance with the original plan in the course of the month of May, 
so that, before establishing their defences, they would had reached 
the national boundary in the directions of Murmansk (the area from 
the Bay of MaloVolokovoy to Lake Chapr) and Kestenga (the eastern 
bank of the River Sofyanga) and the line Kuolajäivi —Anajärvi —Vuo-
rijärvi in the Kandalaksha direction. A General Staff pronouncement 
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on the following day nevertheless regarded the attaining of these 
goals as an obligation only for the 14th and 26th Armies. The means 
by which this was to be done was again defined as the creation of lo-
cal superiority in manpower and fire-power. The 14th Army received 
a definition of the goals from the Front on 4.5. that implied that they 
were to be achieved by 18.5.83 
The 26th Army recommenced its attack on 3.5., but this time 
the opposition succeeded in encircling the Russians' right flank and 
the strength of the second echelon was expended entirely on the 
resolution of this situation. The 26th Army then partially regrouped 
on 7.5., on the orders of the front commander, and was reinforced 
with a border guard regiment, and also the 80th Marine Infantry 
Brigade as its reserve. The General Staff criticized the Karelian Front 
for its lack of communications and ordered it to move troops from 
further south (the 32nd Army) into the Kestenga area. The front was 
ready for a new offensive on 10.5. 
The Stavka nevertheless ordered them on 10.5. to move over to 
defending their existing positions in both the Murmansk and Keste-
nga directions, on account of bad weather and the poor state of the 
roads as the frost in the ground was melting. The Karelian Front was 
to inform the Stavka when it would be possible to begin fully pre-
pared attacks in these directions. The front commander neverthe-
less regarded preparations for the assault on Kestenga as being so 
advanced that any interruption at that stage would be detrimental to 
the operation. The attack by the 23rd Guards Division to the east of 
LakeYarosh (aiming to reach the Louhi — Kestenga road) proceeded 
slowly, however, and the following day the Stavka issued a new order 
for a halt. The troops were to be strengthened, a re-grouping was to 
be performed, rapid preparations were to be made for a new attack, 
and the prospects for commencement were to be communicated by 
15.5. at the latest. When the front reported on these prospects, the 
Stavka concluded that it was not possible to mount an attack un-
der those conditions and gave the requested orders for an organized 
withdrawal of the right flank. As far as the Murmansk offensive was 
concerned, the Stavka gave fresh entrenchment orders on 11.5. and 
required one marine infantry brigade to be held in reserve in the Ura 
Guba — Ara Guba area. The 12th Marine Infantry Brigade was also 
withdrawn from the landing shore at this point, on 13.5. 84 
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For Better Positions (1942 - 1943) 
The offensive mounted by the Germans in summer 1942 that ex-
tended deep into the Caucasus had the effect of turning the Red 
Army's attention towards the south. No new resources were allocat-
ed to the Karelian Front, and four divisions with combat experience 
were transferred from the region to the focus of hostilities during the 
battle of Stalingrad at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943. 
There were plans, of course. The General Staff encouraged the 
creation of a reserve with the strength of a division in the Murmansk 
sector on 1.7.1942, this being essential both for an attack and for 
successful defence, and the front did indeed envisage such an attack 
in the Murmansk sector in September 1942, in order to destroy the 
German 2nd Mountain Division and advance to the River Titovka. 
With Kestenga in mind, it also considered an offensive in the direc-
tion of Uhtua in 1942-43. 
The 7th Army drew up a plan in August 1942 with the object 
of capturing the southern bank of the River Svir between Voznese-
nie and Svir 3, but the General Staff regarded it as unrealistic (on 
3.9.1942), as the army did not have the necessary strength. The ob-
jective would have to be achieved in stages, attacking first the stretch 
Kiselovo — Svir 3 and gaining a bridgehead on the north side of the 
river if possible. This operation would require 4 divisions and one 
brigade, together with 2/3 of all the available supporting units. This 
plan was similarly never put into effect. 
By the following summer the situation had altered to the ex-
tent that the German army had had to retreat on the southern front 
from the positions it had achieved the previous year. This still did not 
mean that the Soviet forces had the necessary superiority in num-
bers and fire-power in the north, but a new flurry of plans began to 
emerge on the Karelian Front. 
In August 1943 the front commander, General Frolov, endorsed 
a plan for an attack towards Medvezhegorsk. It was calculated that 
30 days would be needed for preparations and 10 days for the ad-
vance of 28 — 30 km. 
1) A breakthrough with two divisions to a depth of 6-8  km would 
take 2 — 3 days. The divisions assigned to the supporting attack 
would contain the enemy in their own areas of operations on 
the northern flank. 
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2) The right-hand division would then extend its attack towards 
north and north-west aiming at the enemy's flank and rear. The 
other divisions — including the second echelon — would con-
tinue the thrust towards the west and seize the enemy's artil-
lery positions. The aim was to reach the Maaselkä — Chebino 
— Medvezhegorsk road and occupy the Chebino — Ostraye -
Kumsa 2 — Medvezhegorsk area. While the breakthrough troops 
were taking the railway, the marine sniper brigade would be 
brought into action, establishing itself at the level of the lakes 
Kommunarov and Uchma in order to secure the right flank of 
the main force and working in cooperation with the division 
that was attacking towards the north and north-west. The divi-
sions responsible for the supporting directions of attack would 
continue to expand their operations towards the flanks and to-
wards greater depth. This phase would last 4 days, entailing an 
advance of 22 — 24 km. 
3) At the pursuit stage the whole force of main and supporting 
assault troops would advance to the line MaaseWä — Medve-
zhegorsk and tightly protect the Chebino — Ostreche - Kumsa 
2 — Pokrovskoye area. This phase would last 3 days. 
The commander of the Karelian Front also devised a corresponding 
plan for the Kandalaksha area in September 1943, for the purpose 
of destroying the enemy's Kandalaksha Group, occupying the Ala-
kurtti area and creating suitable circumstances for a later attack on 
Kairala. Preparations would take at least 30 days. The main offensive 
would be in a sector extending from the southern shore of Upper 
Lake Verman to the northern shore of Lower Lake Verman, and the 
strength of the force would be two divisions in the first echelon and 
two in the second. Substantial pressure would be maintained over 
the whole front, with at least a division located south of Lower Lake 
Verman and at least a brigade north of Upper Lake Verman. At least 
a brigade would be held in reserve. Once a breakthrough in the op-
posing defences had been achieved in the principal direction of at-
tack, the hills of Lysaya and Voita would be taken, requiring 4 days. 
The next step would be to develop attacks on the enemy's flanks, en-
circling and destroying one unit at a time and maintaining defences 
in the north and south, so as to prevent the enemy from retreating 
from the River Shunsha (Tuntsa). This would take a further 5 days. At 
the same time the western offensive would be maintained, with the 
aim of capturing Alakurtti and crossing the River Tuntsa, requiring 6 
days, by which time the force would have advanced 25 km from the 
original front line. 
Following instructions from the Red Army supreme command, 
work on training and re-organizing the forces on the Karelian Front 
continued throughout the period of trench warfare, although no sub-
stantial increase in resources was forthcoming until spring 1944.85 
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Order of battle of the Red Army in the 
Finnish theatre of war 22.6.1941-19.9.1944 
Leningrad front (and troops in Karelian Isthmus) 
Northern front - Commander general lieutenant M.M. Popov 24.6.-26.8.41; mem-
ber of War council korpkom N.N. Klementev; chief of staff General major M.V. 
Nikishev 24.6.- 22.8.41, colonel N.V. Gorodetskii 22.8. - 26.8.41. 
Leningrad front - Commander general lieutenant M.M. Popov 23.8.-5.9.41, mar-
shal of Soviet Union K.Y. Voroshilov 5-12.9.41, army general G.K. Zhukov 
12.9-10.10.41, general major I.I. Fedyuninskii 10.10-26.10.41, general lieuten-
ant M.S. Hozin 26.10.42 - 9.6.42, general lieutenant, 15.1.43- general colonel, 
18.11.43 army general, 18.6.44- marshal of Soviet Union L.A.Govorov 9.6.42 -; 
member of War council korpkom N.N. Klementev 23.8.-4.9.41,12.2.43- general 
lieutenant, 18.6.44- general colonel A.A. Zhdanov 4.9.41- ; chief of staff colo-
nel General major M.V. Nikishev 24.6-22.8.41, colonel N.V. Gorodetskii 23.8. 
- 4.9., 6.9.- 12.9.41, general lieutenant M.M. Popov 4.- 6.9.41, general lieutenant 
M.S. Hozin 12.9-9.10.41, general major, 3.5.42- general lieutenant D.N. Gusev 
9.10.41- 28.4.44, army general M.M. Popov 28.4.44-. 
21.Army - Commander General lieutenant D.N. Gusev. - In Karelian Isthmus 
6.-9.44. - Included 30. Guards Corps 3.-15.6.44, 25.6.-5.7.44, 94.Corps 8.7.-
17./27.9.44, 97.Corps (8.6.)-10.6, 16.6.-9.44, 98.Corps 15.7-4.9.44, 108.Corps 
11.6.- 31.7.44, 109. Corps 2.-26.6.44, 3.-15.7.44, 110.Corps 12.6.-5.7.44. 
23.Army - Commander General lieutenant P.S. Pshennikov -4.8.1941, general 
lieutenant M.N. Gerasimov 4.8.-8.9. 1941, general lieutenant A.N. Tsherepanov 
8.9.41-2.7.44, generallieutenantVL Shvetsov 2.7.44-. - Karelian Isthmus 1941-
1944. - Included 10. Mechanized Corps 6.-7.41, 19.Corps 6.-9.41, 50.Corps 6.-
8.41; 6.Corps 18.6.44, 97.Corps 11-12.6.44, 98.Corps c. 19.4-6.5.44 (in 23.Army 
reserve), 12.6-14.7.44, 4.9.44--, 108.Corps 19.4.-(6.5.)44, 115.Corps 2.-22.6.44, 
29.6.44 --. 
59.Army - Commander General major, 11.11.1942- general lieutenant I.T. Koro-
vnikov. - In Karelian Isthmus 6.-11.44. - Included 43.Corps 2.7.44--17./27.9.44, 
97.Corps 9.44--. 
6.Corps - Commander General major I. I. Fadejev. - Into Karelian Isthmus 18.6. 44, 
in 23.Army. -- Included 13.D, 142.D, 177.D, 327.D, 382.D. 
10. Mechanized Corps - Commander armoured troops general major I.G. Lazarev 
11.3.-20.7.41. - In 23.Army 6.-7.41. -- Included 21.Armoured Division, 24.Ar-
moured Division, 198. Motorized Division. 
19.Corps - Commander General lieutenant M.N. Gerasimov --5.8.41, general ma-
jor F.N. Starikov 6.8-22.9.41. - In 23.Army 6.-9.41. -- Included 142.D, 168.D, 
198.D, 265.D, 115.D. 
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22.Corp5 - Commander General major A.S. Ksenofontov 3.6.-22.9.41. - In North-
ern front 22.-30.6.41. -- Included 16.D, 180.D, 182.D, 191.D. 
30. Guards Corps - Commander General lieutenant N. P. Simoniak. - In 21.Arm); 
3-15.6.44, in front reserve 16-24.6., in 21.Army 25.6.-5.7. In front reserve 5.7.-
moved from Karelian Isthmus, elsewhere 29.7.44. -- Included 45.GuardsD, 
63.GuardsD, 64.GuardsD. 
43.Corps - Commander General major A. I.Andreiev. - In 59.Army2.7.44--17./27.9. 
44. -- Included 13.D, 80.0, 124.D, 224.0 
50.Corps - Commander General major V.I. Shtsherbakov --4.8.41. - In 23.Army 
6.-8.41. -- Included 43.D, 115.D, 123.D. 
94.Corps - Commander General major I. I. Popov. - In Karelian front in 7.Army 
15.6.-22.6.44. Under stavka since 22.6.44, into Leningrad front 26.6.44. From 
front reserve in 21.Army 8.7.-17./27.9.44. -- Included 135.0, 221.0, 286.0, 327. 
D. 
97.Corps - Commander General major M. M. Busarov 23.4.44-9.5.45. - From stavka 
reserve 28.4.44 to Leningrad front. In 21.Anny (8.6.)-10.6., in 23.Army 11.6., in 
front reserve 12.6., in 21.Army 16.6.-. In 59.Army since September 44. -- In-
cluded 90.D, 178.0, 358.D, 372.D, 381.0. 
98.Corps - Commander General lieutenant G. I. Anisimov. - In 23.Army reserve 
n. 19.4.-6.5.44. From Leningrad front reserve in 23.Army (12.6.), in 21.Army 
14/15.7.-, in 23.Army 4.9.44-. -- Included 92.D, 177.0. 281.0, 372.D, 381.D. 
108.Corps - Commander General lieutenant NI. F. Tihonov 3.1.-2.8.44. - In 23.Army 
reserve c. 19.4.- 31.5. 44. In front reserve 31.5.-10.6., in 21.Army 11.6.- 31.7., 
moved from Karelian Isthmus 4.8. In front reserve in Pulkovo already 7.8. -- In-
cluded 46.D, 90.D, 178.D, 268.D, 314.D, 372.D. 
109.Corps - Commander General lieutenant I. P. Alferov 6.1.44-9.5.45. - In 21.Army 
2.6.44-, in front reserve 26.6.-, in 21.Army 3.7.-, in front reserve 15.7.- and 
moved from Karelian Isthmus. Elsewhere 25.7.44. -- Included 13.D, 72.D, 109. 
D, 125.D, 265.D, 286.D. 
110.Corps - Commander General major A. S. Grjaznov 15.4.44-9.5.45. - In 21.Army 
12.6-5.7.44. In front reserve 5.7.- and moved from Karelian Isthmus. -- Includ-
ed 109.D, 168.0, 265.0, 268.D. 
115.Corps - Commander General major S. B. Kozatshek 20.11.43-9.5.45. - In 
23.Army February 1944- (12.4.44); in 23.Army (12.6 44)-, under front staff 22.6.-
29.6., in 23.Army 29.6.-. -- Included 10.D, 92.D, 142.D, 382.0, 17.Fortification 
Area. 
1.Division of People's volunteers - Leningrad volunteers. On regiment in Kare-
lian Isthmus in 23.Army c. 1.9.- c.15.10.41. 
1.D NKVD - see 46.D. 
10.D - In 23.Army 18.3.42- (1.5.44)- and sen 115.Corps (10.6.--31.8.1944). 
13.D - Was Leningradin 4. Division of People's volunteers 27.7.41--, 5. Guards Di-
vision of People's volunteers c. 25.8. - 13.9.41. In Leningrad front reserve (10.-
13.6.44), in 21.Army 15.6.-, in its 109.Corps 17.-18.6., 6.Corps 18.6.-2.7., 13.7.-
31.8.44; in front reserve (10.7.44). To 23.Army 13.7. In 59.Ariny 43.Cohps moved 
away 12.12.44. 
16.D - 22.Corps in Estonia 22.6-30.6.41. 
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20.Infantry Division NKVD - see 92.D. 
23.D NKVD - Troops for protecting the railways. In summer 1941. 
43.D - In 23.Army 50.Corps 6.41- 4.8.1941, in 23.Army (still October) 1941. 
45.GuardsD - Was 70.D up to 16.10.42. In 23.Army 22.6.- 4.7. 1941. From front 
reserve in 30.Guards Corps to Karelian Isthmus, in 21.Army 3.6.44-. In front 
reserve 5.7.44-, and sent elswhere. 
46.D - Was 1.NKVD-Division up to 9.8. 1942, formed in Leningrad district from 3., 
7., 33. and 102. Border detachments in August 1941. In 23. Army a short period 
in July 1942. In 23.Army s. 19.4.-31.5, in front reserve 31.5.44-, 21.Army 11.6.-
44-, in 108.Corps (30.4.)-27.6. 44 and 1.7.- (9.44), in 97.Corps 28-30.6.44, in 
front reserve 15.7.-(7.8.)44, and sent elsewhere. 
63.GuardsD - Was 136D up to 19.1.43. In 23.Army 2.42-12.8.42. From front reserve 
in 30.Guards Corps to Karelian Isthmus, in 21.Army 3.6.44-. In front reserve 
5.7.44-, and sent elswhere. 
64.GuardsD - Was 327.D tip to 19.1.43. From front reserve in 30.Guards Corps 
to Karelian Isthmus, in 21.Army 3.6.44-. In front reserve 5.7.44-, and sent els-
where.. 
70.D - see 45.GuardsD. 
71.D - see Karelian front. 
72.D - Was 7. Marine Infantry Brigade up to 15.12.41 (formed c. 15.9.41 in Leningrad 
for 23.Army). In 23.Army 115.Corps (30.4.1944)-, in 23.Army reserve (1.5.44), in 
109.Corps 2.6.-, in front reserve (109.Corps) 15.7.44-, and sent elsewhere. 
80.D - Was 1. Leningrad Guards Division of Peoples volunteers up to 24.9.41 
(formed 18.7.41). In June 1944 into Karelian Isthmus. In 59.Army 43.Corps 
2.7.-(16.8.), in 97.Corps (27.9. 1944). 
90.D - In 23.Army 108.Corps (30.4.44)-20.6., 23.6. - (September 44), in 97.Corps 
21.-23.6.44. 21.Army reserve (108.Corps) 15.7-. In front reserve 7.8.44-, 8.44 
moved into Esthonia. 
92.D -Was 20. NKVD-Division tip to 16.8.42 (formed 8.9.41 from 56. NKVD Brigade). 
In Karelian Isthmus in 23.Army 23.2.42.-, in 115.Corps (30.4.44) - 14.6, 20.6, 
23.6.-1.7, in 98.Corps 15-16.6., 21.-23.6., 1.-9.7., in 115.Corps 10.7.-(10.9.). 
109.D - Was 21. NKVD-Division up to 1.8. 42 (formed 6.41). In 21.Army 109. 
Corps (3.6.44)-September 1944, (possibly 110.Corps 24..-25.6.). Infront reserve 
15.7.44-, sent to Kerstovo area 19.7. 
115.D - In 23.Army 6.41-5.9.41; moved 5.9.1941 into 48.Army. 
123.D - In 23.Army (50.Corps -4.8.41) -1. 43.. 
124.D - Formed in Shltisselburg 19.4.43 from 56., 102 and 138.Infantry Brigades. In 
59.Army at the end of June 1944, in 43.Corps 2.7.44 - September 1944. 
125.D - In front reserve from March 1944 - (6.7.44), in 21.Army 109.Corps 7.7.-15.7. 
1944, front reserve (109.Corps) 15.7.44. in 59.Anny 9.-10.44. 
135.D - From Ukrainassa in 94.Corps. In Karelian front c. 15,6,44, then to Karelian 
Isthmus, there in 21.Army 94.Corps 8.7.-(17.8.) 1944, in 43.Corps (27.9.44). 
136.D - see 63.GuardsD. 
142.D - In 23. Army 6.41-19.1.43, in 19.Corps -22.9.41, again in 23.Army 15.3.43-, 
in its 98.Corps (30.4.44), 115.Corps (1.6.44)-14.7., 6.Corps 14-16.7., 115.Corps 
16.7.-(10.9.) 44. 
163.Motorized Division - In Northern front -(30.6.41) in 1. Mechanized Corps, 
moved 24.6.41 to Rakvere area. Transformed into infantry division 9.41. 
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168.D - In 7.Anny 6.1941, moved into 23.Army 21.7.41, in its 19.Corps -27.8.41. In 
21.Army 110.Corps (12.6.)-(21.6.44), (27.6.)-(5.7.)44., in 109.Corps (23.6.44), in 
front reserve 5.7.44. 
177.D - In Northern front reserve in 6.1941- 8.7.41. In 23.Army reserve (16.6.44), in 
98.Corps (1.6.)-(13.6.) and 17-20.6.44, in 6.Corps 21.6.-9.7., 98.Corps 10.7.-(17.8. 
44); in 43.Corps (27.9.44). 
178.D - In 97.Corps (in 21.Army, 11.6.- 23.Army) and 16.6.- 21.Army) 1.-28.6.44, 
in 21.Arrny 108.Corps 2.-17.7.44, in 21.Army reserve 18.7-11.8., in 97.Corps 
12.8.-(27.9.44). 
180.D - Esthonian Division, in Northern front (up to 30.6.41). 
182.D - Esthonian Division, in Northern front (up to 30.6.41). 
191.D - In Northern front (up to 30.6.41). In 22.6.41 in 22.Corps, sent to Luga group 
8.7.41. 
198.D - Was 198. Motorized D up to 17.9.41. In 10. Mechanized Corps, in 23.Army 
25.6-28.11.41. 
201.D - Formed 6.43, in 23.Army (10.6.)-(31.7.)43. 
221.D - Formed in June 1943 from 79. Infantry Brigade. From Ukraina. In 94.Corps 
in Karelian front c. 15.6.1944-. Into Karelian Isthmus, in Leningrad front reserve 
(7.7.), in 94.Corps 8.7.-(17.9.44). 
224.D - In 23.Army (10.2.)-(10.3.43). From Esthonia by sea 28.6.44 to 59.Arm5; in 
43.Corps 16.7. -(16.8.) 44- , in 59.Army detached (27.9. 44). 
265.D - From Moscow district. In 23.Army 7.8. - (31.10.41). In 21.Army 109.Corps 
22.6.-25.6., 5-6.7.44, in 110.Corps (12.6.)-21.6., 26.6.-4.7.44, 7.7.44- and moved 
elswhere. 
268.D - Formed from NKVD people in 1941. In 23.Army 1.4.--(10.5.43). In 21.Army 
108.Corps 18.6.- 21.6.44, in 109.Corps 22.-25.6., in 110.Corps 12.-17.6, 26.6-
(5.7.44) and moved elswhere. 
281.D - In 23.Army 98.Corps (1.6.44) - (17.8.44--). 
286.D - In 23.Army (1.4.44, not 30.4.44), in 21.Army 109.Corps (5.6.)-14.7., de-
tached 14.7., in 94.Corps 15.7.-(23.8.44-), in 43.Corps (27.9.44). 
291.D - From Moscow district. Moved into 14.8.194lVolkhovstroi as reserve for Olo-
nets direction, to the south of Leningrad 17.8.41-, in 23.Army 1.9.41- 15.2.43. 
314.D - In 7.Army 6.9-16.9.41. Again in 7.Army in 1942. In 23.Army 115.Corps area 
as front reserve (12.4.44)-31.5. in 108.Corps as front reserve 31.5.44-, in 23.Army 
115.Corps (9.6.)-20.6.44, in 21.Army 97.Corps (5.7.--12.8.44-) 
327.D - In Karelian front c. 15.6.-, in Leningrad front c. 26.6.-, in 94.Corps c. 15.6.-
8.7.44, in Leningrad front reserve, in 23.Army reserve 9-10.7.and in 6.Corps 
10.7.-(10.9.44)-. 
358.D - In 97. Corps (1.6.) - (5.9.1944). 
372.D - In 23.Army 115.Corps (12.4.44), 98.Corps (30.4.44), in 108.Corps (1.6.44), 
in 98.Corps (10.6.)-12.6.44, in 21.Army 16.6., in 97.Corps 12.6.-(21.6.), in 108. 
Corps (23.6.) and 7.7.-,17.7.-(7.8.), in 97.Corps (4.7.)-7.7.,14-16.7.44, in 6.Corps 
(10.7.44). Sent elsewhere in 108.Corps. 
381.D - In 23.Army 97.Corps (1.6.)-11.6.44, in 98.Corps 12.6-16.6., 20.6.-
(16.8.)44-. 
382.D - From front reserve to 23.Army 15.6.44, in 115.Corps 15-16.6., in army 
reserve 17.6., in 6.Corps 18.6. -14.7., in 115.Corps 14.-16.7., in 6.Corps 16.7.-
(10.9.44)-. 
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1. Marine Brigade - In Gulf of Finland area - 12.11.41. 
2.Marine Brigade - In Leningrad area 15.7.41-2.43. 
5. Marine Brigade - Formed in the Baltic fleet 21.8. 1941. In 23.Army 28.8. -
30.9.41. Renamed 25.8.42 to 71. Detached Marine Infantry Brigade. Attached to 
Leningrad front 2.9. 1942. 
7. Marine Brigade - see 72.D. 
8. Brigade - In Hanko 6-12.1941, in 23.Army still 21-28.2.42, renamed 136.D. 
13. Infantry Brigade - In 23.Army (31.5.1943). Probably attached in June 1943to 
201.D. 
22.Infantry Brigade - In Karelian Isthmus in 23.Army (1.3.44)-(1.4.44). 
27.Infantry Brigade - In 23.Army as border guards 19-21.9.41 and as detached 
Border guards Brigade 22.9.41-7.42, renamed 27 Infantry Brigade (already 
1.8.42)-(still 1.6.43). Attached in June 1943 to the new 201.D. 
260. Marine Brigade - Formed in Baltic fleet 24.7. 42. In Kronstadt coast defence 
area 24.12.42-. In Koivisto area 21-27.6.44. 
Detached Border Brigade - see 27.Infantry Brigade. 
Detached Brigade of Navy Schools or VMUZ - In 23.Army 5.7-4.9.41. 
16.Fortification Area - Formed 2.8.1942 in Leningrad front. In 59.Army c. 18.7. 
(--27.9.44-). 
17.Fortification Area - Formed 29.7.1942 in Leningrad front,. in 23.Army (already 
10.11.42) - (10.9.44) . 
22.Fortification Area - In Leningrad oblast since 1928. In 23.Army (31.10.41)-
(1.6.44). Under front staff (17.8. 44). 
27.Fortification Area - Formed 7.6.41 in Käkisalmi, up to August 1941. 
28.Fortification Area - Formed 12.4. 1941 in Viipuri, in 23.Army (still 1.10.41). 
29.Fortification Area - Formed 12.4.1941 in Hanl<o, disbanded in 12.1941. 
3.Armoured Division - In 1. Mechanized Corps -7.41. 
21.Armoured Division - In 10. Mechanized Corps, in 23.Army 6.41- 11.7.41. 
24.Armoured Division - In 10. Mechanized Corps , in 23.Army 23.6.- 5.7. 41. 
1.Guards Armoured Brigade - In 21.Arnry 12.6.-(15.6.) 44. In front reserve. in 
July. 
30.Guards Armoured Brigade - Was 61.Armoured Brigade up to 2.43. 1944 in 
front reserve, in 21.Army (11.6.)-14.7.44. In Front reserve 14.7.44, and sent els-
where. 
152.Armoured Brigade - In 23.Army (already 25.6.42) - 15.12.42, in front reserve in. 
23.Army area (12.4.44), in 23.Army (30.4.)-(1.6.44), in 21.Army (15.6.)- (19.6.). 
In front reserve in July. 
220.Armoured Brigade - In front reserve 1944, in 21.Army (19.6.). In front reserve. 
in July. 
222.Armoured Brigade - In 23.Army (31.1.43), (1.4.)-(1.5.43). - Renamed 222.Ar- 
moured Regiment in June 1943. 
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Karelian front (and troops between Ladoga and Arctic 
Ocean) 
Karelian front - Commander General lieutenant, 24.8.43- General colonel V.A. 
Frolov 1.9.41 - 21.2. 44; member of War council korpkom A.S. Zheltov 1.9.41 
- 4.7.42, brigkom, 7.10.42- divkom G.N. Kuprianov 1.9.41 - 11.11.42, divkom, 
6.12.42 General major P.K. Batrakov 11.11.42 - 21.2.44, General lieutenant T.F. 
Shtykov; chief of staff colonel, 11.11.42- General major L.S. Skivirskii 1.9.42 -
18.5.43, general major, 17.10.43- General lieutenant B.A. Pigarevitsh 18.5.43-. 
7.Army - Commander General lieutenant F.D. Gorelenko 6.41 - 24.9.41, 3.11.41-
1.7.42, Army general K.A. Meretskov 24.9.-9.11.41, general major S.G. Trofi-
menko 4.7.42-29.1.43, general major A.N. Krutikov 29.1.-17.8.44, general lieu-
tenantV.A. Gluzdivskij 27.8.-7.12.44. - Included Petrozavodsk Operative Group 
7. - 8.41, Southern group and 1. Operative Group 7.41 - 6.42, 4.Corps 4.4.1942 
- (10.9.44), 37. Guards Corps 9.6.-8.8.44, 99.Corps 9.6-10.8.44, 94.Corps 15.6.-
22.6.44, 127. Light Mountain Corps 2.7.-4.8.44. 
14.Army - Commander General lieutenantV.A. Frolov 6.41-23.8.41, general major 
P.I. Panin 23.8.41 - 27.3.42, general major, 28.4.43- general lieutenant V.I. Sht-
sherbakov 28.3.42 - 9.7.45. - Included 42.Corps 6.-10.1941, Kandalaksha group 
10.41 - 4.42, Kemi Operative Group 9.- 10.41, Murmansk group 10-12.41. 
99.Corps 10.9.44--, 126. Light MountainCorps 3.44-9.44, 127. Light Mountain-
Corps 1.9.44 --, 131.Corps 10.9.44-. 
19.Army - Commander General major S.I. Morozov 28.3.42-21 .5.43, general ma-
jor, 12.2.43- general lieutenant G.K. Kozlov 23.5.43-6.3.45. - Included 127. Light 
Mountain Corps 3.44- 15.6.44, 133.Corps 9.44 --, 134.Corps 9.44 --. 
26.Army - Commander General major N.N. Nikishin 28.3.42-17.5.43, general 
major, 26.8.44- general lieutenant L.S. Skvirskij 17.5.43-18.1.45. - Included 
31.Corps 19.8. 43 -- 9.44,Corps 9.44 --. 
32.Army - Commander General major, 13.6.42- general lieutenant S.G.Trofirnenko 
3.3.42-4.7.42, general lieutenant F.D. Gorelenko 4.7.42 -. - Included 127. Light 
MountainCorps 7.8. -- 1.9.44, 131. Corps 23.8. -- 10.9.44, 135.Corps 9.44 --. 
1.Mechanized Corps - Commander Armoured troops general major M.L. Zhern-
jayskij 21.1-23.8.41. - In Northern front -23.8.41. -- Included 1.Aretoured Divi-
sion, 3.Arnloured Division, 163.Motorized D. 
4.Corps - Commander General major P.A. Zajtsev 4.4.42-27.11.43, general major 
P.V. Gnedin 8.12.43-14.11.44. - Formed 4.4.1942. in 7.Army 1942 - (10.9.44). 
- Included (1942:) 114.D, 272.D, 3.Marine Brigade. 
31.Corps - Commander General major V.A. Solovev 25.5.-18.8.43, general major 
K.F. Skorobogatkin 19.8. 43-20.9.45. - Formed 5.6.1943, in 26.Army 1943-(10.9. 
44). - Included 83.D, 205.D. 
37. Guards Corps - Commander General lieutenant P.V. Mironov. - Formed 
19.1. 1944. In Karelian front , in 7.Army 9.6. - 8.8.44. - Included 98.GuardsD, 
99.GuardsD, 100.GuardsD, 29.Armoured Brigade. 
42.Corps - Commander General major R. I Panin 14.3.41-23.8.41, S.N. Morozov 
1941. - In 14.Army 6.-10.1941. 
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94.Corp5 - see Leningrad front. 
99.Corps - Commander General lieutenant S.P. Mikulskij 3.6-29.12.44. - Formed 
4.10.43. In Karelian front, in 7.Army 9.6. - (10.8.), under the front staff c. 1.9.44, 
in front reserve (11.9.44), in 14.Army (c. 10.9.-). - Included 18.D, 65.D, 114.D, 
310.D. 
126. Light Mountain Corps - Commander Colonel V.N. Solovjev 27.2.44-. -
Formed as 1.Light Corps 27.2.44, renamed 8.3.44. In 14.Army (20.6.)-(11.9.44). 
127. Light Mountain Corps - Commander General major G.V. Golovanov -
12.7.44, general major Z.N. Aleksejev 13.7.44-3.9.45 - Formed as 2.Light Corps 
in 27.2.44, renamed 8.3.44. In 19.Army (1.6.44), in front reserve (15.6.), in 7.Army 
2.7.44-, in front reserve 4.8., in 32.Army c. 7-10.8., in 14.Army since c. 1.9.44. 
131.Corps - Commander General major M.A. Absaljamov 23.8.-28.9.44, general 
major Z.N Alekseev 29.9.-23.10.44, general major F.F. Korotkov 24.10.-4.11.44 
- Formed 23.8. 44. In 32.Army (10.9.44), then in 14.Army. - Included 14.D, 
10.GuardsD. 
132.Corps - Commander General major S.P. Perkov 23.8.-27.9.44, general major 
F F. Korotkov 4.11.44-9.5.45 - Formed 23.8. 44 in Kemi. In 26.Arcoy (already 
10.9.44). - Included 27.D, 54.D. 
133.Corps - Commander General major Z.N. Aleksejev 3.9.-28.9.44, general major 
P.A. Artjushenko 29.9.44-9.5.45 - Formed 3.9. 44 in 19.Army (already 10.9.44). 
134.Corps - Commander Colonel G.E. Guardslinovskij 3.9-20.9.44, general ma-
jor K.F. Skorobogatkin 21.9.44-23.3.45. - Formed 3.9.44 in 19.Army (already 
10.9.44). 
135.Corps - Commander General major P.V Gnedin 11.11.44-9.5.45. - Formed 5.9. 
44 in 32.Army. 
7.Army Petrozavodsk Operative Group - Commander General lieutenant M.A. 
Antonjuk. - Operated 21.7.41- (August) 41. - Included 24.Motorized regiment, 
9.Motocycle regiment, 10.reserve regiment, 2. tank regiment. 
7.Army Southern Group and 1. Operative Group - Commander General lieuten-
ant V.D. Tsvetaev 21.7.41-27.3.42; Zaitsev 27.3.-20.6.42. - Operated 1941- 1942. 
Transformed in 20.6.42 into 4.Corps. - Included (originally) 3.Marine Brigade., 
451. regiment, 719. regiment, 7. regiment; (in 1942) 114, 272, 67. D, 69, 70, 73. 
Marine Infantry Brigade. 
Kandalaksha Group - Commander General major S.N. Morozov (17.9.41)-1942, 
general major Shevtshenko. - Former staff of 42.Corps. In 14.Army 14.10.41-
4.4.42. -- Included 104, 122.D, (c. 31.3.42-) 77.Marine Infantry Brigade and 4. 
Ski Brigade. 
Medvezhegorsk Operative Group - Commander General major Knjazev 16.10.-
29.12.41, general major S.G. Trofimenko 29.12.41-3.3.42. - Operated 14.10.41-
3.3.42. -- Included 37, 71, 313.D, 2. Light Infantry Brigade, 1. Ski Brigade. 
Kemi Operative Group - Commander General major N.N. Nikishin (10.11.41). 
- Operated 12.9.41-4.4.42.Originally in 14.Army, and directly under Karelian 
front staff 14.10.41--. - Included 14., 88., 27., 54.D, 67. and 80. Marine Infantry 
Brigade. 
Maaselkä Operative Group - Commander General major G.A. Veshtshezerskij 
26.12.41-9.3.42. - Operated 16.11.41 - 9.3.42. -- Included 289, 367 D. 
Murmansk Group - 14.Army (already 20.10.)-(20.12.41). 
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Repola Operative Group - Commander Colonel G.K. Kozlov. - Formed 29.7.41-, 
renamed 10.8.41 into 27.D. 
Northern Defence area - Commander Coastal defence general lieutenant S.I. Ka-
banov 42-43, general major J.T. Dubovtsev (15.10.44). - Formed 12.7. 1942 in 
Northern fleet. 
3.D of People's volunteers - Leningrad volunteers, formed 1-15.7.41. In 7.Army 
(minus one regiment) 24.7.41-, detached, then in Southern group 9.8. - 
n.3.10.41. 
10.GuardsD - Was 52.D up to 26.12.41. h1 14.Army 6.41-11.44, Murmansk group 
(20.10.41). 
14.D - In 14.Army 6.-12.41, in Murmansk group (20.10.41), in Kemi Operative 
Group (31.12.41)-10.1.42, in 14.Army (31.1.42)-1. 1945. Later 101.GuardsD. 
18.D - In 7.Army 99.Corps c. 15.6.-(31.8.44), in 7.Army (11.9.44). 
21.D NKVD - Formed 6.1941, from NKVD troops, in Petrozavodsk area and Kare-
lian Isthmus. See later 109.D. 
21.D - From the Far Eastern front. In 7.Army 25.9.41 -3.44, in 19.Army 3.44-
(10.9.44) . 
23.GuardsD - Was 88.D up to 17.3.42. Transported from Arkhangelsk area 10.8. 
41, in 14.Army 11.8.41-. In Kemi Operative Group 15.9. 41-, in 26.Army 4.42 
- (30.9.42). From Louhi 18.10.42 to South Western front. 
27.D - Was Rebola D up to 24.9.41 (formed by order 10.8. 41). In Kemi Operative 
Group and in 26.Army (30.9.41)-(1.1.44, 31.Corps), in 32.Army probably from 
March 44 - (31.8.44), in 26.Army (10.9.44). 
37.D - Was Petrozavodsk D up to 24.9.1941. In 7.Army, under Karelian front staff 
15.10.41-, in Medvezhegorsk group 14.10.-(30.11.41); in Maaselkä Group and 
in 32.Army (26.12.41)-- 2.43. 
45. D - Formed in Louhi (order 16.4.43) from 67. Marine Infantry Brigade. In 26.Army 
15.5.1943 - (10.9.44), 31.Corps - 21.7.44 and 18.9.44-, then in 14.Arnry. 
52.D - see 10.GuardsD. 
54.D - 42.Corps 6.41-. In Kemi Operative Group and in 26.Army (12.9.1941) -11. 
1944, in its 31.Corps (1.1.44)-. 
65.D - In 7.Army 99.Corps c. 15.6.44 - (31.8.44), in 14.Army (already 1.9.44)-11.44. 
Since 29.12.44 102. GuardsD. 
67.D - Up to 18.10.41 Olonets division, which had been formed on Svir 24.9.41. In 
7.Army 1941-2.44. In 19.Army from March 1944 -11.44. In 14.Army-9.45. 
71.D - In 7.Army 6.41-15.10.41, temporarily in 23.Army (1.8.41). In Medvezhegorsk 
Operative Group and 32.Army 14.10.41--(30.9.42). To Volkhov front 10.42. 
83.D - Formed near Louhi in January 1944 from 61. and 85. Marine Infantry Bri-
gades. In 26.Army 1.44-(10.9.44), in its 31.Corps (18.9.44) and (25.9.44). In 
14.Army 10-11.44. 
88.D see 23.GuardsD. 
98.GuardsD - Up to 19.1.44 named 13. Guards Air landing division, which had 
been formed in Moscow area. In Karelian front, in 7.Army (20.6.)- August 44. 
99.GuardsD - Up to 19.1.44 named 14. Guards Air landing division, which had 
been formed in Moscow area. In Karelian front. in 7.Army (20.6.)- August 44. 
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100.Guard5D - Up to 19.1.44 named 15. Guards Air landing division, which had 
been formed in Moscow area. In Karelian front, in 7.Army (20.6.) - August 
1944. 
104.D - In 14.Army 42.Corps 6.41-(14.10.41), in Kandalaksha Operative Group and 
in 19.Army (20.10.41) - 11.44. 
114.D - In 7.A:rmy 8./9.10.41-, 4.Corps (1.6.)-(31.8.44); to 14.Army c. 10.9.44. 
122. D - In 14.Army 42.Corps 6.41-, in Kandalaksha group and 19.Army (30.9.41)-
(10.9.44) . 
152.D - In Karelian front, its 26.Army (April 42), in 14.Army (1.8.1942)-25.1.43. Left 
for Harkov. 
168.D - See Leningrad front. 
176.D - Formed from 65. and 80. Marine Infantry Brigades in Maaselkä 20.2. 44. In 
32.Army 2-11.44. 
186.D - Was PoijarnojeD up to 28.9.41, and 205.D since 26.6.43. Formed in Mur-
mansk from Border troops in summer 1941. In 14.Army (30.9.)-(31.10.41), in 
Murmansk group (20.10.41). In Kemi Operative Group (30.11.)-10.12.41, under 
Karelian front staff 10-31.12.41, in Maaselkä Operative Group and in 32.Army 
(31.1.) - (31.3.42), in 26.Army (30.4.)-25.5.42, in 32.Army 25.5.- (1.7.)42, in 
26.Army 1.8.42-11.44, 31.Corps. 
205.D - See 186.D. 
237.D - Formed in 5. 1941 in Karhu station. In 7.Army, Petrozavodsk 23.6.41-, in 
Loimola 27.6-7.7.41. Moved away 7.7.41. 
263.D - Formed 7.41. From Vologda 9.8.41 to Arkhangelsk area. Into Karelian front 
23.11.41. In fron reserve 25-30.11.41, 10-20.12.41, (31.1.)-15.2.1942, in 32.Army 
15-28.2.42, in 26.Army (30.4.42)-22.1.43. Sent away from Louhi. 
272.D - In 7.Army Petrozavodsk group 1-5.8.41, in 7.Army (16.9.41). Fought against 
Getrmans in Tikhvin area, but again in 7.Army 1941-, in its 4.Corps (10.3.)-
(10.9.) 44. 
289.D - Formed 15.10.41 in Medvezhegorsk from 5. Brigade. In Medvezhegorsk 
group (20.10.)-(30.11.41), under front staff (31.12.41), in Maaselkä Group and 
in 32.Army (31.1.42)--(10.9.) 44. 
310.D - In 7.A:n 4.Corps (c. 15.6.44)-, in 99.Corps (20.6.)-(10.9.44). 
313.D - In 7.Army 28.8.41-(10.41). In Medvezhegorsk group and in 32.Army 
(20.10.41)-- 11.44. 
314.D - see Leningrad front. 
341.D - Formed from 77. Marine Infantry Brigade 3.6.44. In 19.A 3.6.-(10.9.44). 
367.D - In Karelian front as detached 10-20.12.41. In Maaselkä Group (31.1.)-
(28.2.1942)."Destroyde in 6-7.2.42". In front reserve (31.3.)-(30.4.42). Reformed 
in Kemi c. 1.5.42. In 32.Army (1.6.42)-(1.1.44), in 26.Army probably from March 
44 --(31.8.44); 132.Corps. 
368.D - In 7.Army 3.42 -, in its 4.Corps (10.3.)- 10.7.44, in 32.Army 11.7. -(31.8.44); 
in 14.Army (c. 10.9.44-). 
Olonets Division - see 67.D. 
Polyarnoye Division - see 186.D. 
Rebola Division - see 27.D. 
Petrozavodsk Division - see 37.D. 
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1. Light Infantry Brigade - In 7.Arniy (24.9. 41) in Petrozavodsk, in Medvezhe-
gorsk 9-10.41. 
1. Partisan Brigade - Formed in Puutois 6.12.41, disbanded 10.1942. 
1. Ski Infantry Brigade - Also 1. Light Ski Brigade (31.1.)-(31.3.42), 1. Ski Brigade 
(30.4.), 1. Infantry Brigade (1.6.)-(9.42). In Medvezhegorsk group and 32.Army 
(31.12.41)-(9.42). Attached to 33. Ski BrigadeiGuardsatiin (already 30.9.42). 
2. Light Infantry Brigade - Formed in Petrozavodsk 26.9.41, in 7.Army. Under 
Karelian front 15.10.41-, in Medvezhegorsk group (20.10.)-12.12.1941, disband-
ed. 
2. Ski Brigade -Also 2. Infants), Brigade 14.5.42-, in 32.Army (31.3.) - (9.42). Dis-
banded in Sekehe 9.42, attached to 33. Ski Brigade. 
3. Ski Brigade or "Tunkua Ski Brigade" - Also 3. Infantry Brigade. Formed near 
Novosibirsk, to Beloinorsk (Sorokka) 30.1-15.2.42, in 26.Army 25.3.-(1.6.42); 
attached in 9.42 to 32.Ski Brigade. - Note: In Kemi Operative Group there was 
(19.2.42) a Northern Ski Brigade and a Southern Ski Brigade and later (28.2.42) 
Kemi Ski Brigade. 
3. Marine Brigade - Formed in the Baltic fleet 18.7. 41, transferred into RedArmy 
10.10.42. In 7.Arn1y (18.4.42), 4.Corps (1.6.)-(28.7.44), 32.Arn1y (5.8.)-(31.8.44), 
to 14.Army c. 10.9.44. Since 15.11.44 3.Mountain Brigade. 
4. Ski Brigade - In Kandalaksha group of the 14.Army and in 19.Army (2.)--9. 
42. 
4. Marine Brigade - Formed in the Baltic fleet 18.7.41. In the isalands of Ladoga 
24.7.-14.9.41.Transferred to fight Germans 15.11.41. In Olonets direction in the 
summer 1942. Disbanded 24.7.42. 
5. Brigade see Murmansk Brigade. 
5. Reindeer Brigade - Also 5. Ski Brigade. Formed in Onega 3. 1942, In 14.Army 
12.3.-20.9.1942 Attached to 31. Ski Brigade. 
6. Ski Brigade - Also 6. Reindeer Brigade. Formed in Molotovsk, in 14.Army 
(31.3.)-- 9.1942. Attached to 31. Ski Brigade. 
7. Ski Brigade - In 7.Army (11.4.42). 
7. Ski Brigade - In 32.Army 3.4.-7.5.42. 
8. Ski Brigade - Also 8. Reindeer Brigade. Formed in Louhi area 2.1942-, in 
26.Army (31.3.)-- 9.1942. Attached to 32.Ski Brigade. 
9. Ski Brigade - Formed in faroslav. In the beginning of February 1942 to Majguba 
and 9.3. 42 to Ontajiirvi. Disappears at the end of March 1942. The rank and file 
moved in 5.42 into direction of Moscow. 
12. Marine Brigade - Formed in the Northern fleet in autumn 1941. Sent from 
Arkhangelsk 7.9.41 to Kandalakscha. In Murmansk group of the 14.Army 
16.12.41 -. In Karelian front (31.1.42). In the Northern defence area 7. 42, in 
Murmansk area 9.42 ... (1.1.45). Since 30.4.1943 12. Marine Infantry Brigade. 
30. Ski Brigade - Formed in 3.44. In 19.Army (1.6.44), in front reserve (20.6.44), in 
7.Army 127.Corps (30.6.), moved in 4.8.44 into 99.Corps, still in the 7.Army in 
10.9.44. 
31. Ski Brigade - Formerly 5. and 6. Ski Brigades. 14.Army 20.9.42-(1.1.43), and its 
126.Corps (--1. 6.44) - 10.9.44. 
32. Ski Brigade - Formerly 3. and 8. Ski Brigades. In 26.Army (9.42), in 19.Army 
probably from March 44 - (1.6. 44), in 7.Army 127.Corps (30.6.)-(16.7.), moved 
in 4.8. to 99.Corps, still in the 7.Army 10.9.44. 
120 
33. Ski Brigade - Formerly 1. and 2. Brigades (order of 7.9.42). In 32. A (30.9.42)-
(1943), in 19.Army probably from March 44 - (1.6. 44), in front resrve (20.6.)-
(10.7.), in 7.Army 127.Corps (16.7.), moved in 4.8. to front reserve, in 32.Army 
(7.8.) - (31.8.44). To 14.Army c. 10.9.44. 
61. Marine Infantry Brigade - Formed in the Pacific fleet. In Maaselkä group 
27.12.41/1.1.42-(28.2.42), in 32.Army 13.3.-22.7.42, in front reserve 22.7.-
13.8.42, in 26.Army 19.8.42 - (1.1.44). Attached to 83.D. 
63. Marine Infantry Brigade - Formed in the Pacific fleet. In Arkhangel in 
the Northern fleet 1.7.42--. In 14.Army 6.1942-, In Northern defence area 
12.7.42-(1944). Since 30.3.1943 63. Marine Brigade. 
65. Marine Infantry Brigade - Formed in the Pacific fleet. In Maaselkä Group 
27.12.41- (28.2.42), in 32.Army (13.3.42 - (1.1.43), possibly during the summer 
1942 in 26.Army (9. 1942), in 32.Army 1943, attached to 176.D in 2. 1944. 
66. Marine Infantry Brigade - Formed in the Pacific and Ainur fleet. Into Kare-
lian front 9.12.41. In Maaselkä group 27.12.41 (actually 13.1.42)- (28.2.1942), 
to Medvezhegorsk 18.3.1942, in 32.Army (31.3.)-(1.6.42). Left in 19.6.42 for 
Northern Caucasus. 
67. Marine Infantry Brigade - Formed in the Pacific fleet. Into Karelian front 
2.1.1942, in Kemi Operative Group and in 26.Army 15.1.42-15.5.43. Attached 
to 45.D. 
69. Marine Infantry Brigade - Formed in the Pacific and Black Sea fleet. In 7.Army 
10.1.42-(29.7.44), in 32.Army (5.8.)-(31.8.44), to 14.Army c. 10.9.44. 
70. Marine Infantry Brigade - Into Karelian front 30.12.41. In 7.Army 4.1.42-(9.42). 
ToVolkhov front 3.1.43. In 7.Army (1.6.44), in 32.Army, to 14.Arrvy c.10.9.44. 
72. Marine Infantry Brigade -To Murmansk 28.12.41. Into Karelian front 6.2.42. 
In 14.Army (14.2.42)-(10.9.44). 
73. Marine Infantry Brigade - In 7.Army (oredr of 12.41) 6.1.42-. Into Votkhov 
front 21.9.42. Disbanded 8.43. 
77. Marine Infantry Brigade - Into Karelian front 5.1.42, in 14.Army 2.1.-(31.1.42), 
In Kandalaksha Operative Group and in 19.Army (28.2.42)-3.6.44. Attached to 
341.D. 
80. Marine Infantry Brigade - Into Karelian front 12.1.42, in Kemi Operative 
Group and in 26.Army 22.2.42-(1.1.43), in 32.Army (already 1943) - 2. 1944. 
Attached to 176.D. 
82. Marine Infantry Brigade -To Northern fleet, and there 28.6.42- in Murmansk 
Fortification Area. In the coastal defence of the Polyarnyi base 7.9.42-. Disband-
ed 10.2.43. 
85. Marine Infantry Brigade - Arrived 27.12.41. Into Karelian front reserve 12.1.42 
-. In Maaselkä Group, first part 26.2..42-, then all of it in 32.Army (31.3.)-
(30.4.42). in 26.Army 7.5.42-1.44. Attached to 83.D. 
254. Brigade - Formed 31.7.42. in the Northern fleet (in the Northern defence area). 
In front line since the beginning of 1943. 
Murmansk Brigade - Formed in Murmansk in the beginning of August 1941. In 
Kestenga/Louhi direction 12.8. 41-9.41, In Kemi Operative Group (31.8.41). 
Renamed 5.Brigade in 16.9.41-(30.9.41). In 10.41 transformed into 289.D in 
15.10.41. 
Kemi Ski Brigade - In Kemi Operative Group (28.2.42). Then possibly 3. Ski Bri-
gade. 
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2. Fortification Area - in 14.Army (1.6.)-(31.8.44), actually 2. Defence area. 
23. Fortification Area - Formed 1.6.41 in Murmansk, in 14.Army (31.8.41)-
(1.7.42). 
150. Fortification Area - Ordered already 28.3.42 to be given to 7.Army. In Kare-
lian front from March 1944, in 7.Army (10.3.--11.9.44), in its 37.GuardsCorps 
(29.7.44) and in 4.Corps (4.8.)-(31.8.44). 
162. Fortification Area - Ordered 20.5.42 to be given to 7.Army. In 7.Army 1942-
(11.9.44) and in its 4.Corps (10.3.)-(31.8.44). 
1. Armoured Division - Sent from Pskov to Kandalakscha 19.-24.6., to Petroza-
vodsk 15.7., part of it went 20-22.7. to Gatchina, part was (10.8.) in Kandalak-
sha-Kuolajärvi direction. Rest of the Division was moved from Petrozavodsk 
area to "Russia"by 3.9. 1941. 
7. Guards Armoured Brigade - Was up to 16.2.42 the 46. Armoured Brigade. In 
7.Arnvy 27.9. - 10.11.41. Again in 7.Army (20.6.)-(31.8.44), in 26.Army 10.9.44-. 
29. Armoured Brigade - In Karelian front 6.6.44 and in 7.Army (20.6.) - (29.7.), in 
32.Army (3.8.)-(11.9.) 44. 
38. Guards Armoured Regiment or Brigade - In 19.Army (1.6. --10.9.44). 
46. Armoured Brigade - see 7.Guards Armoured Brigade. 
Sources 
- TsAMO: Northern front, Leningrad front, Karelian front and 7.Army operative 
and loss reports. 
- Finnish military archives (SArk), booty and prisoner documents. 
- German Bundes archiv - Militär archiv: Intelligence reports. 
- Red Army - internet site (www.rkka.ru). 
- Soviet historical books and memoirs. 
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5. The strategic operations against Finland 
in the summer of 1944 
The great shock of the mass attack mounted by the Soviet Union 
against Finland in 1944 has been described by many authors and 
this shock has given rise to much heated discussion. The fundamen-
tal sources of the decision to attack have not yet been analysed. The 
decision was made by Stalin, of course, and his papers, in the Krem-
lin archives, are still closed to historians. There is a great deal of ma-
terial on the planning of the attack available in the Soviet archives 
and literature, however. The first phases were successful, which is 
not something that can be said about all Soviet operations in the 
direction of Finland. Furthermore, the operations in Svir, Vitele, Vii-
pun i Bay, and Vuosalmi were interesting examples of art of war, as 
they included amphibious crossings and naval activity, which were 
otherwise quite rare in that war. 
The memoirs of S.M. Shtemenko, published in 1968-1973, pro-
vide a colourful description of the course of events from the view-
point of the General Staff. Likewise K.A. Meretskov has recounted 
his activities as commander of the Karelian Front. Meretskov's view 
was apparently narrower than Shtemenko's, but then Shtemenko's 
main attention in spring 1944 was directed not at Finland but else-
where. He did acquaint himself with the Finnish issue from a politi-
cal viewpoint as well, however, when he was Molotov's assistant in 
late March, at the time when J.K. Paasikivi and Carl Enckell were in 
Moscow exploring the possibilities for peace. 
The descriptions of Shtemenko and Meretskov differ some-
what, and it is apparent that much more archive material was avail-
able when Shtemenko's memoirs were being prepared than when 
Meretskov was going through the same process. Also, Shtemenko 
emphasizes, somewhat critically, that directions and limitations 
were constantly needed with regard to Meretskov's decisions and 
actions. 
The overall image of the mass attack is quite clear as far as its 
general lines are concerned. The Red Army had numerical superior-
ity in both men and weapons at the time, and this could be best ex-
ploited by developing massive attacks one after another in different 
areas. Success achieved in one area would make the enemy concen- 
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trate its reserves there, and the front would consequently be weak-
ened at some other point, where the next attack could take place." 
Choosing the attack direction 
The great Soviet strikes of the early winter of 1944 had been directed 
at breaking the siege of Leningrad in January-February and at lib-
erating the Ukraine in December-April. The Soviet high command 
confirmed on 12th April that the most important task for the coming 
summer season would be to crush the German concentration in Be-
lorussia. As preparations were being made for this main operation, 
operations would be carried out along other parts of the front to 
divert German attention and forces away from Belorussia. 
When confirming the programme for the summer season, the 
Soviet high command also decided that the first summer attack 
would have to be carried out on the Karelian Isthmus and in Olo-
nets. The time of the attack and its echelons were also affected by 
natural circumstances, i.e. the recovery of the roads from the melting 
of the ground frost. 
There were several reasons for choosing the Karelian Isthmus 
- Olonets operation plan: 
1) Trends in Finnish domestic policy seemed to point to a con-
tinuous strengthening of those in favour of peace. Although 
the government had rejected the terms offered for peace, it 
had nevertheless shown a great longing for peace. Defeating 
the country's armed forces would naturally resolve the situa-
tiort. Severe casualties might also be an adequate incentive for 
surrender, or even for the acceptance of harsh terms of peace. 
When the mass attack began, Stalin explained to Averell Har-
riman, representing the United States, that the Finns were"re-
markably stubborn and slow-witted people" and that "sense 
had to be beaten into their heads with a hammer." 
2) Stalin wanted to observe whether the landing of the western 
powers in France in June 1944 would really prove to be an 
operation to be taken seriously, and decided to use the wait-
ing period to his advantage by dealing with the enemy in the 
north-west. Leaving Finland to continue her resistance even for 
a short period after the fall of Germany would have been po-
litically inappropriate in Stalin's opinion, because the western 
powers could have influenced the situation in Finland's favour. 
124 
3) The attack on Finland would divert German attention away 
from Belorussia, the direction of the Soviet Union's main of-
fensive. 
4) The large pouch in the Soviet front extending to Lake Onega 
could be straightened. The front would become still significant-
ly shorter if the enemy could be removed from Finland. 
5) The Murmansk railway and the canal leading to the White Sea 
could be taken into use again. As the capacity of the alterna-
tive route, the Belomorsk (Sorokka)-Arkhangelsk branch line, 
was small, personnel and logistic transport for the operation 
against the Germans in the north could be improved in this 
way, and the capacity for transporting vital materials from the 
west would increase decisively. 
6) The enemy troops could be removed from the area north of 
Leningrad. The Finnish decision not to attack, which had held 
good since 1941, was well known, but there was still a hidden 
threat, e.g. by the German V-weapons. After the resolution of 
the Leningrad situation, troops in the area could be used in the 
direction of Central Europe if the Finnish army no longer posed 
a threat to Leningrad. On the other hand, this was the first op-
portunity for an attack on Finland, and the troop concentra-
tions that it required had not been possible until now, when 
the transport routes to Leningrad and the Isthmus were again 
in use. If the troops were taken to Central Europe in between, 
they would have to be brought back to capture Finland, and this 
would take rather a long time and require considerable trans-
portation capacity. 
7) It was thought that the Finnish army had been debilitated by 
the long period of trench warfare. Its training and weaponry 
were poorer than those of the German army, so that a powerful 
attack could be expected to have a swift impact and the troops 
would not be contained on this subsidiary front for long. On 
the other hand, the troops in the Petsamo-Salla direction would 
face a long period of containment. German resistance might 
prove effective and exhausting, and the process of moving the 
attack force to the north would be arduous and slow due to the 
poor condition of the road network. By comparison, the Finns 
could be defeated in a relatively short time. 
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Attacking Finland was not an alien thought for the Soviet leadership 
even during the Continuation War. An attack in this direction had al-
ready been included in the plans of the Soviet General Staff in 1943. 
The question was whether it was rational to carry out such an attack 
and when. It had not been at all obvious that this attack would be 
carried out on the Karelian Isthmus and in Olonets, however. It is 
worth noting that General N.N.Voronov of the artillery, who was the 
representative of the high command of the Soviet Union during the 
operation to break the siege of Leningrad, wrote on 2.2.1944 to com-
rade Ivanov (i.e. Stalin) proposing to limit the area of the Leningrad 
front to the direction of Finland by excluding the Estonian direction. 
He also included thoughts on subduing Finland in his communi-
cation. According to the proposal, the command of the Leningrad 
front would consist of the troops protecting the coast of the Gulf 
of Finland, the army on the Isthmus and the 7th Army (now work-
ing independently in the direction of Svir). Furthermore,"The army 
on the Isthmus must be strengthened, especially with artillery. The 
task of the front is to prepare in two or two and a half months an 
operation to break the Finnish front on the Karelian Isthmus and 
penetrate into Finland. In my view, a decision like this may be ad-
vantageous to us in all circumstances. Merely the preparations for 
prompt action may be successful in forcing the Finns to accept our 
terms. If the Stavka accepts my proposal, I will add to it what kind 
of grouping of the artillery would be useful and what would be the 
possibilities for executing such a mission. The artillery formation de-
ployed on the Karelian Isthmus will practice, but if the need arises, it 
can be used on other fronts." 
Thus Voronov estimated that April would bring a suitable time 
for attacking Finland and that it would be useful to concentrate the 
troops then (since they could be transported through Leningrad and 
would be released from the area east of Leningrad). Stalin still be-
lieved at that point, however, that Finland would accept his condi-
tions for peace without preparations for an offensive of this kind. The 
work of developing the idea was therefore laid to rest until April. 
Pressure was exerted on the Finns during February by means of 
bombings, and Stalin also wanted to advance rapidly into Estonia, 
so that the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland could by taken into 
use in order to apply more pressure on Finland. In a directive is-
sued on 14 February, he emphasized that Narva was to be captured 
by 17 February. "Both the political and the military situation" de- 
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manded this. Nevertheless, the Narva front managed to stay strong. 
On 22 February the Stavka approved a plan for an attack towards 
Riga, and on 4 March 1944 the commander of the front, Govorov, 
made a proposal to the chief of the General Staff that they should 
attack through through Pskov instead of through Narva. This meant 
advancing past Tallinn and operating via Tartu area. 
On 19 February the Stavka gave instructions that — contrary to 
Voronov's proposal - the 7th Army in Svir would on 25 February 
be added to the Karelian Front; a small battle command headquar-
ters would be located in the Kantalahti area and the re-organized 
headquarters of the Karelian Front would commence activities on 1 
March. 87 
Towards Rovaniemi: The ideas of Meretskov in 1944 
General K.A. Meretskov, who had led the attack on the Isthmus dur-
ing the Winter War, now became commander of the Karelian Front. 
He began the planning work enthusiastically, preparing first, from 
mid-February onwards, an attack against the Germans at the level of 
Kantalahti (Kandalaksha) - according to Stalin's orders - and then, 
on 12 March, 1944 a plan for the Front to destroy the Finnish 1st 
Division in the area of the 32nd Army. In connection with this the 
area Karelian Maaselkä — Sayozero - point 175.0 - the south-eastern 
shore of Lake Kommunarov was to be captured. Thus it would be a 
typical front-line operation with short-range goals. 
It was curtly pointed out to Meretskov on 23 March that "no 
attacks in the area of the Karelian Front are being considered for the 
time being, not against the Finns nor against the Germans".ss 
Planning was by no means stopped, however. In April Merets-
kov outlined an attack on Finnish territory by the 32nd Army, direct-
ed at the line Korpiselkä - Värtsilä. This plan, completed by Goro-
lenko of the 32nd Army on 4-5 April 1944, consisted of two options, 
one designed to be carried out with existing troops and the other 
with reinforcements. 
The depth of the operation was 270-405 km and the duration 
was 30 days under the first option and 27 under the second. The 
night before D-day one reconnaissance detachment, no stronger 
than a reinforced battalion, would be in operation for each division 
of the attack group. 
The main attack group would strike between Krivozero - Van- 
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zhozero over a width of 7 km. The supporting attack would take 
place in the direction of Derevna No. 5 - Derevna No. 4 at a width 
of 2 km with one division (less one regiment). The rest of the front 
would engage in defence with one division, two regiments, two bor-
der regiments, one border battalion and the army's machine gun 
battalion. 
The depth of the first phase would be 25 km and its duration 6 
days (D - D+5). The task was to break through the enemy's tactical 
depth, develop an attack, destroy the Finnish MaaseUKä Group, cap-
ture Medvezhegorsk and advance to the line Ostreche - Kalddovary 
- Chebino - Medvezhegorsk. In the second option the task of the 
first phase would be the same (defined by the line Maaselkä - Ostre-
che - Chebino - Medvezhegorsk) and the speed would be 4 km / day 
at first and 12-13 km / day in the second and third phases. 
The task in the second phase of the first option, depth 165-260 
km, duration 15-17 days (D+6 - D+22), was to advance to the line 
Suojärvi - Suojärvi station, cut off the enemy's railway connection 
Petrozavodsk - Suojärvi station - Värtsilä, and capture Suojärvi. The 
task in the second option was the same, but the duration was 12-14 
days (D+6 - D+19). 
The rehiforceiniel ts deeded for the second options of General 
Goreleilko (on 5 April 1944). 
to be acquired 
needed by the 
attack group 
already in existence 
infanti3, division 	 4 	3 	5 
heavy artillery regiment 
of the high command 	 3 	3 
armoured battalion 1 	 1 
mortar regiment 	 1 4 (120 nun) 
rocket launcher regiment (M-8) 	1 
rocket launcher regiment (M-13) 2 
rocket launcher regiment (M-31) 	 2 
engineer brigade 	 1 
engineer battalion 1 
air defence battalion 	 1 	1 
flame-thrower company 2 
mixed air division 	 1 
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The third phase, depth 90-120 km, was aimed at capturing the 
line Korpiselkä - Vartsilä. The duration of the prepared attack would 
be 3-4 days, and the total duration of the third phase would be 7 days 
(in the first option D+23 - D+29 and in the second D+20 - D+26). 
In the first option an (376th) armoured battalion would be as-
signed to the 289th Division and the 47th Armoured Train Battery 
would support one regiment of the 176th Division, covering theVe-
likaya Guba - Maaselkä - Raz. 14 road and operating 2 km north-
west of Maaselkä.89 
Even though Meretskods main attention was focused on the 
north, this did not mean that preparations for an attack in the south-
ern area would be neglected. On the contrary, in accordance with his 
instructions of 29 March, an attack plan for the 7th Army, operating 
in the area of Svir was already completed by 19 April. The basic idea 
— a hard strike parallel to the coast of Lake Ladoga towards Sortavala 
— was the same as was taken in June.90 
By March 1944 the Soviet leadership had noticed that if the 
Finns were to withdraw from the war, the Germans would try to 
fight in Finland, especially in the southern parts of the country and 
on the Åland Islands. In that case battles would be fought on Finn-
ish territory. In this context the two main enemy defence lines were 
defined as "1. The bay of Virolahti - Järvelä - Hurtala - Parkkala -
Ylijäivi - Möttö - Nuppola - Lappeenranta. 2. Rakila - Kouvola sta-
tion". These lines were of importance when evaluating the chances 
of the Germans continuing to fight in Finland. This is evident from 
the instructions received by the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Ad-
miral Tributs from Admiral Kuznetsov on 31 March, reminding him 
that the Germans could significantly increase their naval strength in 
the Gulf of Finland and that operating in the Finnish archipelago as 
the Red Army advanced would be difficult and would require careful 
planning. The operational area and depth of the Baltic Fleet would 
increase. 
At the same time the Northern Fleet was given the task of pre-
paring (by 15 April) for the capture of the German bases in Varang-
erfjord in summer as the Red Army advanced to the west.' 
The planning for the Viipuri and the Sortavala operations 
It was not until the tentative peace talks with Finland became more 
protracted and finally broke down that the direction of the attack was 
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turned against the Finns instead of the Germans, the decision in this 
respect being made on 19-20 April. The General Staff justified such 
a solution with the fact that it would be easier to beat the Finns than 
the Germans and that defeating the Finns would open up the Ger-
man flank. Their possibilities of withdrawing from Finland through 
Oulu, Kemi and Tornio by sea and to Norway over land would have 
weakened. It may be that the idea was to advance through the west-
ern arm of Finland to Norway and attack the German rear. 
The General Staff thus around 17-20 April proposed a mass 
attack on Finland and Stalin accepted the proposal (put actually 
forward by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, A.I. Antonov). 
Shtemenko's account would seem to suggest that Stalin was al-
ready considering a solution of this kind in late March, at least for 
the Karelian Front. In his memoirs, Zhukov placed the decision - to 
regard the Isthmus and Petrozavodsk as the first phases of the sum-
mer plan - in the period 22-28 April, perhaps 24-26 April. 
There are nevertheless indications that preparations for the at-
tack had commenced earlier. In accordance with a proposal made 
in March, the area of responsibility of the commander of the Lenin-
grad Front, General Govorov, was narrowed down in the south on 
18 April so that he could concentrate on the directions of Narva and 
Finland. The decision gained its incentive from the preparations for 
an operation in the Baltic direction. When instructing the Leningrad 
Front on 19 April - still about defence - the Stavka ordered defenc-
es on the Isthmus in particular to be strengthened. The 23rd Army 
would receive two divisions as reserves, and a few days later, on 21 
April, Leningrad was notified that the headquarters and troops of 
the 23rd Artillery Division would be moved to the area, in addition 
to other artillery troops. On 28th April the staff of the 21st Army was 
given to the Leningrad front.92 
The final instructions to the front commands regarding the 
direction of the attack were given on 27 May and 1 June. Merets-
kov had (Map 11) considered that - as the Finnish defence relied 
on the Germans - the Germans should be attacked and that, the 
attack should be directed against the northern part of Finland, be-
tween Kantalahti and Kestenga, proceeding through Rovaniemi to 
the Kemi-Oulu area. Only after the German 20th Army had been 
dispersed would the Finns be attacked again. The Red Army did not 
have the strength to fight both at the same time, he said. If the Finns 
were attacked first, the emphasis would have to be directed at the 
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Map 11. The proposed operation to separate the German and Finnish 
armies (March 1944) 
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area of Medvezhegorsk (Karhumäki) (while elsewhere the focus 
would be on defence). Clearly the idea was based on the previously 
mentioned plan made in early April. Thus Meretskov was suggesting 
to Stalin in vain that the strengthening of the front should take place 
in the Medvezhegorsk direction. 
Meretskov's memoirs give the impression that it was not until 
this point that he was told of the change that moved the emphasis 
on the Karelian Front to the south, against the Finns. Furthermore, 
the front was only to support the operation on the Karelian Isthmus, 
where the attack would begin on 10 June, to be followed by another 
on Svir two weeks later. A reason for this order of importance was 
that the roads in Olonets were expected to recover from the frost 
later than those on the Isthmus, so that transportation of the assault 
troops would be completed later. Roads, railways and water trans-
port could be used more effectively on the Isthmus, where a power-
ful attack was expected to break the Finns' defensive will and remove 
the Finnish army from Eastern Karelia, so that it would be possible 
to advance to Olonets with a relatively smaller body of troops. If the 
Germans moved troops from the north to assist the Finns, an attack 
would have to be commenced in the north as well - mainly from the 
directions of Kantalahti and Kestenga.93  
The attack plan for the Leningrad Front was almost completed 
- Govorov's directive had already been completed on 3 May - but 
the decision for the Karelian Front was not made until 11 June. Mer-
etskov was still presenting his plans in Moscow when 20 shots were 
fired with 224 cannons to celebrate the capture of Terijoki, the"capi-
tal" of Finland during the Winter War. Now, despite the opposition 
of the General Staff, Stalin promised him one more army corps (the 
94th Army Corps) to continue the attack after the breakthrough in 
the Svir Area. 
Despite the approval Stalin gave to the attack to be carried out 
on both sides of Lake Ladoga, it is evident that he was still keep-
ing a close eye on the situation in Lapland in particular. Meretskov 
received repeated orders (in March, May and June) not to weaken 
the northern flank of the front that was facing the Germans. The 
readiness of the armies there would have to be maintained and the 
Germans must be attacked if they tried to move their troops south-
wards. As late as 18 June, when the attack on Svir was beginning, 
Stalin gave a direct order to increase activity in the direction of Ru-
kajärvi (Rugozero) as well. This was a deviation from the plan. On 
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20 June Meretskov ordered the 32nd Army to take the 27th Division 
into action as well.94 
Concealment and surprise 
The most puzzling of the ifs and buts in the Finnish discussion about 
the events of summer 1944 have been concerned with whether the 
Finns expected a mass attack on the Isthmus and why troops were 
not moved from East Karelia to the Isthmus in readiness for this. In 
all likelihood it would not have been possible to gain any very early 
warning of the plan, definitely not in March or April. The transporta-
tion of the attack troops actually commenced quite late, the artillery 
being brought to the Isthmus mostly on 25th May — 3rd June, and the 
three army corps on 5-7th June — some by rail and most by sea.95 
Time table of the preparations in the Karelian Isthmus 
Order In effect 
Deception plan 20.4. 
Demonstrative landing via Ladoga 10.6. 11.6.) 
Informing the commanders 3.5 and 13.5. 
Battle reconnaissance 28.5. 6.6. 
Aerial photographs 30.5.,5.-8.6 
Gathering the forces 28.5. 
Arrival of the 3rd Artillery Corps — 10.5.- 
98. and 108.Corps to be kept behind the lines 3.5. 
97.Corps by rail 4.-8.6. 
30. Guards Corps and 109.Corps over the sea 4.-8.6. 
110. Corps included 1.6. 
Regrouping of the supporting artillery 28.5. - 3.6. 
Bringing the artillery of infantry divisions 28.5. 2.-5.6. 
Bringing the artillery of the regiments 28.5. 5.-8.6. 
Bringing the rear troops 28.5. 5.-8.6. 
Moving into 2nd line 3.6. --8.6. 
Moving into starting positions 3.6. [9.6.] 
Readiness for landing on the southern 
coast of Isthmus (224.D) 3.6. 
Readiness for transporting a division by sea 23.5. (30.5.) 
Air support 
Bomber divisions ..., 6.6. 4-5.6.,9.-10.6. 
Sturmoviks 5.6. 14.6. 
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When the decision to attack had been made in principle - in 
late April -, the Soviet army also began a determined deception 
campaign to give the impression that the attack would be direct-
ed towards Petsamo. On 20 April the Stavka instructed the Kare-
lian Front to spread misinformation that an attack on Petsamo and 
Kirkenes (including a landing at Berlevåg) was being prepared. Sim-
ilar misinformation concerning the Baltic region was also put about 
on 20 April.9e 
Thus it may be said that it would have been possible for the 
Finns to detect the beginning of an attack early enough to change 
their sporting gear for fighting gear — as it is said that they were 
holding sports competitions at the time when the attack began — but 
no advance warning could have been obtained that would have en-
abled the Finnish army to have shifted the emphasis of its deploy-
ment decisively to the Isthmus. 
The objectives of the offensive 
The minimum goal of the mass attacks on the Isthmus and in Svir 
can be deduced from the fact that the defined annual objective of the 
Soviet military command for the year 1944 was to repel the enemy 
forces from Soviet territory. hz Finland's case this meant that the So-
viet Union could stop at the 1940 borders while saving face. Further-
more, the goal was not, at least in military documents, to incorporate 
Finland into the Soviet Union. The objective was to ensure the Red 
Navy of free passage out of the Gulf of Finland and enable the Red 
Army to attack the Germans' flank in the north. 
According to the Soviet literature, the aim of the Leningrad 
Front was to destroy the main Finnish forces with an attack in the 
general direction of Valkeasaari - Viipuri - Lappeenranta and to cre-
ate a"real threat" directed at the most important population centres 
of southern Finland from the north-western and western sides of 
Viipuri. The task of the Svir - Petrozavodsk operation was to car-
ry out its main attack roughly parallel to the eastern shore of Lake 
Ladoga, disperse the main forces of the Finnish Aunus (Olonets) 
group, capture South Karelia (which probably meant the parts of 
Karelia around Lake Ladoga) and create preconditions for a later 
attack on the inner parts of Finland. The wording was"expose to an 
attack" and "create a threat". These terms as used in the literature 
had probably been inspected by the post-war political censorship, 
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but it is nevertheless likely that they appeared in the original text as 
well. This claim is supported by the fact that the battle report of the 
Karelian Front, drawn up in 1944, contains a similar expression: the 
offensive was intended to advance to the line Tiiksjärvi - Ilomantsi 
- Värtsilä - Sortavala and"create preconditions for expanding the at-
tack into the inner parts of Finland". 
The words "create preconditions" show that the Soviet leader-
ship expected to bring Finland under control without any serious 
resistance, at least in the latter stages. It is understandable that Sta-
lin did not want to use too large a proportion of his forces to defeat 
Finland, as they were desperately needed elsewhere. He is reported 
to have said to Meretskov in June that the Finns would give up when 
the troops of the Karelian Front arrived at Loimola, and he undoubt-
edly believed that Finland's defence and political resistance would 
collapse once its army had been crushed in the field.97 
By 30 May 1944 the operative thoughts of the Soviet supreme 
command had turned to the"Map relating to plan No. 4081", a large 
map drawn up by the General Staff in its final form, to a scale of 1:1 
million, on which the goals of all the operations planned to take 
place (in phases) in European Russia in 1944 were marked. On this 
map the goal of the Leningrad Front was to advance to the line Kot-
ka - Kouvola, while that of the Karelian Front was the line Tiiksjärvi 
- Ilomantsi — Sortavala, and from there by the shortest route to the 
level ofVärtsilä-Parikkala. 
The line defined by the River Kymi was naturally a carefully con-
sidered goal. Since it was a waterway, it was a natural place to stop 
and assume a defensive position if needed. If the line were reached, 
the Finns' defence line built in 1940-1944, which was referred to in 
1944 as Suomen salpa (i.e. the Bolt of Finland) or Salpa line (i.e. 
the Bolt Line), would also have been broken and its southern part 
would be in the hands of the Soviet troops. The River Kymi — as we 
have seen — was also considered as a possible line of defence for the 
Germans if Finland would leave the war. 
There were three intermediate lines to be achieved in both di-
rections. On the Isthmus the Finns' front position (past Raivola) was 
to be broken first up to the former Mannerheim-line in the western 
part of the Isthmus, followed by an advance to the area north of Vii-
puri and Heinjoki, and then to the level of Virolahti-Imatra, and after 
that through the Salpa line all the way to the River Kymi. In the same 
way the 7th Army was to break the Finnish front position in Olonets, 
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Map 12, The idea of retaking Viipuri in June 1944 
pass the town of the same name and then advance to the line Pit-
käranta-Petrozavodsk. The task of the 32nd Army, advancing from 
Medvezhegorsk was far more modest (but so was its strength). 
The intermediate border between the Karelian and Leningrad 
fronts was on the Stavkå s orders defined to pass along the southern 
and western shores of Lake Ladoga and then to the north of a line 
Tervus - Elisenvaara - Tainionkoski - Lappeenranta - Lahti. It is sig-
nificant that nothing was planned for the area north of Salpausselkä 
(the lake district of Finland). The importance of covering the right 
flank of the main attack direction was recalled at least by the Viipuri 
phase, for the Winter War at the latest had drawn the attention of the 
Soviet leadership to the problems related to this lake area as combat 
terrain. 
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The goal of the main force of the strike (Map 12) on the Lenin-
grad Front (the 21st Army) was to capture Viipuri, because this inter-
section of roads and railways was estimated to be central to the Finn-
ish defences. Viipuri had to be reached on 18-20 June. After crossing 
the Mannerheim Line, the 23rd Army fighting in the eastern part 
of the Isthmus was to concentrate a significant past of its forces on 
its left flank, towards Viipuri. The 21st Army had in its ranks in the 
beginning 9 divisions which were supported by 12 artillery brigades, 
14 artillery regiments, 5 tank regiments and 3 assault gun regiments, 
and the 23rd Army had 6 divisions, which were supported by one 
artillery brigade, 3 artillery regiments, one tank regiment and one as-
sault gun regiment. In the next phase three more divisions and more 
artillery and tanks were to be given to the 23rd Army.93  
The mass attack begins 
The first phase of the attack took place very much at the planned 
speed, but the Finnish army could not be defeated and its defences 
had not fallen at once. The situation had to be re-evaluated. As early 
as 17 June the 23rd Army received an order to advance towards Vii-
puri on the western bank of the RiverVuoksi, with emphasis on the 
left flank. It would have to attack to the village Repola and advance 
around Viipuri on the northern side, just as at the end of the Winter 
War. Immediately before the capture ofViipuri, in the early morning 
of 20 June, the war council of the Leningrad Front gave the 21st Army 
the task of advancing from the area Kämärä hovi — Säiniö — Sommee 
to the line Kavantsaari-Juustila-Tienhaara by 21 June and the 23rd 
Army orders to advance at the same time from the Kyläpaakkola-
Heinjoki area towards north-west to the line Kuukauppi-Kavant-
saari station.99 
We are told that Stalin paid special attention to the Finnish 
front on 18-19 June. The attack from Svir was ordered to begin on 
20/21 June, five days earlier than originally planned (Map 13). The 
Svir attack would contain the Finnish troops in Eastern Karelia and 
ensure that they would not reach the Käkisalmi area and penetrate 
to the flank of the Soviet troops beyond Viipuri. On 18 June Stalin 
told Meretskov that he expected that the right flank and centre of 
the front would not be weakened, and the later, in turn, gave an 
order to the Ladoga naval detachment on 18 June 1944 for a landing 
in the Finnish rear. goo 
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The mass attack on the Isthmus did not end after the capture of 
Viipuri, either, and the supreme command of the Red Army decided 
to continue the attack. On 21 June it moved its objective (as defined 
in an earlier general order) to the line of River Kymi. During the first 
phase, the troops had to force their way to the level ofVirojoki - Lap-
peenranta - Imatra in one week and in the direction of Elisenvaara -
Kilkisalmi on the north side of the Vuoksi, in order to clear the north-
eastern part of the Isthmus. Then the main forces would advance to 
the west and north-west to reach the level of Kotka - Kouvola. The 
northern flank had to be secured in the direction of Lappeenranta. 
As the front line was expected to lengthen considerably, a new army 
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Map 13. The idea of the Svir Sortavala operation in June 1944 
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headquarters (the 59th Army) was made available to the Leningrad 
Front. 
The decision of the war council of the Leningrad Front on 21 
June calculated that five army corps should reach the level Nisalahti 
- Lainela - Nuijamaa - Enso by 24 June and that the attack would be 
continued to Imatra, Lappeenranta and Suurpäälä with eight army 
corps from three armies, and also north-west to Hiitola and, with 
a separate army corps, in the direction of Käkisalmi, crossing the 
Vuoksi at Kiviniemi. The war council considered it necessary to have 
reinforcements, and asked for two army corps and special troops, 30 
tanks, 30 assault cannons and enough trucks to service the increas-
ing maintenance connections. Stalin promised material reinforce-
ments but not the two army corps. The front would have to manage 
with what it had already. At the same time (on 22 June) the supreme 
command retained the 94th Army Corps located on the south-east-
ern side of Lake Ladoga as a reserve for the Karelian Front, appar-
ently preparing to use it on the west side of Lake Ladoga. Because 
the Finns were withdrawing their troops from Eastern Karelia, there 
did not seem to be any need to direct reinforcements to Olonets, 
where it was difficult to advance. 
The order given to the 21st Army (Map 14) required the cre-
ation of a bridgehead immediately on 21 June and continuation of 
the attack westwards from Viipuri. The army took Lappeenranta as 
its main direction, and the western direction along the coastal road 
to Helsinki seems to have been a minor one. The objectives of the 
three army corps destined to continue the attack were defined on 
22 June as follows: Närvi for the 109th Army Corps, Nuijamaa for 
the 97th Army Corps and Lappeenranta for the 108th Army Corps. 
The 23rd Army was now supposed to attack Antrea in the direction 
of Vuoksi and then proceed through Kavantsaari to the north-west. 
In order to reach Antrea, the army sought to achieve the line of the 
road on the eastern side of the Vuoksi. 
By the end of June the Red Army on the Isthmus had given up 
trying to cross the Saimaa canal at Viipuri and the goal was now to 
try to cross it further north. An even larger concentration was now 
located at Tali-Ihantala, and another wedge of the attack was con-
centrated further south for the crossing of Viipuri Bay. The attempt of 
the 23rd Army at crossing a destroyed bridge at Kiviniemi ended on 
26 June, after which the army corps in the area was concentrated at 
Vuosalmi to attempt another crossing.'°' 
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Map 14. The idea of continuing the attack to the River Kymi in June 
1944 
The changing ideas in July 1944 
Once the advance had slowed down, the higher headquarters were 
forced to send more troops to the Isthmus. Six divisions were with-
drawn from the Isthmus on 5-7 July and another six on 14-15 July. 
The first withdrawal did not actually mean the end of the attack, but 
merely a rotation. During the period 15 June — 4 July, while the attack 
was still going on, five divisions had been added to the armies in the 
Isthmus, and four more divisions had already been brought to the 
area by 8-9 July, when the Leningrad Front was re-organizing its at-
tack. In June-July the troops there were strengthened by the arrival of 
the 94th Army Corps (three divisions) from the Stavka's reserves and 
the 43rd Corps headquarters brought in from the Leningrad Front 
south of the Gulf of Finland, as well as four divisions. The area of 
operation of the 59th Army headquarters, which had been brought 
to the Isthmus, had to be changed, and it was this body of troops 
that received the task of crossing Viipuri Bay. The map exercise it had 
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played out on 25-27 June had been directed at the Lappeenranta 
area, but the assignment it received on 2 July required the capture of 
islands of Gulf ofViipuri, then the area Tervajoki. — Peltola - Nisalahti, 
and finally to Tienhaara (to the west of Viipuri). Fierce battles were 
fought over the islands on 4-5 July. 
On 6 July the command at the front ordered the Baltic Fleet 
to prepare for a landing of two divisions on 12 July on the western 
bank ofViipuri Bay and for the transfer of a third division across the 
bay a few days later. The crossing began on 9 July, but was held up 
by the Finnish resistance. As late as 8 July the 21st Army fighting 
in Ihantala received an order to begin a new attack on 10 July. The 
army's goal had been set at the level ofAntrea- Kananoja-Tienhaara, 
more modestly than before, but the achieving of this line would have 
provided better conditions for continuing the attack than the front 
formed during the battle. 
During the same phase the 23rd Army was diverted toVuosalmi. 
The emphasis defined earlier by the front - first to north and north-
west and then to the north-east - had shifted at least temporarily 
to the area east of the River Vuoksi. The crossing of the Vuoksi and 
establishing of a bridgehead took place on 9 July, after two weeks of 
battles following the dispatch of the 115th Army Corps to the area 
from the south. 
The first half of July was a decisive culmination phase for the 
attack on the Isthmus. The heavy losses suffered by the Red Army 
in Ihantala, Viipuri Bay and Vuosalmi showed that immediate re-
sults were not to be expected. The losses were at their greatest on 
27 June — 3 July, a total of 19 000 men, 18 000 men in the Tali-Ihan-
tala area, 900 men in that ofVuosalmi and approximately 250 men 
in Viipuri Bay, and the situation did not improve during the follow-
ing week, as the losses of the Red Army on 4-10 July amounted to 
14 800 men, 8 700 in the Vuosalmi area, 3 900 in that of Ihantala 
and 2 200 inViipuri Bay. 
The forces were now too exhausted to fight, and on 9 July the 
headquarters of the 21st Army received an order to give up the 
planned attack for the time being. A separate order for its recorn-
mencement would be issued later. A similar order was sent to the 
59th Army in Viipuri Bay on 10 July, to stop the landing for the mo-
ment and defend the islands in the bay.'°2 
After the first week of July the Stavka's faith in the abilities of 
the commander of the Leningrad Front, L. Govorov, to continue the 
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attack faded rapidly. Attacks in various directions were cancelled, 
and in the early hours of 12 July Lieutenant General Gryzlov wrote 
in a memo that Marshal Govorov had received at midnight on 11 
Jasly "a personal order from Comrade Stalin during the session of 
the Stavka to assume the defensive on the Isthmus". It appears that 
Govorov had tried even in Moscow to offer explanations for his de-
sire to continue the attack, but the answer had been a clear"no". A 
month was enough. 
Govorov was allowed to strengthen the Vuosalmi bridgehead, 
however, to expand the bridgehead in Vuosalmi area, and the 6th 
Army Corps, which had previously been sent to the north-west, was 
brought back to the Äyräpää area on 10-14 July. On 13 July Govorov 
gave an order to the 23rd Army to destroy the Finnish formations 
fighting to the south and west of Myllyoja, bring (13 — 14th July) 
another corps (6th) overVuoksi river and begin there a general at-
tack in the morning of 15th July and to advance to a line on Vuoksi 
from Noisniemi to the mouth of Rapaoja stream and then Rapao-
ja — Kivijärvi — Hernemaa — Korpilahti — Salo-Kekkelä. In the next 
phase an area to the line Räisälä — Inkil5 — Arvtrea should be seized. 
For this operation six divisions, four artillery brigades, three artillery 
regiments, four anti tamt artillery regiments, on mortar brigade, two 
rocket launcher regiments, three tank regiments and three assault 
gun regiments were available. 
On the other hand, the 59th Army, preparing for crossing of 
the Gulf of Viipuri, was on 13 July ordered to abandon its offensive 
and prepare for another one. This army included three divisions, one 
artillery brigade, one artillery regiment, one anti tank brigade, one 
mortar brigade and one tank battalion. Even the 21st Army was or-
dered to stand down and to settle "temporarily" down to defend 
the lines. It still had 12 divisions, nine artillery brigades, three artil-
lery regiments, one anti tank regiment, four mortar regiments, one 
battalion of rocket launchers, three heavy artillery battalions, three 
tank regiments and two assault gun regiments. The front staff had in 
reserve one more infantry corps in the Karelian Isthmus. 
When the new attack began on 14 July in Vuosalmi area, an 
order was given to shift the border between the 21st and the 23rd 
Armies eastwards so that almost the entire strength of the 23rd Army 
was in the Vuosalmi area. Fortification troops remained at the fronts 
in Taipale and Suvanto. So the battles in that area continued for two 
three days, partly with fresh troops. The losses of the Red Army on 
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the Isthmus on 11-17 July were a further 8 200 men, of whom 6 400 
fell in the Vuosalmi area, but the situation calmed down after that. 
The 23rd Army grouped for defence on 16 July.'o3  
The attack dies down 
In summer 1944 the Red Army used a total of 54 divisions, 11 infan-
try brigades and 7 fortification areas on the Finnish front, i.e. 72 all-
arms formations. Theoretically the number was much greater than 
that at the end of the Winter War, but since the size of a division had 
decreased throughout the Continuation War, the overall strength of 
the Soviet troops at the start of the attack - 605 000 men - was actu-
ally less than the one million men in action there in February 1940. 
On the other hand, the firepower of the infantry was now on a com-
pletely new level compared with the Winter War. 
It is possible to follow the weakening of the attack force and the 
resulting defeats from the war journals and the daily reports of the 
armies, army corps and divisions that fought on the Finnish front. 
The information has not been verified, of course, but it undoubtedly 
points in the right direction. The Red Army lost approximately 25 000 
men on the Isthmus in early July, during the battles of Tali - Ihantala 
andVuosalmi, i.e. the strength of three divisions and the remaining 
strength of a fourth division. Clear indications of the end of the mass 
attack were the withdrawals of troops from the front. 
The objective of the Karelian Front was still far from having 
been achieved, and the attempt was continued in that direction. On 
12 July, after reaching the Finns' U position, Meretskov ordered the 
7th Army to reach the line Sortavala - Matkaselkä on 25 July and the 
32nd Army to be at the line Koitere — Ilomantsi - Tuupovaara on 20 
July. The next day, 13 July, his appetite grew, and he demanded that 
the Matkaselkä -Sortavala line should be reached by 20 July and the 
Ilomantsi - Korpisellcä line by 16 July. The 37th Guards Corps was 
to speed up the pursuit of the Finns, so that they would not have 
time to settle down in a temporary position. The idea was that the 
32nd Army would turn its attack towards Värtsilä from Korpiselkä 
and from there to the south, to the rear of the Finnish grouping in 
Sortavala. While carrying out this idea, two Soviet divisions ended 
up by being encircled in Ilomantsi. 
There was an attempt to speed up the attack by means of an 
order issued on 13 July, which insisted that the 127th Light Army 
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Corps that had been attached to the 7th Army from the front reserve 
should capture Matkaselkä on 18-19 July. The Finns fended off these 
attempts with the battles that culminated in Nietjärvi, for example. 
Here the Karelian Front defined much more modest objectives that 
were limited to the level Uuksujäivi - Kitelä. The attack continued 
until 30 July, but by that time all the forces that the 7th Army could 
spare had to be sent in the direction of Ilomantsi to stabilize the 
Soviet front. 
In the operative calculations of the Karelian Front the duration 
of the operation was to have been 35-45 days,104 and the operation 
really did last 45 days. It is evident that logistics had not been reserved 
for any longer operation. In the Karelian front staff a new operative 
idea was put on the paper on 10 July for an operation through the 
area of the Great Finnish lakes. According to this calculation (Map 
15), objectives to the west of Mikkeli would have been reached by 28 
August, in another seven weeks.105 
It must be remembered that the primary question was not Fin-
land's future position as a state, but the elimination of the Finnish 
army from the war so that the Red Army's forces could be concen-
trated against the Germans in Belorussia and in Lapland. When the 
situation could not be resolved, the Soviet high command abandoned 
their Finnish front to manage as well as it could, without sending it 
any further reinforcements and withdrawing from it in mid-July and 
early August the troops that were needed to broaden the main at-
tack. The attack ended on 15 July on the Isthmus, on 4 August in 
the Lake Ladoga area and a few days later in Ilomantsi. The orders 
which took the guards corps and an important part of artillery away 
from the Karelian front were given on 1.-2.8. 
The plans made by Karelian front were as yet not taken into 
consideration by the General Staff, because riot enough attention 
had been given to crushing the Finns in the Rugozero (Rukajäivi) 
— Andronova Gora direction and to the stabilization of the Ilomantsi 
direction. Then, following the orders of the high command given on 
10 August, the troops of the Karelian Front that had participated in 
the main attack were grouped for defence along the line Paatene 
- Kudom Guba — Kuolismaa - Pitkäranta. This was confirmed by an 
order of Stavka on 29 August, just two days after some arrangements 
had been made in the staff of the Karelian front, including the sack-
ing of the chief of staff and the chief of operation department.106 
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At the time of the armistice 
Finnish devotees of military history have contemplated at length 
whether the Finnish troops in August 1944 would have been suf-
ficient for a counter-attack to push the Soviet forces further away, 
perhaps even to the 1939 borders. 
Despite the losses it had suffered, the Red Army was not pow-
erless on the Isthmus. There were 150 000 men there from mid-July 
onwards, and 240 000 men along the eastern border of Finland. The 
Soviet divisions that had been worn down by the attacks on the Isth-
mus - 18 divisions remained in addition to the three fortification ar-
eas - were moved away from the front to rest and to be replenished 
during July.1 ' The overall strength of the Finns and the Germans 
exceeded the Soviet strength along Finland's borders, but in all like-
lihood the Red Army had more firepower. 
Under no circumstances did the Red Army let itself believe that 
the threat coming from the Finnish direction was negligible. An ex-
tensive order to defend was given to the troops on the Isthmus in 
mid-August, and fortification work was carefully supervised. On 23 
August the 115th Army Corps in Vuoksi received an order to prepare 
for a counter-attack, and they were preparing to counter a surprise 
attack on the north-eastern shore of Lake Ladoga as well. The 7th 
Army located there was prepared in late August to fend off a landing 
on the coast between Pitkäranta and Svir.1°8 Even though the orders 
do not reveal the actual readiness of the troops, it can be said that 
it would not have been easy for the Finns to achieve any element of 
surprise. 
Just before the agreed moment of armistice the Red Army made 
preparations for a situation where the Finns had ceased hostilities 
but there was no armistice according to the Soviet government. Late 
at night on 4 September the war council of the Leningrad Front sent 
an operative directive to the commanders of the armies operating 
in the Finnish direction (the 23rd, the 21st and 59th Armies) stat-
ing that operations on the Isthmus would not be stopped without a 
separate order. The armies would continue the determined defence 
of their positions, and prepare to move onto the attack if the Finns 
started withdrawing. 
As soon as the Finns withdrew they had to be followed with 
vanguards prepared for the task (5 September). The main forces of 
the three armies mentioned above were to move onto the attack. 
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The 23rd Army would attack with two army corps in the directions of 
Kiviniemi, Käkisalmi, Elisenvaara andVuosalmi and then advance to 
the 1940 border along the line Tarvajärvi - Vuoksi. Until the comple-
tion of the defences on the border, the 17th Fortification Area had 
to be left along the line Taipaleenjoki - Suvantojärvi - Vuoksi and 
one infantry division had to be present to defend the bridgehead at 
Vuoksi (i.e.Vuosalmi). 
The 21st Army was to attack with the strength of three army 
corps in the directions of Joutseno - Lappeenranta, theViipuri - Si-
mola railway andTienhaara - Säkkijärvi - Salojärvi, and to advance to 
the 1940 state border along the line Enso (excl.) - the northern coast 
of the Gulf of Finland (including the islands in the area of Pajsaari). 
Each army corps had to leave one division to defend the current 
front area until the border defences were complete. Their task was 
to secure the main direction of the front (from the left) Repola — Tali 
- Viipuri. 
The vanguards of the 59th Army were to capture Tervajoki, 
Nisalahti and Vilajoki and hold them until the 21st Army arrived. 
The main forces of the 59th army would be grouped (under a sepa-
rate order) in the area south of Viipuri to prepare to move along the 
shore on the Gulf of Finland, following the 21st Army. One divi-
sion and two machinegun -- artillery battalions (subordinated to the 
army corps, but belonging to the fortification troops) would be left 
to defend the islands inViipuri Bay. 
On arriving at the state border, the troops were to organize 
their defence, and the border should not be crossed until a separate 
order was given. No more troops would be available on the Finnish 
front and ahead of them was the "Bolt Line", which was known to 
be strong. The leaving of troops at existing defence lines suggests 
that Marshal Govorov was not quite convinced of the success of the 
attack if the Finns were to show some activity. (In practice, the Finn-
ish decision-makers had not even thought of any action under the 
circumstances, although the headquarters had considered attacking 
the flank and rear of the Soviet troops across the Vuoksi from the 
Eastern Isthmus.) 
The solution had in principle to be ready by the morning of 5 
September 1944, but the situation had changed by then.109 The So-
viet leadership considered that it had received the full response that 
it required from Finland and the armistice was effective. The purpose 
of the directive issued on 4 September had actually been to act as a 
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temporary solution and replace the armistice and peace agreement. 
The Soviets expected the Finns to withdraw to the level of the Treaty 
of Moscow in any case. 
The Finns had thought in spring 1944 that the Soviet Union 
was not interested in attacking, and that Finland could remain on 
the sidelines, standing"at ease" and waiting for peace (in which case 
the word of the western nations might have carried more weight 
than in the presence of hostilities). The decision made by Govorov 
on 4 September suggests that a similar thought of standing"at ease" 
had been in his mind as well, although the act of moving the 59th 
Arthy to the second echelon showed that he was nevertheless pre-
pared to advance across state borders. It is very possible that this 
operation plan would have been the actual idea of an offensive plan, 
should one been needed in September 1944. 
The emphasis in the planning of the Karelian front at the end of 
August 1944 shifted to the north, and plans for occupying Lapland 
(Map 16) and attacking through Petsamo to Norway 1° were in pro-
cess when the hostilities ceased on 5 September 1944. 
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